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SUMMARY 
 
The central objective of this thesis is to investigate, understand and explain the 
conditions under which the administrative problem known as potentially avoidable 
failure induced demand (PAFID) arises in UK public services and might be prevented. 
PAFID is defined as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by earlier failures, 
such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and potentially 
avoidable demands to impinge upon public services”. A secondary objective of the 
thesis is to establish how, and under what better conditions, the public sector could 
successfully exploit the management paradigm called Lean thinking, as an alternative to 
the current New Public Management method, in order to address the PAFID problem. 
 
An analysis of the results from three case-studies conducted in UK local authority 
settings confirms that nearly half of all customer contacts in high-volume services such 
as housing benefits are potentially avoidable. The extrapolation of this finding to the 
contact volumes and handling costs in one UK council alone suggests possible savings 
of more than £1 million a year. The potential benefits that are available to the case-study 
councils and nearly 500 other local councils, together with numerous other providers of 
UK public services, are also very substantial.  
 
A variety of conceptual lenses are applied to the PAFID problem in order to generate 
alternative explanations and policy options. This thesis makes a number of contributions 
to public sector management theory and practice, including the finding that councils 
might reduce principal-agent problems that add to PAFID by espousing more supportive 
and enabling environments, and by adopting systems-oriented approaches that 
acknowledge the complex and subjective nature of real-world problems. The findings 
also suggest that, while the deployment of Lean ‘tools’ can result in short-term savings 
and performance improvements, the adoption of Lean thinking as a comprehensive 
management approach is more likely to bring about fundamental changes. 
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CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
 
UK central government is constantly seeking to focus scarce resources on priority 
public services such as health and education. In recent decades, the struggle to control 
rising expenditure, meet increasing customer expectations and counter declining public 
satisfaction has been waged under the banner of New Public Management (NPM).  
NPM espouses public sector reform through the application of private sector techniques 
such as market testing, service automation, performance management and the 
incentivisation of staff. Government has invested heavily in, and placed a high degree of 
reliance upon, one particular strand of NPM philosophy: the e-Government agenda. 
This mandates the increasing deployment of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT)1 in public sector services to improve performance and reduce costs. 
 
However, in this thesis, I argue that the e-Government agenda is unlikely to deliver 
improvements and savings on the scale (or in the timescales) mandated by central 
government. Among the explanations identified in this research are: in recent 
experience, ICT projects are more likely to fail than to succeed; insufficient attention 
has been paid to information security; and high levels of government investment are not 
sustainable.  
 
The NPM method is widely perceived as being harmful to government IT performance. 
For example, e-Government is characterised as a prescriptive, top-down approach that 
has resulted in conformance to centrally imposed targets, instead of producing genuine 
performance to desired standards. Consequently, I assert that ICT-based systems built 
upon modernist managerial assumptions alone cannot be relied upon to produce the 
required changes and that alternative solutions are needed. I also maintain that 
government’s approach to ICT is disguising the potential of other less costly and lower 
risk solutions. For example, this dissertation will provide evidence to show that a 
significant proportion of the many customer contacts that impinge upon some UK 
public services are caused by previous failures that might have been prevented. The 
name potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) is used to describe these 
transactions, which are defined here as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated 
                                                          
1 Technology that captures, stores, processes, transmits and displays data and information electronically. 
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by earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional 
and potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services”. 
 
The central objective of this research is to investigate, understand and explain the 
conditions under which PAFID arises in UK public sector services and how it might be 
prevented. A secondary objective is to explore the potential applicability in the public 
sector of a new management approach called Lean thinking as a means of managing 
PAFID. The three Research Questions that this dissertation addresses are: 
 
Q1. What is potentially avoidable failure induced demand and why does it occur in 
public service delivery? 
 
Q2. What does an examination of the failure mode tell us about improving the 
exchange process, diagnosing avoidable failure and resolving it ‘ex ante’? 
 
Q3.     How and under what better conditions could the public sector successfully 
exploit Lean thinking in order to manage potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand? 
 
I employed a case-study approach, because it provides a flexible research design that 
accommodates both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Put simply, it was 
anticipated that quantitative research would reveal what was happening but that 
qualitative research would be needed to explain why. The research focused upon 
selected sub-components of public agencies, namely housing and council tax benefits 
services administered by local councils on behalf of central government in England. 
Local councils are more bounded in terms of size and policy than central government 
services and there was anecdotal evidence (described in Chapter 2) that housing and 
council tax benefits services suffer high levels of PAFID. Three types of local council 
administer these benefits and one example of each was investigated - a district council, 
a unitary council and a London borough council.  
 
I am a part-time student in full-time work, with more than 35 years experience of public 
service delivery and more than 20 years service in senior management. Consequently, it 
was necessary to strive for maximum economy of time and effort by restricting the 
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selection of case-study sites to councils in south-east England. This region has a range 
of councils in terms of size, diversity and prosperity that provide some basis for 
generalisation. Government argues that “what happens in a contact centre is so often 
indicative of an organisation’s overall service delivery capability” (HM Treasury, 
2007b, 15). As corporate contact centres and customer relationship management 
strategies are currently at the heart of UK public sector service provision, the empirical 
stage of this research focused upon housing and council tax benefits services that could 
be observed in contact centre environments, at the interface between customers and 
service providers.  
 
Three councils fulfilled the criteria outlined above and responded with enthusiasm for 
the project. Here they are called Councils A, B and C. Pilot work was conducted in 
Council P. The selected cases facilitated the identification of PAFID and, by developing 
a better understanding of the phenomenon in housing and council tax benefits services, 
enabled an appreciation of how PAFID is likely to be affecting other councils and large 
scale transactional services such as those administered by the Department for Work and 
Pensions, the Child Support Agency, the Courts Service and Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs.  
 
Contact centres strive for high levels of first time resolution. The ‘one and done’ 
mentality that they employ is similar to the ‘get it right first time’ philosophy 
underpinning Lean thinking, which is derived from the Toyota Production System and 
earlier management paradigms. Lean thinking is typically deployed to prevent defects, 
remove waste, eliminate non-value-adding activities, and improve performance 
(Bicheno, 2004, 14). The effort to address customer contact handling problems in the 
UK public sector is not unprecedented and the resolution of these problems has become 
associated with Lean thinking. However, much of the evidence regarding Lean 
thinking’s effectiveness, and the extent to which it has penetrated the public sector, 
remains anecdotal. The literature reveals a deficiency of research and understanding, 
which this thesis seeks to reduce.  
 
Management consultants are already developing and implementing improvement 
programs for the public sector that claim to embrace Lean principles but according to 
David Welsh of Impower Consulting these initiatives amount to little more than 
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business process mapping by another name (personal communication, 23rd January 
2007). If correct, this is unfortunate because (as this thesis will explain in Chapters 2 
and 3) according to the literature Lean thinking is more than a collection of management 
tools. John Seddon at Vanguard Consulting (Seddon, 2005, 2008) and the Scottish 
Executive in conjunction with the University of Warwick (Radnor et al., 2006) have 
made useful forays into this territory (the improvement of public service delivery from 
Lean thinking perspectives), but this dissertation argues (in Chapter 3) that further work 
is needed. 
 
The findings of this thesis are evaluated for their transferability to UK public sector 
services in general, where they may generate ‘third stream’ activities, such as those that 
the Lambert Review has encouraged and recommended as a component of academic 
entrepreneurialism (HM Treasury, 2003). 
 
Chapter 2 develops the argument that an over-reliance on centrally imposed 
technological solutions to make UK public sector services more efficient is disguising 
the potential for improvements driven by other approaches, such as the reduction or 
eradication of potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID). Concepts such as 
electronic service delivery, modernism and hyper-modernism are explained, and some 
characteristics of customer contact are explored to enhance our understanding of service 
delivery failures and how they might be prevented. 
 
Chapter 3 explores several different theoretical perspectives and approaches in order to 
inform the research and assist with the development of new insights. These include New 
Public Management and e-Government, Lean thinking, agency theory, innovation and 
change management, knowledge management, and organisational learning. This chapter 
also draws out points of congruence and contrast between NPM and Lean thinking, 
because an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the NPM method, and the 
potential of Lean thinking to address key reform issues like PAFID, are key aspects of 
this thesis. The printed and electronic resources of the British Library, the West Sussex 
Library Service, and the University of Sussex were employed to facilitate this review. 
 
Chapter 4 clarifies the principal purpose of this thesis, which is to investigate, 
understand and explain why potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) 
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occurs in UK public sector services, and how it might be prevented. It presents the 
specific questions that the research seeks to answer, describes the case-study method 
that was adopted to explore the issues under consideration, and details the pilot work 
that was undertaken to test and enhance the research design. The pilot study was 
conducted in a corporate contact centre run by Council P, where I was assisted by the 
management and staff who were administering housing and council tax benefits 
services. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the collection and validation of data captured during three case-
studies conducted in local authority settings, specifically housing and council tax 
benefits services dealing with high-volume customer enquiries in contact centre 
environments. Each of the case-studies was divided into four phases: document review, 
non-participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey 
mapping. Management and staff in each of the case-study councils helped me to observe 
and analyse customer contacts, and they participated in the interviews and mapping 
exercises. A range of precautions (developed during the pilot work) were employed to 
guard against potential methodological problems. The output included a multiplicity of 
explanations and suggestions for ways in which the PAFID problem might be 
addressed, and Lean thinking might be successfully exploited. 
 
Chapter 6 compares and contrasts the findings from the case-studies to further 
illuminate the PAFID problem. It also reveals the characteristics that may determine the 
extent to which generalisability can be inferred from the conclusions.  
 
Chapter 7 inter-relates the primary and secondary research, including the relevant 
theoretical literature, in order to summarise the argument regarding NPM, Lean thinking 
and PAFID. It discusses policy options, and notes the contributions that the thesis 
makes to our knowledge about the delivery of public services. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions and policy implications that can be drawn from 
the research described in the thesis. Comments about recent developments and 
suggestions for further research are presented.  
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CHAPTER 2:   BACKGROUND 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I maintain that ICT-based systems built upon modernist managerial 
assumptions alone cannot be relied upon to produce required public service 
improvements and cost savings. I will argue that an over-reliance on Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT), adopted with the aim of making UK public sector 
services better and more efficient, is disguising the potential for productivity and 
performance improvements driven by other approaches, such as the reduction or 
eradication of unnecessary and potentially avoidable customer contacts. 
 
In order to set the context for my argument, I will first describe the scale of UK public 
expenditure and the efficiency gains mandated by central government. I will then 
explain key concepts including electronic service delivery (e-Government), modernism 
and hyper-modernism. Finally, I will identify some characteristics of customer contact 
that could be investigated using these ideas in order to enhance our understanding of 
service delivery failures and how they might be prevented. 
 
UK public expenditure  
 
There are 494 local authorities in the UK, plus numerous other central government 
services and public sector associations and organisations (Municipal Year Book 2005). 
Figure 1, below, shows that by 2006, total UK public expenditure exceeded 40% of 
Gross Domestic Product, and its cost was more than £500 billion a year.2 
 
 
                                                          
2 The impact of the subsequent financial crisis and world-wide recession is described in Chapter 8, page 
241, in the section entitled ‘Recent developments’. 
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Figure 1: UK Total Managed Expenditure 
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Source: HM Treasury (2007a) ‘Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review: the economy 
and public finances – supplementary charts and tables’, available online at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_economy907.pdf accessed 20/06/09. 
 
Central government requires efficiency improvements3 throughout the public sector – 
but such exhortations are not new. Forty years ago, Peter Drucker was arguing that we 
could and should improve the efficiency of government (Drucker, 1969, 231). Thirty-
five years later, Sir Peter Gershon led a review that aimed to reduce bureaucracy and 
move resources to the front line (HM Treasury 2004). Gershon identified potential 
efficiency gains of over £21 billion a year by 2007-08 across the public sector, over 
60% of which were to be cash savings.4 As Margetts (1999, 165) points out: “At first 
glance information technology would appear to facilitate the [required] modernisation 
process …”. For these reasons, the next section of this chapter describes the UK’s e-
Government project. 
                                                          
3 In this context, efficiency means reforms to delivery processes that achieve reduced inputs for the same 
level of outputs or additional outputs for the same level of inputs (HM Treasury, 2004). 
4 The chancellor of the exchequer subsequently extended the programme, demanding 2.5% annual 
efficiency savings but then increasing the target to 3% and subsequently 4% per annum. 
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Electronic service delivery (e-Government) 
 
Central to the delivery of public services in the UK is electronic delivery, embodied in 
the relatively new concept of e-Government. According to Flowers et al. (2005), its 
main purpose is to deliver joined-up government using ICT to achieve better co-
ordination and co-operation between departments and agencies. Other definitions of e-
Government are available including: 
 
“… the use of technology to enhance the access to and delivery of government 
services to benefit citizens, business partners and employees” (Silcock, 2001, 
88) 
 
“… the use of information and communications technologies to improve the 
functioning of government” (Jain, 2004, 1) 
 
“… the growing application of ICT in the public sector, with particular 
emphasis on their application for service delivery” (Flowers et al., 2005, 52) 
 
“… almost any use of Information and Communications Technology by a 
public sector body” and “… the use of ICT to support the delivery of public 
services, democratic participation and public policy making” (Irani and 
Elliman, 2007, 23). 
 
A paper entitled ‘Modernising Government’ contained guidelines for introducing new 
technology to deliver UK public services (Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet 
Office, 1999). A strategic framework for public services in the Information Age 
appeared the following year and by 2001 a timetable had been devised to secure joined-
up electronic service delivery. A national strategy for local e-Government eventually 
emerged (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2002). Indeed, by 2002 some 
commentators were already maintaining that the UK’s e-Government policy had been 
largely successful (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2002). 
 
Central government claimed to have invested £675 million in local e-Government 
during the period 2000 to 2005, to support the electronic enablement5 of public services 
                                                          
5 The Society of Information Technology Management argued that the government’s emphasis on 
achieving the 100% enablement of all services was unreasonable and contrary to normal principles for 
securing value for money (E-Government Bulletin, 2003. Mystery of the missing priorities. e-Government 
Bulletin, 139, 20 June). 
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such as libraries, environmental health, planning, electoral registration, local tax 
collection, and housing and council tax benefits (Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2006, 139). The local government minister exhorted councils to 
constrain council tax bills and improve services by exploiting savings from e-
Government6 (Conrad, 2004).  Local government was obliged to implement the new 
technologies in line with a regime of Priority Services and Transformation Outcomes 
mandated by central government. The potential efficiency gains were said to be 
considerable, and front-line services were reported to be able to use re-deployed 
resources arising from the initiative as early as 2005 (Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2005, 20). 
 
It is possible to identify some positive claims for the applicability of e-Government. For 
example, Dunleavy et al. (2006) refer to the central role of computerised information 
systems in modern government. They document a number of useful applications, 
including: online web and e-mail facilities for customer enquiries; government records 
(including property rights databases, and immigration and citizenship records); 
computerised tax forms; management information systems; courts and penalty systems; 
tax and welfare benefits databases; and web-enabled contact centres (Dunleavy et al., 
2006, 20). Other applications that have made things easier, more cost-effective and 
time-saving for citizens would include: inter-agency information sharing; online access 
to information and records; and e-commerce applications such as renewing licences, 
booking facilities, paying charges and receiving payments. 
 
However, the literature reveals that early optimism regarding the transformational effect 
of electronic service delivery was misplaced. For example, Margetts acknowledges that 
the tools of government rely heavily upon IT systems and that politicians see IT as a 
panacea for the problems of administration (Margetts, 1999, 162). Never-the-less, she  
rejects the modernist approach and asserts that there is little evidence to suggest that a 
process of overarching transformation is taking place, or that government is “… 
                                                          
6 The minister was referring to the electronic delivery of services through innovations such as the Internet, 
digital television, e-mail, text messaging, video conferencing, contact centres and Customer Relationship 
Management systems. Other ICT initiatives being progressed at that time included document management 
systems, mobile working, smartcards and e-procurement (see for example the former ODPM’s ‘Local E-
gov’ website, which is available online at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20041211020500/www.localegovnp.org.uk/default.asp?sID=1093959861672 
accessed 21/06/09). 
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embarked upon some kind of progress towards a modernised, up-to-the-minute state” 
(Margetts, 1999, 184). The author characterises writers who believe that IT will 
transform the central state, according to their view of the consequences. At one end of 
the spectrum are the anti-modernists, who believe that IT is driving us toward the 
‘control state’. At the other extreme are the hyper-modernists, the “technological 
utopians who see information technology as the central enabling element of a utopian 
vision” (Margetts, 1999, 165). The concept of hyper-modernism is subsequently 
employed by Dunleavy et al. (2006, 94) who argue that the scale of the expenditure on 
government IT modernisation has been so large as to support the view that the UK 
government is hyper-modernist in this respect (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Hyper-modernism 
 
 
 
Cover illustration from ‘Better Public Services through e-Government’, a report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, published in April 2002. Reproduced with the permission of the Office of Public Sector 
Information. 
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In 2005, only 38% of the UK population used an e-Government service (broadly the 
same as 2004), and postal communication remained very popular (Timmins, 2006a). 
The range of technological opportunities became so great that IT was viewed by some 
as “… a solution looking for problems” (Tidd et al., 2005, 49), and customer 
satisfaction with public services continued to decline (Golding, 2007). Meanwhile, 
claims that public sector efficiency targets detailed in the Gershon Report (HM 
Treasury, 2004) were being met or exceeded (Burton, 2006; HM Treasury, 2007a, Ch.3, 
42) were met with scepticism. In 2007, the National Audit Office reported that only 
26% of the total savings claimed by central government departments since the baseline 
of 1st April 2004 were actually being delivered (National Audit Office, 2007a). This was 
partly because the professed savings from electronic transactions were largely notional 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007a). The scheme recorded 
efficiencies from 2004 onwards, but did not assess the savings made previously, so it 
was not clear whether councils generated more or fewer efficiencies than before. The 
programme accounted for successes (where councils made savings), but did not 
quantify the effect of services that became less efficient.  
 
It appears that the prospects for meeting centrally imposed efficiency targets through the 
installation of ICT-based systems alone were never strong. Moyer (2007) asserted that 
most of the efficiency targets identified by Gershon (HM Treasury, 2004) would not be 
possible without mandating that legacy channels (such as telephones and face-to-face) 
should give way to the Internet. If the volume of electronic public business does 
eventually increase so that opportunities to realise significant savings do arise, political 
sensitivities might prevent those anticipated savings from being realised. For example, 
the closure of local offices might be unacceptable to elected members if they perceive 
that it is disadvantageous to those who do not have access to technology, while the 
retention of a physical presence might be considered important for the preservation of 
civic identity. 
 
Margetts describes how interactions between citizens and government may start off 
being computerised but quickly revert to the forms they had before computerisation, as 
soon as transactions progress beyond the initial enquiry stage (Margetts, 1999, 28). In 
2008, a cursory examination of public sector websites reveals that electronic service 
delivery is still a work-in-progress. For example, an enquiry on the DirectGov website 
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(www.direct.gov.uk) about a replacement driving licence was met with the response that 
an application form should be obtained from the Driver Vehicle Licensing Agency or a 
local Post Office. In the same year, an attempt to register to vote was blocked by a 
security alert announcing that the security certificate was invalid and it was not possible 
to complete an online application. A form had to be printed, completed and sent by post 
to a local council. Also in 2008, none of the thirteen local councils in East and West 
Sussex offered the facility to submit electronic applications for housing and council tax 
benefits. 
 
E-Government’s offspring, ‘transformational government’, is about customer-centric 
services, shared services and IT professionalism (Cabinet Office, 2005). The strategy, 
which focuses on technological change and value for money, asserts that electronic 
transactions should be the norm, but the Parliamentary IT Committee has warned that 
the approach is unrealistic because transformation will take longer and cost more than 
projected. Margetts and Willcocks (1993, 56), when discussing the risks involved in the 
use of IT for public service delivery, argue that these technologies “… cannot be used as 
a straightforward cost cutting tool in isolation from the rest of the administration”.  
 
Bannister (2006) maintains that employing the word ‘transformative’ to describe what is 
going on in e-Government “… is to overstate, by a large margin, what is actually 
happening”. Irani and Elliman (2007, 4) explain that, in international academic circles 
and the literature, e-Government remains the preferred term. Bannister (2006) says that 
e-Government is an adequate description for this expanding and exciting field of 
research, and dismisses the expression ‘t-Government’ as “verbal inflation”, i.e. a 
tendency to think of evermore grandiose words to describe the same things. 
Consequently, in this thesis, I will continue to use the expression ‘e-Government’ to 
describe the use of ICT to support the delivery of public services and democratic 
participation. 
 
That opportunities exist for achieving service transformation through investment in ICT 
may seem tautological but, in a study aimed at identifying areas for future e-
Government research, it emerged as the creator of numerous problems (Irani and 
Elliman, 2007, 6). For example, in a survey, some 80% of local councils in the UK said 
that the use of wireless technology (such as hand-held and wireless-enabled laptop 
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computers) would help them to achieve efficiency savings7 (Mobile Data Association, 
2007) but O’Brien, chairman of the technology group at KPMG, maintains that “there 
are huge, huge [data security] risks in mobile working” (O’Brien cited in Cane, 2007a). 
 
The Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefits (Electronic Communications) Order 
2006 permits local councils to accept online benefit applications but little use has been 
made of the facility because of security concerns following the closure of Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) website portal (at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk) after 
fraudsters stole 13,000 identities to make fraudulent claims for tax credits (Bailey, 
2007). Following an investigation into the loss of two compact discs containing the 
personal details of some 25 million Child Benefit claimants, the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission found that HMRC’s processes for handling sensitive data were 
“woefully inadequate” (IPCC, 2008). The Electoral Commission called for an end to 
trials of electronic counting and voting until concerns about strategy, procurement, 
preparation, security, transparency, technology, public confidence, and accessibility 
were resolved (Electoral Commission, 2007). While these problems are not directly 
created by ICT, the technology has allowed security breaches to happen on a very large 
scale as a consequence of simple carelessness.8  
 
The UK government may have invested heavily in ICT initiatives from 1999 onwards, 
but it appears that "the results did not match the rhetoric" (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 80). A 
succession of high-profile public sector IT projects failed, and measures such as 
Gateway Reviews, taken to improve delivery following publication of the McCartney 
Report, have not remedied the situation (Cabinet Office, 2000). For instance, the Child 
Support Agency’s new computer system was called a "£456m fiasco" (Thomas, 2003), 
while the implementation of the Customer Management System within Jobcentre Plus 
was described as seriously flawed (Public Accounts Committee, 2006). A long-delayed 
computer system for the Magistrates’ Courts tripled in cost and was expected to be 
partly obsolete by the time it was implemented (Eaglesham, 2006).  
 
                                                          
7 London’s Waltham Forest Council agreed a contract with British Telecom to supply wireless technology 
that should allow anybody to communicate from wi-fi enabled devices anywhere in the borough (see 
http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/index/council/about/transforming-government.htm accessed 28/06/09). 
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In 2006, a new electronic passport application service called EP2A failed, causing 
delays affecting thousands of customers (Braithwaite and Eaglesham, 2006). At the 
same time, incompatible IT systems were delaying millions of pounds of savings in 
health and social care services (Golding, 2006). The National Health Service was 
planning to spend some £20 billion over the following decade to create an electronic 
patient records system but there was confusion about what the programme covered and 
progress was then more than two years behind schedule (Timmins, 2006b). More 
recently, thousands of junior doctors protested against deficiencies in a new online 
Medical Training Application Service (Copping, 2007).  
 
There is evidence that IT projects are more likely to fail than to succeed (IT Cortex, 
2004). A survey of respondents that included local, state and federal government in the 
United States revealed that: for every 100 projects that started, 94% had to re-start; 
average cost overruns ranged from 178% to 214%; and the average time overrun was 
222% (The Standish Group, 1995). The principal reasons why projects failed were said 
to include lack of user involvement, insufficient management support, incomplete 
specifications, changing requirements, unrealistic expectations, and technological 
incompetence. Barker (2007) says that failure to derive expected benefits from IT 
systems is legendary, while Heeks (2001, 165) argues that the success or failure of e-
Government initiatives depends upon the size of the gap between current realities and 
system design concepts, the risk being greatest when the gap is large. For example, 
information systems designed for private sector use may be based upon design concepts 
that do not match public sector realities, and may thus be more prone to failure. 
 
Why have public sector managers not intervened to prevent these problems? Horn et al. 
(2006) explain how psychological biases can make it difficult for executives to abandon 
failing projects. They argue that well-run organisations routinely assess whether 
projects are meeting expectations and, if they aren’t, decisions are made about shutting 
them down. Each stage in the decision-making process is vulnerable to ‘cognitive 
biases’. Confirmation bias involves seeking out information that supports continuation 
of the project and ignoring information that does not. The sunk-cost fallacy is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Chapter 8 contains a brief description of recent information security requirements imposed on local 
councils by central government because councils need to access the Government Connect Secure Extranet 
(GCSx) in order to exchange information. 
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characterised by a focus on resources already spent, when attention should be 
concentrated upon the potential return of any further investment. Escalation of 
commitment can result in additional investment in failing projects, while anchoring and 
adjustment refers to the failure to revise earlier expectations and valuations. 
 
Venkatramen (1994) asserted that only marginal benefits could accrue from 
superimposing ICT on existing organisational conditions. In 2002, commentators were 
already warning that the rush to get all UK public services online by 2005 was 
preventing sufficient consideration of how those services could be re-designed (Booz 
Allen Hamilton, 2002, 140). Government’s own Office of Commerce maintained that 
technology would only deliver a small proportion of the required savings (Carroll, 
2004b). Creese (2006) said that public service providers had to focus on organisational 
change and process improvement to deliver the services that people wanted, if the 
billions of pounds spent on e-Government were not to be wasted.  
 
Seddon (2003, 195) argued that the UK government was making the same mistakes as 
the private sector in its insistence that local authorities should invest in ICT to manage 
relationships with the people they serve, when a better way is “… to firstly improve the 
services”. Sir David Varney made a similar point, arguing that the imposition of 
technology does not work if the services are not designed properly in the first place.9 He 
went on to say that recent levels of government investment in public sector technology 
were not sustainable, and that attention should be focused on the improvement of 
services (personal conversation with Sir David Varney, Kable Event ‘Transforming 
front-line service delivery’, London, 27th March 2007).  
 
The potential that this thesis identifies for less complicated, technological, risk-laden, 
and costly approaches to public service improvement lies at the heart of the dissertation. 
The next section of this chapter introduces one such opportunity: the eradication or 
reduction of an administrative problem that I call ‘potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand’. 
 
                                                          
9 Heeks (2001, 165) describes the development of a public sector management information system in the 
USA that was based upon the organisation’s existing processes. Many of these processes were “fouled 
up” and automating them simply helped to create a system that remained ineffective - but (according to 
Heeks) it was more quickly, expensively and voluminously ineffective. 
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The framing of ‘potentially avoidable failure induced demand’ (PAFID) 
 
In Chapter 1, and in the first part of this chapter, I highlighted the central problem with 
the delivery of UK public services and with e-Government as a means of ameliorating 
service delivery problems. This section explains how I arrived at the concept of 
potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) by inter-relating and expanding 
upon previous notions of service failure such as non-value work, avoidable contact and 
failure demand - and how a method for investigating the phenomenon was identified. 
The section concludes with a discussion about the potential benefits of waste 
prevention, and the possible cost savings available to local councils. 
 
Precursors of PAFID: failure demand and avoidable contact 
 
Cane (2007b) points out that “there are thousands of ways to improve the customer 
experience, many of them involving little technology and little cost”. Seddon (2003, 
195) makes a similar point, explaining that 40% of customer contacts into a local 
authority housing repairs call centre were attributable to previous failures to get things 
right first time, the solution to which was improving the service, not investing in ICT. In 
areas such as housing and council tax benefits services,10 Seddon maintains that this so-
called ‘failure demand’ could be as high as 86%, i.e. 86 out of every 100 customers seen 
on any day need not have been there if proper actions had occurred earlier. Seddon also 
draws a distinction between ‘value work’ (work that matters to the customer) and ‘non-
value work’,11 and designates the latter as the source of ‘failure demand’.  
 
There is a problem with the idea of failure demand as envisaged by Seddon, because 
some non-value work is inevitable (e.g. identifying a customer’s requirements before 
attempting to address them), or at least difficult to avoid (such as brief discussions about 
the weather). It also seems just as likely that failure demand could cause non-value 
work as that non-value work could generate failure demand. Furthermore, the failures 
                                                          
10 Housing and council tax benefits are means-tested welfare benefits administered by local councils and 
funded by central government, which help residents to meet their housing costs (rents) and council tax 
liabilities. 
11 These concepts appear to be derived from ideas about two types of activity, value-added work and non-
value-added work, identified by Taiichi Ohno. According to Ohno, value-added work is some kind of 
useful process, while non-value-added work corresponds to waste in the conventional sense. The Toyota 
Production System that Ohno describes seeks to maximise the ratio of the value-added to the non-value-
added work (Ohno, 1988, 57). 
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underlying Seddon’s concept of failure demand are attributed to the system, and not to 
the staff or customers (Seddon, 2003, 37), but this may be an over-simplification. Henry 
Ford claims that “waste is largely due to not understanding what one does or being 
careless in the doing of it” (Ford and Crowther, 1924, 19) and these failings sound more 
individual than systemic. 
 
Sir David Varney (Varney, 2006, 59) says that, in some of the contact centres that he 
investigated during the preparation of his seminal report, nearly two-thirds of all 
contacts made were potentially avoidable. Similarly, HM Treasury (2007b, 3) maintains 
that the entire public sector faces a constant battle with ‘avoidable contact’ that would 
not be necessary if they could get things right first time.12 Illustrations of inefficient and 
ineffective administration include the former Department of Social Security (DSS), 
which admitted to more than one million errors in benefit assessments during 1990/91. 
The proportion of Income Support payments containing monetary errors had risen to 
more than 16% by 1991/92, even though all the DSS offices were by then using a new 
IT system, and the situation appeared to be deteriorating (Collingridge and Margetts, 
1994, 57). Another more recent example is seen in welfare benefit overpayments. By 
2004/05, these overpayments (caused by official error in the Department for Work and 
Pensions) had reached almost £2.5 billion a year (Green, 2006). At the local level, 
Swale Borough Council in Kent provided one of the worst housing and council tax 
benefits13 services in the country (Caulkin, 2005). Around two-thirds of incoming 
letters, telephone calls and visits were categorised as ‘waste demand’ resulting from 
previous failures. Most applicants visited the council’s offices at least three times to 
settle their claims, and some came in up to ten times.  
 
Varney further argues that public service contact centres could do more to drive out 
inefficient and ineffective practices by ensuring that each contact adds value to the 
                                                          
12 Varney’s notion of ‘avoidable contact’ appears to be vulnerable to the same criticism as that leveled at 
Seddon’s account of failure demand, namely that it is constructed upon a simplistic assessment of 
concepts such as failure and avoidability. 
13 The Housing and Council Tax Benefit scheme is administered by local councils, but financed and 
controlled by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The detailed technical legislation governing 
the assessment and payment of housing and council tax benefits is very similar to other means-tested 
benefits such as Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance, which are administered by the DWP. 
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outcome (Varney, 2006, 19). Here, value means relevance for the citizen14 and non-
value work means work such as providing information and forms, resolving queries 
about processes or claims, processing information about changes of circumstances, 
providing progress updates, and receiving payments. Varney says that valuable contacts 
are those that are not duplicated, made in error or nugatory, and he too concludes that 
there is scope to substantially reduce the avoidable work. 
 
Having established a connection between non-value and avoidability, Varney highlights 
the need to identify the causes of customer contacts, recommending as good practice 
research undertaken by HMRC. An analysis of 60,000 telephone calls established that 
27% of the contacts resulted from confusion caused by the timing of letters sent by 
HMRC to pensioners (Varney, 2006, 58). The government’s Central Office of 
Information (COI) makes a similar point, namely that that contact centres should 
measure customer demand and what causes it, and have mechanisms for distinguishing 
between contacts that are valued15 and those that are avoidable, because this will enable 
them to “… engineer out avoidable demand by eliminating the cause” (COI, 2008). 
Calls that are neither valuable nor avoidable are classified as off remit and include miss-
dials, hoaxes and wrong numbers. 
 
In 2007, central government departments were set the target of halving the rate of so-
called ‘avoidable contact’ by 2011. The Cabinet Office (2007, 16) describes ‘avoidable 
contact’ as “… contact largely caused by failure within some process”, such as 
unnecessary clarification, progress chasing, providing information already provided, 
rework, reassurance, and wrong numbers caused by confused sign-posting. It is further 
defined as “demand caused by a failure to do something or to do something correctly for 
the customer” (Cabinet Office, 2007, 49), such as failing to turn up, call back, send 
something that is anticipated, do something right (for example not solving a problem), 
sending out confusing forms, and missing a payment date. The Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) provides additional examples that include 
poor call transfer, having to give the same information to different parts of the same 
                                                          
14 Tidd et al. (2005, 79) warn that problems can be generated by partial (i.e. incomplete) views of 
innovation. For example, if innovation is treated as though its principal role is to understand and meet 
customer needs, the requirements of other stakeholders may be overlooked. 
15 In this instance, value is to be measured in terms of the degree to which the contacts help toward policy 
outcomes. 
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organisation, responses to inabilities to deliver as expected, and premature contact 
closure such as abandoned calls (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2008).  
 
The Cabinet Office’s description of avoidable contact is almost indistinguishable from 
Seddon’s definition of failure demand described above. This indicates that the 
expressions are being used interchangeably. While the concept of ‘failure demand’ is 
unsatisfactory for the reasons described above, the identification of the link between 
failure and non-value is a helpful starting point in the process of developing a method 
for investigating the phenomenon. For example, the Cabinet Office recommends 
sampling exercises to enable managers to separate customer contacts into those that are 
valuable to the customer or the organisation, and those that could or should have been 
avoided (Cabinet Office, 2007, 24). Three categories of contacts are identified (high 
value, low value and avoidable), to which it is necessary to add a class for unclassified 
or off remit contacts. The Cabinet Office acknowledges that the classification of 
contacts involves the application of value judgments or subjective assessments, partly 
driven by business objectives. This issue is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, 
where differing attitudes toward concepts such as contact cause, value and resolution 
are discussed in the context of three case-studies.  
 
Crosby suggests a method by which the costs of defect prevention could be quantified. 
He asserts that failure consists of non-conformance to required standards, and that “the 
cost of quality is the expense of doing things wrong” (Crosby, 1979, 12). This led to the 
unfortunate claim that “quality is free”, implying that defect prevention will always 
produce savings in excess of the associated costs. This cannot be right, as it is not 
difficult to envisage levels of defect prevention that would be unfeasible or 
prohibitively expensive.16 However, Crosby argues that there is nothing else (apart from 
preventing defects) that a manager can do that will improve performance and reduce 
costs so quickly and easily (Crosby, 1979, 16). Crosby also maintains that mistakes (i.e. 
failures) are caused by lack of attention and lack of knowledge. Aspects of knowledge 
management, and distinctions between different types of knowledge that point to 
possible solutions to the PAFID problem, are explored in Chapter 3, pages 72-76.  
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Potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) 
 
The literature thus provides some guidance on the nature of failure and its inter-
relationships with avoidability, cause, value, resolution, and the customer experience. A 
synthesis of the various definitions of ‘failure demand’ and ‘avoidable contact’ suggests 
that they are intended to describe customer contacts caused by failures, within 
processes, to do things right first time. This is a useful starting point, but ambiguities 
remain, and there is a need for further clarification. Consequently, I have re-designated 
the customer contact under investigation as potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand (PAFID), and defined it as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by 
earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and 
potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services”. This is a more 
complete description, which comes closer to an intuitive understanding of the 
phenomenon, and accommodates uncertainties about the meanings of key concepts that 
are addressed later in this thesis.  
 
At an intermediate stage in this research (following the pilot case-study described in 
Chapter 4), the definition of ‘the customer’ was expanded beyond the immediate users 
of the services to include other stakeholders such as councillors and council staff. This 
action was taken to avoid the restrictions imposed by a wholly customer-centric 
definition of service failure, and the potential problems that might be caused by taking a 
partial view of innovation, as described above.  
 
The eradication or reduction of PAFID has thus been identified as a possible 
opportunity to improve services and reduce costs without making the investments or 
incurring the risks involved in technological ‘solutions’. The literature reveals ways in 
which the characteristics of customer contact handling can be exposed to examination 
and possible elimination during the case-study phase of the empirical research, 
described later in this thesis. Professor Steinmueller suggests an approach to 
operationalising the investigation that parallels the method outlined by the COI and the 
Cabinet Office, as described on pages 31 and 32 above. It involves characterising 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Evans asserts that the ‘law of diminishing returns’ is flawed when applied to quality because 
effectiveness is more important than efficiency (Barry Evans, speaking at the Lean Enterprise Research 
Centre’s annual conference, Cardiff University, 6th July 2007). 
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customer contact as an exchange process expressed in terms of collecting, analysing and 
understanding a range of information about customers, and providing them with the 
information they need to access services. Waste (or service failure) can be represented 
as a malfunction of that exchange process, which facilitates an examination of the 
failure mode. Reducing failure is then characterised as an attempt to improve the 
exchange process by investigating and disaggregating customer contacts with a view to 
diagnosing ‘avoidability’ and suggesting ways in which these failures can be identified 
and resolved ‘ex ante’ (personal conversation with Professor Ed Steinmueller, 5th 
September 2006). 
 
Tidd et al. (2005) explain that the changes required to bring about the sort of 
incremental improvements described above fall into the category of ‘process 
innovations’, which are said to be mainly about optimisation and “… getting the bugs 
out of the system”. The authors point out that the associated cumulative efficiency gains 
can be much greater than those generated by occasional radical changes, but that 
innovation presents managers with very different challenges compared to those that they 
encounter on a day-to-day basis (Tidd et al., 2005, xiii). Consequently, managers are not 
always successful in their endeavours. Factors affecting change management and 
challenges associated with migrating from one management paradigm to another are 
explored in Chapter 3, pages 68 to 72.  
 
Waste prevention in manufacturing 
 
Early efforts to reduce waste by automating manufacturing activity and improving work 
flow are often attributed to industrialists such as Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford. The 
expression ‘Taylorism’ is synonymous with the concept of scientific management, 
which seeks to maximise productivity through scientific study, automation, the division 
of labour, standardisation, wage incentives and high levels of management control 
(Taylor, 1911). The term ‘Fordism’ refers to the system of mass-production and 
consumption that characterised Western economies following the Second World War. 
Ford exploited techniques such as process engineering and standardisation to increase 
productivity, and expressed “…a horror of waste either in materials or in men” (Ford 
and Crowther, 1924, 16).  
 
 
35 
Ohno (1988) maintains that the attempt to eliminate all waste through the application of 
production management techniques such as defect prevention,17 the eradication of non-
value-adding activity, standardisation and team-work is unique to the Toyota Production 
System (TPS). He acknowledges the contributions made by Taylor and Ford but 
repudiates the American mass-production system in favour of what he considers to be a 
more flexible and less wasteful approach (Ohno, 1988, 95).18 However, it is apparent 
from the management literature that most, if not all, the constituent elements of TPS are 
detectable in preceding viewpoints of management.19 For example, the classical 
viewpoint encompasses scientific management, which emphasises the scientific study of 
working methods to improve productivity and reduce costs (Taylor, 1911). Behavioural 
perspectives stress the importance of understanding the factors that affect human 
behaviour in the workplace, while bureaucratic management accentuates the need for 
organisations to operate rationally (Weber, 1947). Finally, the quantitative standpoint 
uses mathematical and statistical methods to determine the most effective use of 
resources, while contemporary approaches embrace systems theory, which is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4. Toyota is credited with creating a consistent pattern of 
process innovation that involves doing what the organisation usually does but better, 
faster and cheaper (Tidd et al., 2005, 70). 
 
Waste prevention in publicly funded contact centres 
 
The preceding discussion explains how the literature assists with the identification of a 
type of waste called potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID), which 
appears to be attributable to the failure to successfully resolve large numbers of 
customer contacts impacting upon UK public services. Central government’s 
Performance Management Framework for publicly funded contact centres highlights the 
concept of ‘first time resolution’, which refers to the successful completion of a 
transaction “… during the first contact made by the customer and not resulting in a 
                                                          
17 Womack and Jones (2005, 87) call defect prevention “pre-diagnosing the problem” while Crosby 
(1979, 29) refers to “zero defects” and doing the job right first time. 
18 According to Professor Ed Steinmueller, Ohno’s contribution was important in two ways: (1) creating 
strong feedback loops within production so that rework was eliminated or reduced (Taylor and Ford being 
more interested in offline improvements); and (2) adopting a more worker-oriented system in which 
machines could be used flexibly and workers could use several different machines. In a service context, 
the latter approach might now be described as ‘multi-tasking’ (personal communication, 30th July 2009). 
19 See Bartol and Martin (1994, Chapter 2) for a summary of pioneering ideas in management. 
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repeat contact on the same issue” (Cabinet Office, 2007, 16). Low first time resolution 
is described as a major driver of customer dissatisfaction (Cabinet Office, 2007, 22). 
Significantly, resolution is measured across end-to-end processes, not just across the 
routines dealt with in the contact centre. Those processes can be exposed to examination 
through customer journey mapping, which is “… the process of tracking and describing 
all the experiences that customers have as they encounter a service [which can] reveal 
opportunities for improvement and innovation” (Cabinet Office, 2008).  
 
Table 1 below presents a quantification of customer contacts, usage rates and 
transaction costs for two customer access channels maintained by Tameside 
Metropolitan Borough Council, near Manchester. It seems self-evident that a reduction 
in the volume of unnecessary contacts would generate service improvements and cost 
savings. For example, if research established that half of more than 400,000 contacts a 
year were unnecessary, and half of those unnecessary contacts were subsequently 
avoided, then a saving of about £500,000 a year might be available to the council. 
 
Table 1: Customer contacts for Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 
 
Year 
 
Visits face-to-face Cost per visit (£) Total cost (£) 
2003/04 100,126 15.50 1,551,953 
2004/05 104,986 14.65 1,538,039 
Year Telephone calls into call centre Cost per call (£) Total cost (£) 
2003/04 303,511 1.59 482,582 
2004/05 314,602 1.39 437,296 
Source: Varney (2006, 13) ‘Service transformation: a better service for citizens and business’. 
 
Worthing Borough Council in West Sussex has approximately 100,000 residents and 
receives more than 660,000 customer enquiries a year (Impower, 2002). Oldham 
Metropolitan Borough Council in north-west England estimates that face-to-face 
enquiries cost £10 each, telephone calls £2 each and web enquiries £0.20 each (Barton, 
2006). As explained above, commentators argue that a significant proportion of these 
contacts are attributable to previous failures (Seddon, 2003, 2008; Varney 2006), and 
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therefore constitute failure costs. Training programmes and other disbursements leading 
to the elimination of these costs could be self-funding (Crosby, 1979). 
 
If the performance problems encountered by Swale Borough Council in Kent (described 
earlier in this chapter) are common throughout the UK public sector, and the call 
volumes and unit costs illustrated above are typical, then the scope for service 
improvements and cost reductions via the management of PAFID could be 
considerable. This is especially true if, instead of responding to the causes of 
unnecessary enquiries as they arise, they could be diagnosed and prevented. 
 
Most objectives of public service reform can be captured by two parameters: (1) cost of 
delivery; and (2) customer satisfaction (which presumes successful and complete 
delivery of service). The cost of quality was discussed in Chapter 2 on page 32. In the 
next section of this chapter, I will endeavour to show the relationship between the 
management of key reform issues like PAFID and the broader issue of customer 
satisfaction with UK public sector services. The interconnections between job 
satisfaction, customer satisfaction, customer perception, and service quality will also be 
considered. 
 
Why PAFID matters: service quality and customer satisfaction 
 
Key aspects of this thesis are concerned with understanding current problems with UK 
public service delivery in the NPM context, and the potential of Lean thinking to 
address these issues. Academic research into customer satisfaction has concentrated 
primarily on the private sector, while studies commissioned by central government have 
sought to develop similar levels of understanding about public sector services. This 
thesis attempts to bridge the gap between these two areas of investigation in order to 
develop the concept of managing PAFID. 
 
Survey research generates mixed messages about customer satisfaction with public 
services. Local government came last in a national survey undertaken by the Institute of 
Customer Service (Municipal Journal, 2007) with a customer satisfaction rating of 56%, 
compared to other low-scoring providers such as the utilities (58%), central government 
(61%) and transport (63%). The highest-scoring provider was the ambulance service at 
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88%. Ipsos-Mori found that only 24% of people were satisfied with the government, 
while 51% were satisfied with the overall performance of upper-tier councils, down 2% 
since 2003, and down 13% since 2001 (Golding, 2007; Page, 2007). The Department 
for Communities and Local Government published best value user satisfaction survey 
results for 2006/07 that revealed a 1% decline in overall satisfaction since 2003/04, and 
an 11% decline since 2000/01 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2007b). Within this general picture, 77 authorities showed significant improvement, 121 
significant decline, and 189 no significant change. 
 
Scholars have attempted to illuminate the relationship between customer perception and 
customer satisfaction. Parasuraman et al. (1985) highlight three characteristics of 
service: intangibility, heterogeneity and inseparability. Service is described as intangible 
because it is a performance that generates a state of affairs and not an object; 
consequently, it cannot be verified in advance, or stored and checked for quality.20 
Service is said to be heterogeneous because different customers have different needs 
and priorities. Finally, service is characterised as inseparable because production and 
consumption are simultaneous, so that the customer’s input becomes a critical and 
constituent part of the transaction. Parasuraman et al. (1985) argue that, because of its 
unique characteristics, quality judgments about service are driven by comparisons of 
customer expectations and customer perceptions – the distinction is then between the 
objective quality of products and the preferential quality of states of affairs. 
 
Building on early work by authors including Crosby (1979), Garvin (1983), Gronroos 
(1982) and Smith and Houston (1983), Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry constructed a 
conceptual model of service quality (SERVQUAL) to facilitate a better understanding 
of customers’ expectations and perceptions. An exploratory qualitative study generated 
a service quality model, ten ‘service quality determinants’ or dimensions, and four key 
discrepancies (or gaps) occurring in organisations that can cause quality problems 
(Parasuraman et al., 1985). These four gaps create a fifth gap, the difference between 
customer expectations and perceptions, which the authors call ‘service quality’. A 
stream of research subsequently developed the ten dimensions into 97 items and then 
                                                          
20 Modern technology facilitates the recording of customer contacts (such as telephone calls) for training 
purposes but this provides an incomplete picture of most transactions. 
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refined them down to 22 items spread over five key dimensions: tangibles; reliability; 
responsiveness; assurance; and empathy. 
 
SERVQUAL has been widely applied and is highly valued (Buttle, 1996), but some 
researchers have concerns about its validity as a generic measure of perceived service 
(Carman, 1990), and suggest that different factors need to be examined for different 
types of service industry sectors (Scott and Sheiff, 1993). Research into local 
government services identified a wide range of variables that consumers used when 
assessing quality, the most important of which were courtesy, respect, meeting 
deadlines, preserving confidentiality, and consulting with citizens (Scott and Shieff, 
1993). However, service quality requirements were found to vary in accordance with 
income and ethnic grouping, suggesting that councils should either identify sectoral 
groupings in order to address their differing orientations, or communicate the reasons 
for providing different services so that all groups can appreciate their value to the wider 
community. 
 
Other researchers have argued that customer expectations are shaped by factors such as 
personal need, previous experience, service reputation, the media, and the 
characteristics of the client group (Judge and Solomon, 1993). Different factors have 
different impacts upon customer perceptions of service quality. Dissatisfiers are 
outcomes that are necessary to meet adequate levels of satisfaction but above this, they 
have little impact. Satisfiers are outcomes that lead to high ratings when performed 
well, but not poor ratings when performed badly. Critical factors can be both satisfying 
and dissatisfying but neutral factors have little impact (Page, 2004). 
 
There is evidence that satisfaction can be improved by meeting expectations (Canadian 
Centre for Management Development, 1998) and that customer satisfaction, job 
satisfaction and service capability are correlated (Schlesinger and Zornitsky, 1991). In 
the retail sector, customers expect service basics delivered at a level they believe 
commensurate with the price they pay (Parasuraman et al., 1991). The US airline 
industry examined the link between customer satisfaction, operating income, and 
operating expense. As satisfaction declined, income fell and operating expenses 
increased (Behn and Riley, 1999). The link between service quality and finance is 
certainly not straightforward (Greising, 1994; Zahorik and Rust, 1992) and executives 
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can be reluctant to invest in service improvements without solid evidence of their 
financial soundness (Zeithaml et al., 1996).  
 
Other perspectives are reflected in the literature. The Cabinet Office maintains that the 
key drivers of UK public sector customer satisfaction are delivery, timeliness, 
information, professionalism and staff attitude (Cabinet Office, 2004). Mori (2004) 
suggests that the most significant factors are perceived quality of service and value for 
money, while Page (2004) avers that the way in which a customer contact is handled is 
just as important as the outcome. Page maintains that satisfaction is based upon a quick 
response, accurate information about process length and resolution, and being kept 
informed about progress. 
 
Emerging public sector research in Canada confirms a link between government service 
outcomes and Canadians’ rating of overall government performance (Heintzman and 
Marson, 2005). A suggested ‘public service value chain’ identifies three principal 
elements (employee engagement, service satisfaction, and trust in public institutions) 
each underpinned by a set of 'key generic drivers', one of which is service outcomes. 
Research also indicates a positive correlation between private and public call centres’ 
employee satisfaction and customer satisfaction (Service Quality Measurement Group, 
2005).  
 
Even if it is true that most people seek happiness (Aristotle, cited in Donovan and 
Halpern, 2002) and that happiness can be equated with life satisfaction, establishing a 
correlation between life satisfaction, job satisfaction and customer satisfaction is 
problematical (Judge and Watanabe, 1993). Johns and Omerod (2007) caution against 
relying on government for improvements in measured happiness for fear that people 
will think that happiness emanates from the state, resulting in arbitrary objectives, 
stretch targets, unintended consequences and ‘experts’ to tell us what makes us happy. 
While it appears that people who are satisfied with life are also satisfied with other 
things such as public services (Halpern, 1995), the long-held supposition that happy 
staff make happy customers (so-called ‘service profit chain theory’) does not seem to be 
supported by hard evidence (Mitchell, 2007). Maximising satisfaction may not always 
be the best policy anyway. For example, in healthcare, where it seems unlikely that 
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demand will ever be matched by the necessary resources, it may be more important to 
ensure that customer expectations are realistic (Donovan and Halpern, 2002).  
 
The research described above demonstrates that different people in different places have 
different perceptions and expectations of public services, so that improved performance 
does not automatically result in increased customer satisfaction. The perception that 
people are increasingly disenchanted with government is pervasive, but Drucker 
attributes this disappointment to idealism: we expect miracles but don’t get them, and 
this produces disillusionment (Drucker, 1969, 1989). None-the-less, UK central 
government has announced its intention to employ customer satisfaction indicators in a 
future performance management framework for public sector services. The new 
Comprehensive Area Assessments will be looking for sustainable improvements in 
citizen satisfaction, and the evidence is expected to emerge from ‘placed-based 
surveys’, which are described in terms of new national surveys of public views on local 
services (Audit Commission, 2007). It is clear that, for the foreseeable future, customer 
satisfaction cannot be divorced from the consideration of public service delivery. 
 
The preceding examination of service quality and customer satisfaction highlights how 
a better understanding of PAFID can potentially contribute to studies on public service 
delivery. Equally, enhanced understanding can help facilitate improved service 
outcomes by reducing unnecessary customer enquiries and increasing resolution on first 
contact, collectively leading to improved satisfaction for customers, and enhanced job 
satisfaction for public servants. 
 
Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, I explained how, in spite of the benefits available from electronic service 
delivery, the literature demonstrates that ICT is not a panacea for the UK public sector’s 
financial and service delivery problems. This is partly because government ICT projects 
are risk-laden, prone to failure and more likely to create difficulties than to resolve 
them. When this chapter was being drafted (in 2008) the British media contained 
numerous reports of public sector ICT project failures and data security breaches.  
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The literature robustly argues that improving underlying business processes is likely to 
be more efficacious (in terms of improving services and reducing costs) than the 
application of ICTs. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that local authority 
housing and council tax benefits services suffer from high levels of a phenomenon 
variously called ‘failure demand’ or ‘avoidable contact’, which was previously 
described in terms of additional and supposedly avoidable customer contact caused by 
failures within processes. I call this phenomenon potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand (PAFID) and redefine it as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by 
earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and 
potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services”. Management of the 
PAFID problem is identified as a significant opportunity to improve public services and 
reduce costs, using little or no technology. 
 
The literature suggests a strategy that is employed as a starting point for the research 
described later in this thesis. If failure is characterised as a malfunction of the exchange 
process, then improvement can be sought by investigating and disaggregating customer 
contacts with a view to eventual pre-diagnosis and defect prevention. Put simply, 
customer demand can be measured and its causes identified. Valuable and potentially 
avoidable contacts can then be disaggregated, with a view to removing the avoidable 
contacts by eliminating the causes. Concepts such as failure avoidance, continuous 
improvement, and the removal of non-value-adding activity are perhaps most 
commonly associated with the Toyota Production System (TPS), from which emerged 
the management ideology called Lean thinking; both constitute contingent approaches 
to process improvement. If Crosby (1979) is correct, activity of this nature (waste 
prevention) is the quickest and easiest way of improving performance and reducing 
costs. Financial projections based upon customer contact volumes and unit costs 
provided by just one local council in the UK (Tameside MBC) suggest that the scope 
for service improvements and cost reductions via the management of PAFID throughout 
the public sector could be considerable. 
 
It is probable that concepts such as service failure, success and customer satisfaction are 
partly dependent upon factors like customer expectation and perception. The literature 
shows that different people in different places have different perceptions and 
expectations of public services, as a result of which improved performance does not 
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automatically increase customer satisfaction. Never-the-less, it seems self-evident that a 
better understanding of PAFID can help facilitate improved service outcomes by 
reducing unnecessary customer enquiries and increasing resolution on first contact. One 
would expect these improved outcomes to result in enhanced customer and job 
satisfaction, even if cause and effect cannot be established conclusively. 
 
In Chapter 3, I will present a number of theoretical perspectives, principally New Public 
Management, e-Government, Lean thinking and agency theory. I will also call upon the 
literature regarding innovation, knowledge management, and organisational learning. 
All these are employed to illuminate this study and address the Research Questions. The 
chapter will include an attempt to draw out points of congruence and contrast between 
NPM and Lean thinking. It will suggest reasons why, in spite of its positive aspects, 
NPM is perceived to be failing and how its unintended consequences help to explain the 
limitations of e-Government. The analysis also considers the potential for Lean thinking 
to be an alternative vehicle for the improvement of UK public service delivery. 
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CHAPTER 3:   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I maintained that an over-reliance on centrally imposed technological 
solutions (under the banner of New Public Management and e-Government) is 
disguising the potential for improvements in UK public services driven by other less 
precarious approaches. In particular, I suggested that the eradication or reduction of 
what I call potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) might offer 
significant opportunities for service improvement and cost reduction. 
 
There is no single theoretical framework that fully encompasses the proposed research. 
In this chapter, I will call upon the resources provided by several different theoretical 
perspectives and approaches to inform the study and develop new concepts, some of 
which have been further investigated in the case-studies described in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The two bodies of literature that are most pertinent to the study of PAFID are New 
Public Management (within the larger area of Public Administration) and Lean 
thinking, because they address ideas about service delivery improvement and change 
management. Within New Public Management (NPM), I will also draw upon the 
literature about e-Government, which is widely regarded as an extension of NPM. 
Points of congruence and contrast between NPM and Lean thinking will be identified in 
order to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the NPM method, and the potential of 
Lean thinking to address key reform issues such as the eradication or reduction of 
PAFID. 
 
While NPM (including e-Government) and Lean thinking provide the foundations for 
the theoretical approach in this dissertation, there are other streams of literature 
underpinning the approach that can help to enrich the analysis. They are agency theory, 
socio-technical systems theory, innovation, knowledge management, and organisational 
learning. I will also draw upon stakeholder theory and institutional theory. Their 
relevance to PAFID lies in their fundamental aspects: they have a direct bearing on why 
PAFID occurs and how it might be investigated and managed. The thesis will thus 
incorporate selectively these differing approaches and the aforementioned theoretical 
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contributions to construct an integrated framework addressing the research problems 
identified in Chapter 4. 
 
Public Administration and New Public Management 
 
This section discusses New Public Management (NPM), within the broader field of 
study about Public Administration, as a basis for the conceptual framework 
underpinning this thesis. As noted above, e-Government will be described as an 
extension of NPM. This theoretical perspective necessitates a brief discussion about 
Public Administration, which will be followed by NPM. A discussion about the 
unintended consequences of NPM will also be included, as this will serve to explain the 
limitations of e-Government. 
 
This thesis does not attempt to chronicle in detail the history of public administration, 
the origins of which can be traced back to the Sumerians in the fifth or sixth millennium 
BC, if not earlier (Gladden, 1972). However, it is necessary to describe here the 
environment in which the early 21st century public services under investigation are 
located, as I maintain that the context partly explains the perpetuation of the failings that 
this thesis seeks to understand. Consequently, in this section, I describe how the 
expansion of the bureaucratic state culminated (during the 1970s) in a crisis of 
confidence, accompanied by pressures for modernisation, that precipitated the 
emergence of the ‘New Right’. This ideology included the promotion of public sector 
reform through the application of private sector techniques (such as the introduction of 
markets and service automation) to the delivery of public goods. The new 
administrative phenomenon was subsequently labeled the New Public Management 
(NPM).  
 
In this section, I characterise the current managerial reform path specified by central 
government for UK public sector services (e-Government) as an extension or variety of 
NPM and not as a successor to it. I argue that, despite their championing of efficient 
high-quality public services, neither NPM nor e-Government has been efficacious. 
Consequently, I maintain that there remains a requirement for alternative and better 
solutions. 
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Public administration 
 
It is possible to identify a variety of historical influences that have contemporary 
significance for the delivery of UK public services and which may help to explain why 
solutions to the performance problems described in this thesis have not been adequately 
dealt with or managed. The modern state is described as emerging during the 18th and 
19th centuries in response to the preceding ‘absolutist’ system of monarchical 
government (Richards and Smith, 2002). This modernity (based on a belief in the power 
of reason, a quest for objective truths and a strong faith in progress) is said to have 
precipitated the development of bureaucratic government (Weber, 1947). Bureaucracy 
is described as “… the epitome of a formally organised structure based on rational 
politics” (Richards and Smith, 2002, 44), the principal characteristics of which include: 
a clearly identifiable hierarchy; unambiguous lines of responsibility; established rules 
and regulations; an emphasis on control and process; uniformity; predictability; 
stability; and shared public sector values.  
 
The bureaucratic model envisages decision-making that is free of personal, irrational or 
emotional influences. Selection is based on qualifications (i.e. not influenced by social 
and family connections) and staff are compensated via salary. A Weberian bureaucracy 
maintains an elaborate and systematic division of labour, and seeks to maximise 
efficiency (Jain, 2004). A benevolent assessment of traditional public sector 
management would probably reference characteristics such as tradition, service, 
vocation, fairness, rule-governed adherence to codes of conduct, caution, procedure and 
an innate sense of responsibility (Hennessey, 1990a; Hood, 1991; Walker, 1993, 1995). 
 
The role of government expanded rapidly during the 19th and 20th centuries. Public 
expenditure in the UK increased from 11% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1910 
to over 50% of GDP in the late 1970s, and the underlying economy expanded rapidly 
too. By this time, a quarter of the population was working for the public sector. The 
welfare state started to attract criticism because of the drain on the public finances of 
welfare spending, dissatisfaction due to increasing taxes and minimal welfare benefits, 
and failed attempts to bring the situation under control. The condemnations of 
bureaucracy included excessive controls over employees that put them into an ‘iron 
cage’, and the danger that bureaucracy might become more powerful than society itself 
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(Weber, 1947). Bureaucracy was also charged with fostering ‘goal displacement’, 
whereby rules become ends in themselves (Merton, 1957); ‘sub-optimisation’, with sub-
units pursuing independent goals (Selznick, 1957); resistance to change and inadequate 
innovation (Burns and Stalker, 1961); adhering too closely to the regulations (Gouldner, 
1954); and ‘playing to the rules’ (Blau, 1956).  
 
Until the early 1970s, the Civil Service was essentially based upon the cultivation of the 
amateur or generalist. In particular, the administrative class of staff had no specific 
professional education or formal training. The report of the Civil Service Commission 
(1968) resulted in the reform of the class system, the creation of the Civil Service 
College and the application of principles called ‘accountable management’ that 
advocated the identification of cost centres corresponding with the budget centres that 
were to be found in industrial organisations.  The Fulton Report also recommended the 
separation from UK central government control of agencies such as the Post Office, the 
Royal Mint, air traffic control and parts of the social services. 
 
NPM: origins and characteristics as a method for managing change and improving 
performance 
 
The escalating sense of crisis in government (described above) led to the emergence of 
an alternative ideology for the delivery of public services that caused them to think and 
act more like private sector organisations. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) observe that new 
kinds of public institutions emerged in response to the failure of bureaucracy that were 
decentralised, innovative, flexible, adaptable and quick to learn. They used “… 
competition, customer choice, and other non-bureaucratic mechanisms to get things 
done as creatively and effectively as possible” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 2). The 
authors identify the principles that characterise the new model of government: they 
promote competition between service providers; they empower citizens by pushing 
control out into the community; they measure performance focusing on outcomes; they 
are driven by their goals and not by rules and regulations; they redefine their clients as 
customers and offer them choices; they prevent problems before they emerge; they seek 
to earn money and not just to spend it; they decentralise authority and embrace 
participatory management; they prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic solutions; 
and they focus on catalysing all sectors into solving their community’s problems and 
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not simply on providing public services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 19-20). This 
group of ideas was subsequently labeled the New Public Management (NPM). For 
example, Dunleavy et al. (2006) refer to NPM as a “two-level phenomena [sic]” 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006, 97): the first level being a theory of managerial change 
comprised of three main elements (disaggregation, competition and incentivisation); 
and the second level being a collection of NPM-badged ideas such as agencification,21 
de-professionalisation and improved performance management.  
 
As an approach for change management and process innovation, NPM has been 
characterised by other commentators as a ‘can-do’ business-oriented culture that 
promotes market testing, performance management, commercial attitudes and 
commercial methods (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987; Pollitt, 1993; Trapp, 1994; Walker, 
1995). NPM is said to champion efficient high-quality services and a never-ending 
search for greater effectiveness (Hennessey, 1990b; Kemp, 1996). It espouses risk 
taking entrepreneurial management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Walker, 1993, 2001); 
customer focus (Timmins, 1992); and managerial freedom (Hennessey, 1990b; Walker, 
2004). NPM also advocates small-government that is willing to steer and not row 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 25), and the automation of public service delivery via the 
increasing use of information technology (Hood, 1991). Thus NPM is shown to 
embrace and not simply precede electronic service delivery (e-Government), while 
electronic service delivery is shown to be an integral part (and an extension) of NPM.  
                                                          
21 The term ‘agencification’ refers to the rearrangement of large bureaucracies into executive agencies. In 
a report entitled ‘Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps’, central government 
maintained that agencies should be established to carry out executive functions for government. These 
agencies could remain part of government or be separate from it, but the policy and resources framework 
should be set by the commissioning department (Efficiency Unit, 1988, 9). 
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NPM: unintended consequences 
 
However, scholars also argue that NPM has created a technological paradox because it 
both encourages the increased use of government IT and focuses upon organisational 
changes that have been harmful to IT performance (Dunleavy et al., 2006).  The authors 
also observe that NPM has fragmented government institutions, increased policy 
complexity, reduced citizens’ capacity to solve their own problems, hollowed-out public 
sector staffing, and introduced new contractually-based risks and barriers. They point 
out that agencification has created organisational silos that make collective (joined-up) 
action difficult, while competition has resulted in problems for government IT. For 
example, research shows that NPM countries (like the UK) can be expected to perform 
less well in handling government IT than non-NPM countries, which may be 
attributable to NPM’s effects in disintegrating government and enhancing the power of 
the IT industry (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 84). Other authors also maintain that NPM has 
had powerful (adverse) side effects and caused policy problems. For example, Margetts 
and Willcocks (1993) point out that NPM-driven developments in the public sector use 
of IT constitute considerable risks, while Goddard and Riback (1998) maintain that 
government is not a business, and that forcing government managers into private sector 
thinking usually creates more problems than it resolves.  
 
Additional criticisms of NPM refer to an increasing concentration on the micro-
management of specific targets, and the imposition of inspection regimes (Clancy, 
2005). The employment of targets as levers for improvement are said to portray service 
as a commodity that continues to be delivered by an outdated, mechanistic, mass-
production model (Parker, 2006). In a further sign of disaffection with NPM, the terms 
‘scientific management’ and ‘neo-Taylorism’ are employed pejoratively (Pollitt, 1993; 
Seifert, 2002) to highlight a growing polarisation between routine production workers,22 
in-person service workers and symbolic-analytic workers (Reich, 1992, 174). Reich 
explains that symbolic analysts demand a different (better) working environment than 
routine production and in-person service workers, but that traditional job categories 
overlap the new ones, making it difficult to differentiate between them. 
                                                          
22 According to Reich's typology, routine producers are people who are engaged in repetitive high- 
volume work, in-person service workers are people doing simple repetitive tasks in face-to-face 
environments, and symbolic-analytic workers are people with problem-solving skills and the ability to 
broker solutions (Reich, 1992). 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that, while it is possible to 
identify some positive claims for the applicability of the NPM model of public 
administration, which draws heavily upon management techniques from the private 
sector, it is largely perceived by observers to be ineffective and less able to foster 
innovative change than the private sector. However, the UK Government’s adherence to 
NPM has been detrimental to a key objective of its ambitious e-Government strategy: 
that of improving the delivery of public services through the deployment of ICTs. In 
sum, despite the apparent innovativeness of NPM, scholars have shown that, on 
balance, its effects on change management and service delivery have been harmful. 
 
The next section of this chapter will discuss the continuation of the NPM and e-
Government projects, arguing that neither is dead in the way that some commentators 
suggest. It will also describe the search for a theory of e-Government and offer possible 
explanations for major public sector ICT failures from stakeholder theory and 
institutional theory.   
 
E-Government 
 
The above discussion has introduced the contextual framework within which the 
broader changes brought about by e-Government can be located. It portrays e-
Government as an extension of New Public Management. A variety of potential benefits 
from the applicability of NPM and e-Government, and a number of significant problems 
flowing from them, are also identified. Dunleavy et al. go so far as to assert that, 
because of these problems, NPM is dead and has been succeeded by “Digital-Era 
Government” (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 216). Subsequently, however, they acknowledge 
that NPM is “still afloat” (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 218) with some components actively 
developing. Business managerialism (a key feature of NPM) is said to remain the major 
external influence on state organisational changes (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 227). 
Consequently, like the expression transformational Government discussed previously in 
Chapter 2 (see page 25), the expression Digital-Era Government may be another 
example of “verbal inflation” (Bannister, 2006) and this thesis will therefore employ the 
more established expression e-Government. 
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The pressure from central government for public services to keep pace with modern 
business management methods seems unrelenting. For example, in a move that is said to 
mark a further injection of market disciplines into the National Health Service, hospitals 
are being required to adopt ‘activity based costing’. This has been described as a ‘profit 
and loss approach’ that will enable hospitals to distinguish those services that are 
trading at a loss from those that make money, and to adjust charges to their primary care 
trusts accordingly (Timmins, 2007). Walker asserts that the current Labour 
government’s unfolding plans fit squarely within NPM ways of thinking, while Gershon 
(HM Treasury, 2004), Varney (2006) and Lyons (2007) all seem to rely on the 1980s 
postulate that “everything government does can be cheaper” (Walker, 2004). A 
Secretary of State said recently that there would be no reversal of the government’s 
reform programme and that marketisation and choice were being “built into the DNA of 
our public service infrastructure” (Taylor and Timmins, 2007). 
 
The identification of a body of theoretical work on e-Government has been challenging. 
Jackson and Curthoys (2001, 216) claim to have identified the germ of a distinct or 
preliminary theory of e-Government that places stronger emphasis on using internet 
technology to achieve service aims. The authors allude to fundamental changes to 
public sector management precipitated by e-Government (such as organisational 
redesign within the Civil Service) but speculate that it may nevertheless just be a 
continuation of NPM.  
 
The World Bank maintains that there is no e-Government theory: knowledge about e-
Government comes from practice and excellence from best practice (World Bank, 
2002). Halachmi (2004) asks where the grand theory of e-Government is to be found; is 
it influenced or guided by theory at all, or is it just the result of local circumstances? He 
concludes that there may be no generally accepted theory or model, that there is no 
consensus about a common definition, and that there is a lack of evidence regarding 
outcomes (Halachmi, 2004, 5). More recently, Irani and Elliman (2007) have identified 
more than 100 research questions about e-Government, which suggests that there is still 
a paucity of answers. 
 
E-Government may lack a cohesive theory, but I argue that the conceptual framework 
for this thesis is nonetheless strengthened by treating it as an extension of NPM, as 
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outlined above. E-Government has features in common with e-Commerce, which has 
produced a distinct literature, but this theoretical aspect is outside the scope of this 
research because my principal concern is with business processes for change 
management rather than technological implementation. Consequently, the sources that I 
refer to are more directly concerned with these issues. Furthermore, Jackson and 
Curthoys (2001, 210) distinguish e-Government from e-Commerce because e-
Government is “… set within a multi-institutional and public setting with consequently 
differing expectations, financial and technological requirements”. Other theoretical 
perspectives associated with e-Government, such as stakeholder theory and institution 
theory, are discussed below. 
 
Scholars argue that bureaucratic inertia is likely to be a barrier to successful innovation 
in the public sector (Lazer, 2003), where e-Government projects have failed and are 
likely to fail in the future. There are various internal tensions that make e-Government 
projects difficult to achieve and by upsetting the status quo, e-Government efforts 
become vulnerable to subversion by key stakeholders. Jain (2004) maintains that 
information technology can be a tool for reforming bureaucracy; that it can foster 
improved co-operation and information sharing, and make government more flexible, 
responsive and efficient. By counteracting situations where processes become ‘stove 
piped’ (i.e. highly inflexible) and information is held in ‘silos’ (i.e. not shared properly), 
e-Government can precipitate a more collaborative style of government (Zussman, 
2002) through a greater accessibility and sharing of information. E-Government has 
parallels with the objectives of Lean thinking and knowledge management, which are 
discussed in greater depth later in this chapter, on pages 72-76.   
 
Stakeholder theory 
 
A stakeholder in an organisation is “… any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievements of the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, 25). Put 
simply, stakeholder theory maintains that good stakeholder management translates into 
good business (Scholl, 2001), particularly in the context of large scale IT investments, 
where the risk of failure is high, largely because of their complexity. This tenet has 
permeated into the public sector where (as we have seen above) management functions 
increasingly resemble private sector management responsibilities.  
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Research has demonstrated the practical value of a stakeholder approach in an e-
Government setting. For example, a major public sector IT initiative in New York State 
was preceded by a stakeholder needs analysis and consultation exercise involving a 
range of stakeholders, any one of whom had the capacity to support or impede the 
project (Pardo et al., 2000). Workshops generated much useful information, ongoing 
support and constructive publicity. The theory may extend to management decision-
making generally, where it is arguably important to understand the needs of 
stakeholders before the commencement of any ambitious project. More broadly, it is 
arguable that some greater level of stakeholder engagement or feedback might improve 
efficiency, quality or satisfaction with public services. 
 
Institutional theory 
 
Spinoza maintained that those who ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. As we 
have seen above, in spite of repeated disappointments, hyper-modernists (staunch 
believers in the power of IT to solve problems) aver that new information technology 
systems can produce dramatic cost reductions and public service improvements. These 
beliefs seem to echo the ‘triumph of hope over experience’ paradox affecting the NPM 
movement, of which e-Government is a recent manifestation (Hood and Peters, 2004). 
 
Is technology adopted to make government work better, or is it partly attributable to 
conformist tendencies23 such as wanting to be on the cutting edge of technology, 
keeping up with other agencies and complying with EU standards? An examination of 
50 e-Government projects in the USA concluded that there is often no sound business 
plan or cost-benefit analysis, and that such projects are sometimes initiated as a function 
of fad and fashion, and because of legitimacy concerns (Cohen and Eimicke, 2001). 
Institutional theory helps to explain this conformity to the rules and trends of the 
institutional environment (Yildiz, 2003).  
 
Institutional theory encompasses the social aspects of decision-making such as concerns 
about legitimacy, stability and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
                                                          
23 In this context, the term ‘conformist tendencies’ is used to describe the tendency of public agencies to 
adopt the same solutions as other public agencies (i.e. to imitate them) for reasons of legitimacy, even if 
those solutions are not efficacious in other respects.  
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It offers possible explanations of why government organisations are so similar, and why 
there is a process of homogenisation regarding the adoption of ICTs in government. 
Technologies become institutionalised, and technical procedures become taken-for-
granted means to accomplish organisational ends, establishing organisations as 
appropriate, rational, modern and responsible; they become “… myths binding on 
organisations” (Yildiz, 2003). Associated with studies on e-Government is research 
suggesting that organisations feel obliged to do what everybody else in the sector is 
doing because this has the effect of increasing their legitimacy, regardless of the 
efficacy of the solutions that are being adopted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 340). These 
common solutions "… come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action" 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 341) and contribute toward the processes by which 
individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality (Scott, 1987, 496). 
 
Legitimacy is sometimes more important to organisations than the rational decision-
making process (Gold, 1999) and external legitimacy can be particularly beneficial 
(Singh et al., 1986, 176). It may, for example, generate political advantage, attract 
financial resources and other types of support, and reduce the risk of innovative 
schemes being characterised as imprudent. Similarly, research suggests that specific 
solutions are not necessarily created to solve specific problems but may already exist, 
waiting for problems to arise. This ‘garbage can’ model of organisational choice (Cohen 
et al., 1972, 1) assumes that problems and solutions come together in an almost arbitrary 
fashion, determined by their arrival times (like rubbish in a rubbish bin), and not by 
some more rational process. In other words, it is conceivable that the UK’s e-
Government policy has failed because it was adopted for doctrinaire or arbitrary reasons 
and not as an evidence-based approach to cost reduction and service improvement. 
 
Some commentators say that the momentum behind UK central government’s 
technological transformation agenda is undiminished (Varney, 2006), but others warn 
that “the heady days of unremitting investment24 in local e-Government are well and 
truly over” (Hill, 2007). Central support for local capital schemes has largely dried up, 
and the focus of attention has shifted to the development of shared services. While the 
Department for Communities and Local Government has established a Capacity 
                                                          
24 As early as 2004, local authorities were complaining that central government investment in IT based 
services was inadequate (Carroll, 2004a). 
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Building Fund that is supporting a number of improvement initiatives,25 some of which 
are ICT oriented, the available resources are modest compared to the e-Government 
programme. While a short period of consolidation might be beneficial, it seems likely 
that some of the more ambitious ICT projects (such as the integration of Customer 
Relations Management systems with back-office systems to maximise the resolution of 
customer enquiries on first contact) will be delayed. In this environment, references to a 
post-NPM and post e-Government golden age may be too optimistic (Dunleavy et al., 
2006).  
 
The next section of this chapter explores PAFID from a different perspective - that of 
agency theory. The implication is that PAFID may be partly attributable to principal-
agent problems arising in the current NPM context between various stakeholders 
involved in delivering public services, and that PAFID might be managed by addressing 
those problems.   
 
Agency Theory 
 
Hood (1991) contends that NPM can be viewed as a ‘marriage’ between business-type 
managerialism and post-war ideas about public choice, transaction costs and agency 
theory. The following discussion illustrates the ways in which agency theory can be 
helpful in terms of suggesting possible explanations of why the current reform path 
specified by central government (under the banner of NPM and e-Government) may not 
deliver what is required. Significantly, it underpins the argument developed in this 
thesis about the need to focus on alternative approaches, such as Lean thinking and 
managing PAFID. 
 
A key feature of the principal-agent relationship is the assumption that the desires and 
goals of the principal and the agent conflict, and that it is difficult or costly for the 
principal to verify what the agent is doing because of ‘information asymmetry’ (Coase, 
1937; Ross, 1973; Williamson, 1975, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1985, 1989a). People and firms are assumed not to act in ways that are contrary to their 
own interests, and they may even be tempted to behave inappropriately, from the 
                                                          
25 For example, information about the Sussex Improvement Partnership is available online at 
http://www.sece.gov.uk/sussexip accessed 23/08/08. 
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perspective of the principal, giving rise to ‘moral hazard’. Similarly, an institution that 
is insulated from risk (i.e. that does not have to bear the full consequences of its actions) 
may behave differently and perhaps less carefully than it would if it were fully exposed 
to that risk. Consequently, policies have to be designed so that self-interest induces or 
incentivises people to behave in ways that the principal requires (Black, 2002), but this 
gives rise to new concerns about perverse incentives and unintended consequences.  
 
Perverse incentives have unanticipated and undesirable effects; hence the so-called ‘law 
of unintended consequences’, which maintains that all purposeful action will generate 
some unintended outcomes (Merton, 1957, 63-66). Agents may even go so far as to 
‘game the system’ by seeking to exploit rules that are intended for other purposes. For 
instance, once I contract with you to deliver a particular service, you have an incentive 
to examine how I will monitor your performance (Williamson, 1975, 1979). If you can 
make savings in the cost or effort of delivery by ‘playing to the rules’ then that is what 
you will do - leaving aside the risk that I may not retain your services in the future 
because you did not meet the unstated or uncodified elements of the agreement. 
Transposing the concepts outlined above into the arena of local autonomy and the 
central direction of public services, it is arguable that ‘playing to the rules’ could result 
in more and not fewer defects or failures, the costs of which could exceed any ‘savings’ 
produced by centrally-imposed reform paths.  
 
Arguably, the whole notion of externally imposed targets26 (such as UK central 
government’s requirement that councils should implement specified technologies by 
specified dates) is flawed, if they simply engage peoples’ ingenuity in managing the 
numbers and make the public sector less adept at delivering what the public really want 
(Clancy, 2005). The mantra “measures drive behavior” is intended to make a similar 
point (Peter Hines, speaking at the Lean Enterprise Research Council’s annual 
conference, Cardiff University, 6th July 2007). Seddon maintains that targets end up 
taking priority over performance, when most of the variation in performance is in the 
system (Seddon, 2003, 61; 2008, 96). A similar point is pursued by Barrett (2004), who 
highlights the outstanding need to resolve the paradox of control and autonomy in 
achieving desired outcomes, namely how to avoid performance becoming 
                                                          
26 Jowett and Rothwell (1988, 99) use the expression “exogenously stipulated government criteria”. 
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conformance27 with targets at the expense of broader goals. Barrett maintains that NPM 
has reasserted the dominance of prescriptive top-down approaches, the unintended 
consequences of which include the skewing of service priorities and the manipulation of 
data for fear of failure.28 Jowett and Rothwell (1988) point out that the definition of 
performance is to a large extent dependent upon the perspective of the interested parties, 
and consequently they argue that there can be no unique measure by which the level of 
this interest-related performance can be accurately gauged.  
 
The next section of this chapter continues the exploration for alternative ways of 
improving public services and reducing costs. It focuses on the concept of Lean 
thinking, which is investigated from a variety of perspectives including systems 
thinking, innovation and change management, knowledge management and 
organisational learning. 
 
Lean thinking and waste prevention 
 
If the ‘technology push’ or hyper-modernist approach to performance improvement in 
the current NPM context (described in Chapter 2, pages 22-23) is misconceived and 
losing momentum, is there an alternative? The next relevant stream of theoretical 
writings that this thesis considers is the concept of Lean thinking.  
 
In Chapter 2, commentators were identified who maintain that a better way of 
improving public service delivery (i.e. better than relying upon the deployment of ICT 
systems) is to design services against customer demand (Heeks 2001; Seddon 2003, 
2008; Varney 2006; HM Treasury 2007a; Cane 2007b). This involves making a 
distinction between 'value work' that contributes to desired outcomes and ‘non-value 
                                                          
27 Faced with the problem of why public sector organisations cultivate a culture of conformance, a 
possible explanation is that people disagree about the required standards of performance. For example, 
some will say that the perceived quality of service depends upon the quality of the interaction, while 
others will say that quality of service depends almost entirely upon results. Because one cannot have a 
continuing debate about how much priority to assign to competing objectives, there has to be some sort of 
closure. One way of achieving closure is to cultivate the ‘boss culture’, which requires of both the boss 
and the subordinate to adopt particular personalities (Adorno, 1950). 
28 The Department for Work and Pensions castigated local authorities that appeared to be manipulating 
housing benefit processes by refusing to accept defective claims. The effect of the manipulation was to 
enable councils to reduce processing times (as defined by the DWP) and to meet centrally imposed targets 
(Department for Work and Pensions, General Information Bulletin, HB/CTB G8/2007 available at 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/local-authority-staff/housing-benefit/user-communications/hbctb-bulletins/hbctb-
bulletins-2007/ accessed 01/07/09). 
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work’ that leads to what Seddon calls ‘failure demand’.29 Having identified failure 
demand as a major source of waste in service organisations, Seddon recommends a 
solution (the eradication or reduction of failure demand) based upon the Toyota 
Production System and Lean thinking, which he describes as “the Toyota system for 
service organisations” (Seddon, 2005).30 While car production and public service 
delivery may seem incompatible, scholars have argued for decades that manufacturing 
methods for improving efficiency are transferable to the services sector (Levitt, 1972). 
Tidd et al. (2005, 14) confirm that recent experience of deploying Lean thinking in the 
manufacturing and services sectors “… underlines further scope for continuous 
innovation”.  
 
Both NPM and Lean thinking promote management strategies such as customer focus, 
continuous improvement, high-quality service, waste avoidance and service automation 
– and both endorse commercial attitudes and methods. Hood (1991) identifies other 
points of congruence, arguing that NPM can be understood as an expression of values 
(such as frugality, waste reduction and the conservation of resources) that are 
encapsulated by the mantra ‘keep it lean and purposeful’. Hood also asserts that the 
application of Lean manufacturing techniques such as ‘just-in-time’ (which he 
characterises as a classic expression of the values embraced by NPM) offers substantial 
opportunities for cost reduction and service improvement. However, a closer 
examination of the systems-oriented approaches that underpin Lean thinking (see 
below) reveals distinctions between NPM and Lean that begin to explain why Lean 
thinking might be a better vehicle for UK public service improvement. 
 
Lean thinking: origins and characteristics 
 
Lean thinking is commonly recognised as an extension of the Toyota Production 
System (TPS). The location of TPS in management as a field of knowledge was 
                                                          
29 As already noted in Chapters 1 and 2, I call the phenomenon potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand (PAFID) and define it as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by earlier failures, 
such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and potentially avoidable demands to 
impinge upon public services”. 
30 Seddon distinguishes his ‘systems approach’ from the much more comprehensive Lean thinking 
methodology described below by defining it in terms of removing the causes of variation and designing 
the services against customer demand to ensure that the work flows cleanly and smoothly (Seddon, 2008, 
41).  
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discussed in Chapter 2, page 35. The various strains of the Japanese quality movement 
share founding fathers such as Taylor (1911), Ford (1924, 1926), Deming (1986), Juran 
(1962), Fiegenbaum (1951, 1961), Taguchi and Clausing (1990), Shingo (1986), Crosby 
(1979) and Schonberger (1982). They espouse similar principles, such as efficiency, 
explicit quality orientation, continuous incremental improvement, customer focus, self-
motivation through empowerment, and decentralised responsibility for achievement of 
the quality standard (Morgan and Murgatroyd, 1994). They share an interest in process 
concepts such as value added, just-in-time, quality related costs, failure prevention, 
striving for perfection, zero defects, and mistake proofing. They also employ similar 
tools such as benchmarking, team-working, space reduction, rapid improvement 
exercises, quality circles, creative problem solving, the deployment of knowledge 
management, and innovation for competitive advantage.31  
 
At the heart of the Toyota Production System and Lean thinking (Womack, Jones and 
Roos, 1991; Womack and Jones, 1996) lays the elimination of muri, muda and mura 
(excess, waste and unevenness) through a process of continuous incremental innovation. 
Ohno (1988, 19) identifies seven types of manufacturing waste: over-production, 
motion, waiting, transportation, processing, inventory and defects. Bicheno (2004, 20) 
lists seven service wastes: delay, duplication, unnecessary movement, unclear 
communication, incorrect inventory, opportunity lost and errors. Seddon (2001, 206) 
identifies other service wastes, including correcting mistakes, progress chasing, 
checking and mis-directed activity. Work defects leading to re-work are very expensive 
in manufacturing, and major efficiency gains are available from reengineering the 
production process to deliver ‘zero defects’ (Crosby, 1979).  
The management literature is replete with alternative methods, tools and techniques. 
Table 2 below therefore seeks to distinguish the key elements of Lean thinking by 
showing how they differ from other common approaches. What it reveals is that, in 
                                                          
31 Lean thinking and TPS also focus on measurable gains. Edwards Deming is credited with saying, “In 
God we trust – all others must bring data”. 
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spite of Lean thinking’s apparent heterogeneity32 it is possible to identify a distinctive 
underlying philosophy based on process optimisation through the elimination of 
everything that is non-value-adding. The table also shows that Lean thinking is 
constructed around five key principles: value, value stream, work flow, pull and 
perfection (Womack and Jones, 1996). For instance, the literature reveals that the same 
five concepts (re-labeled core principles) have been applied to improvement programs 
in the National Health Service (Jones and Mitchell, 2006). The Lean philosophy 
adopted by Tesco’s equates value with customer focus, value stream with planning, pull 
with responsiveness to customer demand, perfection with discipline and standards, and 
waste reduction with one-touch replenishment of stock (Barry Evans, speaking at the 
Lean Enterprise Research Council’s annual conference, Cardiff University, 6th July 
2007). What this serves to demonstrate is that Lean thinking provides a conceptual 
umbrella under which a variety of management practices may be employed for change 
management, and to improve performance and reduce costs.33 
 
Table 2: Key elements of Lean thinking, and other methods and standards 
 
Method Key Elements Other Characteristics 
Lean thinking 
 
Based on five principles that address: 
(1) value or knowing what the 
customer values; (2) value stream or 
understanding what delivers value and 
employing the irreducible minimum of 
activities required to deliver it; (3) 
work flow or making the value creating 
steps flow smoothly, continuously and 
rapidly by reducing waste; (4) pull or 
responding to the pull of customer 
demand; and (5) perfection or 
continuously seeking improvement. 
 
 
 
A management method and systems 
approach derived from the Toyota 
Production System.  
 
Focuses on improving quality and reducing 
costs through process optimisation, i.e. seeks 
to eliminate non-value-adding activities in 
physical and business processes. For 
example, aims to reduce cycle times by 
eliminating waste in each step of the 
process, as this is perceived to lead to best 
quality and lowest cost. Emphasises team 
working, worker participation in problem 
solving, flattening of hierarchies and 
loosening of organisational models to 
enhance innovation. 
 
                                                          
32 As if to emphasise this point, Bicheno (2004, 11) lists twenty “characteristics of Lean” which are: 
customer focus; simplicity through avoidance of complexity; waste reduction; process improvement; 
visibility to enable control by sight; regularity to avoid surprises; flow to keep output moving at the 
customer rate; pull by producing at the customer rate of demand; postponement to avoid over production; 
prevention of problems and waste; time reduction; improvement which includes innovation; partnership 
through co-operative and team-working; value through co-operative networks; gemba which is managing 
by walking around; variation reduction through measurement and management; participation by enabling 
operators to solve problems; thinking small to retain ‘family focus’; and building trust with suppliers and 
other key stakeholders. 
33 Hence Lean thinking’s usefulness in the identification and reduction of potentially avoidable failure 
induced demand. 
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Table 2 (continued): 
 
Method Key Elements Other Characteristics 
 
Total Quality 
Management 
 
Based on W. Edwards Deming’s 
Fourteen Points for Total Quality 
Control, which address: (1) 
constancy of purpose; (2) reducing 
government regulation; (3) 
preventing defects; (4) building 
relationships with suppliers; (5) 
continuously seeking improvement; 
(6) training and continuous learning 
at all levels; (7) enhancing leadership 
skills; (8) encouraging staff 
involvement; (9) team working; (10) 
eliminating targets and quotas; (11) 
removing barriers; and (12) taking 
action to accomplish transformation. 
 
Focuses on productivity and quality. 
Aims to improve productivity 
through waste avoidance. Seeks to 
sustain the habit of continuous 
quality improvement and achieve 
perfection. Decision making based on 
facts and data. 
 
Provides a quality control approach to 
management that emphasises a long term 
organisation-wide commitment to quality. 
Highlights collective responsibility for 
quality and encourages people to work 
across organisational boundaries. Aims to 
achieve zero defects and make products 
and services that conform exactly to 
desired standards. 
 
Emphasises the cost of quality, i.e. the 
cost of not getting things right first time 
every time. Quality control means 
continuous improvement and defect 
prevention rather than reliance upon 
inspection. Applies statistical methods and 
seeks to create a positive attitude toward 
quality at every level in the organisation. 
Promotes the idea that everyone is a 
supplier and a customer to someone else in 
the organisation. 
 
 
 
EFQM 
Excellence 
Model 
 
A non-prescriptive TQM framework 
that focuses on nine criteria 
consisting of five enablers (what an 
organisation does) and four results 
(what an organisation achieves). The 
enablers are leadership, people, 
policy and strategy, partnership and 
resources. The four results are 
people, customer, society and key 
performance.  
 
 
Provides a framework for organisational 
management based upon the principles of 
TQM. A diagnostic tool for self-
assessment of the organisation, and the 
basis for the EFQM Excellence Award. 
 
 
Six Sigma 
 
Focuses on cost reduction via the 
reduction of defects and variation. 
Employs the sequence: (1) Design or 
define the problem; (2) Measure or 
how are we doing (3) Analyse or 
what is wrong; (4) Improve or fix 
what is wrong; and (5) Control or 
hold the gains and sustain. 
Sometimes the cycle is supplemented 
with Transfer. 
 
Quality is seen as a means to an end 
– making customers happier and 
increasing profitability. 
 
 
A strategic problem-solving method and a 
statistical measure that seeks to reduce 
defects to below 3.4 defects per million 
opportunities. 
 
Structured and quantitative, customer 
focused and project based (one problem at 
a time), accompanied by an elaborate 
training and accreditation process. 
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Table 2 (continued): 
 
Method Key Elements Other Characteristics 
 
ISO 9001 
 
Focuses on the development and 
implementation of quality 
management systems that 
demonstrate the ability to 
consistently provide products that 
meet customer and statutory 
requirements, and address customer 
satisfaction through the effective 
application of the system. Tools 
include continuous improvement and 
the prevention of nonconformity. 
 
 
Provides comprehensive standards for 
quality management systems. 
Accreditation it intended to ensure that 
outputs are produced consistently and in 
accordance with the proper 
documentation, but can be a paper system 
that is not closely related to the way things 
are done. 
 
 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
 
A management tool that promotes 
and facilitates the reporting a 
balanced set of financial and 
operational performance measures. 
The five key elements are (1) 
translating the vision into operational 
goals (2) communicating the vision 
and linking it to individual 
performance (3) business planning 
and index setting (4) feedback and 
learning, and (5) adjust the strategy 
accordingly. 
 
 
Ultimately about choosing measures and 
targets. Allows managers to view the 
organisation from several different 
perspectives simultaneously: financial 
(how do we look to the shareholders?); 
customer (how do customers see us?); 
internal business processes (what must we 
excel at); and learning and growth (can we 
continue to improve and create value?) 
 
Investors in 
People (IiP) 
 
An externally validated and widely 
recognised management standard.  
 
Focuses upon staff improvement and 
quality. Designed to help 
organisations improve performance 
and realise objectives through better 
management and continuous 
development of their people. 
 
The framework is based on three 
main elements (1) Plan – develop 
strategies to improve performance (2) 
Do – take action to improve 
performance, and (3) Review – 
evaluate and improve performance. 
 
 
Described as a flexible and easy to use 
standard that is outcome focused and non-
prescriptive, customer led and 
independently assessed. Promotes 
continuous staff development. 
 
Organisations pursuing the standard 
require specialist external support to meet 
detailed evidential requirements during the 
initial assessment and subsequent three-
yearly reviews. 
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Table 2 (continued): 
 
Method Key Elements Other Characteristics 
 
Customer 
Service 
Excellence 
 
A management tool for driving 
customer-focused change, principally 
intended for public sector 
organisations.  
 
Applicants are assessed against five 
qualifying criteria: customer insight; 
the culture of the organisation; 
information and access; delivery; and 
timeliness and quality of service. 
 
 
The standard gives emphasis to the 
importance of developing an in-depth 
understanding of customers.  
 
Accreditation is obtained via independent 
assessment by external specialists. Any 
public, private or third sector organisation 
may participate. 
 
 
 
The sources informing Table 2 are detailed in the footnote below34 
 
Lean thinking: the systems approach 
 
The literature on systems thinking helps to contextualise Lean thinking and NPM as 
approaches to change management. For instance, Lean thinking is described as systems-
oriented, holistic, integrated, co-ordinated, interactive, consensual, participative and 
continuous. By implication, the NPM method is comparatively reductionist, fragmented, 
complex, mechanistic and losing momentum. Such an interpretation, as noted above in 
the section on NPM, begins to signal the limitations of NPM as an effective approach 
for change management, in spite of several aspects of congruence with Lean thinking. 
 
Systems thinking debates the subjective nature of real-world problems and this helps to 
illuminate aspects of the case-studies described later in this thesis. For example, 
Bicheno (2004) describes Lean as an extension of the Toyota Production System, while 
Seddon identifies Toyota’s Taiichi Ohno as “… the first person to realise the profound 
benefits of managing an organisation as a system” (Seddon, 2003, 13; 2008, 67). If “to 
                                                          
34 Sources informing Table 2. For Lean thinking see Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (2005); Womack and Jones 
(1996; 2005); Bicheno (2000; 2004); Bessant and Tidd (2008). Total Quality Management see Crosby 
(1979); Schonberger (1982); Deming (1986); Morgan and Murgatroyd (1994); Cole (1993); Womack and 
Jones (1996). For EFQM see European Foundation for Quality Management, available online at 
http://www.efqm.org and http://www.qualityscotland.co.uk accessed 18/04/10. For Six Sigma see 
Chowdhury (2001); Bicheno (2004); Byrne, Lubowe and Blitz (2007). For ISO 9001 see International 
Organisation for Standards, available online at http://iso.org accessed 18/04/10. For Balanced Scorecard 
see Kaplan and Norton (1992; 1996) and Balanced Scorecard method, available online at 
www.valuebasedmanagement.net accessed 18/04/10. For Investors in People, available online at 
http://investorsinpeople.co.uk and http://www.iipscotland.co.uk accessed 18/04/10. For Customer Service 
Excellence available online at http://www.cse.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/homeCSE.do accessed 18/04/10. 
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realise” means to comprehend, then this claim overlooks the contribution of thinkers 
such as Ackoff (1974), who writes about an outgoing Machine Age based on doctrines 
of analytical thinking and reductionism, and an incoming Systems Age (beginning in 
the 1940s) characterised by expansionism and systems thinking. Ackoff perceives every 
problem as part of a set of interrelated problems, which he calls a system of problems or 
“a mess” (Ackoff, 1974, 21). Systems thinkers argue that the reductionist approach will 
not solve problems that occur due to the complexity and interconnectedness of the 
issues under investigation. Ackoff maintains that business planning should be about 
dealing holistically with systems of problems, and that only interactive planning 
(participative, co-ordinated, integrated, continuous and consensual) is consistent with 
systems thinking.  
 
Senge connects systems thinking with Lean thinking by proposing Toyota as an 
example of best systems practice, because in Toyota “… all the parts work together” 
(Senge, 2006, 11). He characterises business as activity “… bound by invisible fabrics 
of inter-related actions” (Senge, 2006, 7), and describes systems thinking as a holistic 
approach to problem-solving that integrates five disciplines (personal mastery, mental 
models, building shared visions, team learning and systems thinking). All of these are 
required to underpin learning organisations. The theoretical contributions offered by 
knowledge management and organisational learning are addressed in more detail later in 
this chapter (see pages 72-80). 
 
Checkland characterises systems thinking as an attempt to understand the world’s 
complexity (which he calls real-world problems, or problems of management) through 
the concept of “a set of elements connected together which form a whole, this showing 
properties which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of its component 
parts” (Checkland, 1993, 3). Checkland distinguishes between hard and soft systems, 
both of which are approaches to process improvement. Hard systems analysis makes 
extensive use of quantitative models and computer simulations in situations where goals 
can be set, performance maintained and implementation achieved. Soft systems analysis 
treats organisations as social systems perceived in subjectively different ways by their 
individual members. Consequently, it seeks to provide understanding of problems and 
effect tangible improvements rather than solutions. Naughton (1984) draws similar 
distinctions between hard and soft failures, the latter being described as events about 
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which there is disagreement concerning their extent or significance, such that they 
become matters of opinion.  
 
Hoos rejects the application of hard systems approaches (such as cost-benefit analysis, 
programme budgeting and management by objectives) to real-life problems in the 
public sector as a simplistic, mechanically contrived and self-justifying practice that 
produces “quantomania” (Hoos, 1969, 56). She explains that “… social systems are by 
their very nature so laden with intangible, human variables that concentration on their 
measurable aspects distorts the problem and confuses the issue” (Hoos, 1969, 25). The 
criticism of hard systems analysis presented by Hoos is uncompromising, implying as it 
does that quantification in general is not applicable to the resolution of social problems. 
Ackoff’s ‘interactivist’ approach to change appears to offer a soft systems solution to 
this dilemma that can be tested empirically, as it involves creating improvements in 
complex real-life situations by sharing perceptions and seeking consensus (Ackoff, 
1974, 30). 
 
Lean thinking: socio-technical systems theory 
 
Socio-technical systems theory is a branch of the Human Relations movement that 
emerged from research by the Tavistock Institute into the UK coal-mining industry (see, 
for example, Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Emery and Trist, 1960; Trist, 1993). The theory 
addresses the relationship between organisations and technology, and promotes 
performance improvement through the humanisation of work. For example, the 
associated concept of joint optimisation (or co-optimisation) places shared emphasis on 
the achievement of both excellence in technical performance and quality of working life 
(Trist, 1993). The argument is that attempts to optimise either sub-system alone will 
result in sub-optimisation of the whole. The relevance of the socio-technical approach to 
this thesis thus lies in its potential to provide reasons for the failure of some UK 
government IT projects (described in Chapters 1 and 2), and to explain the occurrence 
of PAFID.  
 
Socio-technical theory proposes ways of achieving joint optimisation through 
organisational design, such that the relationship between the social and technical 
elements generates improved productivity and worker well-being. The innovations to 
 
66 
emerge from this line of thinking include: participative work design structures such as 
self-managing teams; job enrichment, job enlargement and job rotation; and whole task 
responsibility, which appears to anticipate the modern concept of end-to-end working. 
All these pioneering developments are intended to enhance personal commitment, job 
satisfaction, productivity and quality, and to reduce absenteeism, accidents and 
industrial disputes (Trist and Bamforth, 1951). The approach thus offers alternatives to 
scientific management and the hierarchical bureaucracies that still dominate UK public 
service provision. The literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis reveals that 
Lean thinking promotes the humanisation of work by acknowledging that people are the 
most important asset. For example, Liker (2004, 198) explains that “Toyota invests in 
people and in return it gets committed associates who show up to work every day and 
on time and are continuously improving their operations”. 
 
The preceding discussion about the relationship between organisations and technology, 
and its impact upon outcomes, can be extended to embrace the innovation and 
implementation of new technologies. Voss (1992a; 1992b) asks why some firms are 
successful at innovating and implementing new processes and getting benefits from 
them, while others are not. Part of the answer that he provides is that concepts like 
implementation and success are too narrowly defined, as a consequence of which 
management does not give them sufficient attention. For example, Voss (1992a, 31) 
suggests that the process of innovation can be characterised as a three-phase life cycle 
that includes: (1) pre-installation; (2) installation and commission; and (3) 
consolidation. It is during the final consolidation phase that the further improvements 
that are required to progress from technical success to business success are likely to 
materialise. Consequently, Voss argues that the definition of success should be extended 
to include realisation of the required business benefits, and many of the factors that 
influence that success take place in the adopting organisation (e.g. the developer) rather 
than in the innovating organisation (e.g. the user). This post-installation phase is often 
neglected and yet it is a vital part of the innovation and implementation process. Lean 
thinking addresses this issue by rejecting technologies that conflict with the 
organisational culture, and limiting implementation to those reliable, thoroughly tested 
technologies that serve people and processes (Liker, 2004, 39). Following installation, 
cross-functional teams seek to maximise quality and productivity. 
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Leonard-Barton (1988) makes the same point as Voss (about the initial implementation 
phase being part of the innovation process) and explains that implementation requires 
continuing attention to the process of change. When an innovation is first deployed 
there will nearly always be misalignments between the organisation and the technology, 
and between both of these and the purpose of the innovation. To overcome these 
challenges and ensure successful implementation, Leonard-Barton recommends that 
there should be several cycles of “mutual adaptation” of both user and technical 
environments – and she asserts that changes in both environments are more beneficial 
than if one or other of them holds constant (Leonard-Barton, 1988, 265).  
 
In a study of implementation processes, Voss (1992a, 38) specifically observes that 
firms that made some form of matching organisational change achieved some degree of 
business success, whereas others that did not make organisational changes were limited 
to technical success. Leonard-Barton (1988, 265) argues that this is because success 
partly depends upon the extent to which developers and users want the implementation 
to succeed, and this circumstance is more likely to arise if the parties perceive that they 
are co-creating change that will be mutually advantageous. 
 
The argument is then that innovation and implementation do not stop at installation, and 
effective management of all three life-cycle phases (evaluation, installation, and 
consolidation) can be crucial in realising business benefits. In a comparison of US and 
Japanese approaches to implementation, Jaikumar (1986) found that US firms 
disbanded installation teams as soon as systems were working successfully, but the 
Japanese left their installation teams in position where they continued to make 
adaptations, maximise learning and translate innovations into productivity 
improvements. The implication of this is that Lean thinking already embraces socio-
technical approaches and the concept of joint optimisation. 
 
The next section of this chapter describes in more detail some of the factors that affect 
innovation and change management in UK public sector services. Lean thinking is a 
new concept in the realm of UK public services35 but its translation into implementation 
and use corresponds with two of Hartley’s “key dimensions of innovation for public 
                                                          
35 Lean thinking is not new to the private sector but Hartley explains that innovation can include the 
adaptation of an innovation in a new context, location or time (Hartley, 2006, 26).  
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sector organisations”, i.e. process innovation and rhetorical innovation36 (Hartley, 2006, 
31), and thus accommodates aspects of the innovation literature into the conceptual 
framework of this thesis. 
 
Lean thinking: innovation and change management 
 
Dunleavy (1982, 215) describes public administration as an area of study that is “… 
closely linked with practical problems and practiced solutions”. Why then is managing 
the problem of PAFID not being satisfactorily addressed and why has there been a 
scarcity of efficacious or innovative solutions? As noted above, NPM was implemented 
as a means of improving (among other things) public service delivery. Yet, as experts 
and scholars have argued, the adverse or unintended consequences of the NPM method 
of service improvement and change management have inhibited widespread tangible 
service improvement. The argument is that key reform issues like PAFID are not being 
addressed because NPM (which is characterised as reductionist, fragmented, complex, 
mechanistic and losing momentum) is not delivering on its promises as originally 
envisaged.  
 
Extant literature on innovation is focused in the private sector, where there is already an 
extensive body of work that seeks to determine the characteristics of successful and 
unsuccessful innovators. For example, see Rothwell (1977, 1985, and 1992), who 
investigates success and failure in industrial innovation during the latter part of the 20th 
century. The public sector perspective on innovation has not received as much attention 
from academics as the private sector. In the private sector, innovation is about 
competition and survival, but the public sector is more concerned about reducing costs 
and improving quality - benefits that are most likely to flow from incremental rather 
than transformational change (Tidd et al., 2005).  
 
The former UK prime minister, Tony Blair, maintains that policy makers are not to 
blame for the perceived lack of innovation in the public sector. Central government 
fulfills an enabling role, adopting market-like mechanisms to help services generate 
innovation and change as a means to remedy poor service delivery (Timmins, 2006c). 
                                                          
36 Hartley uses the expression “rhetorical innovation” to describe the creation of new language and 
concepts. 
 
69 
Alluding to the cultural inertia that might explain the malaise, the former Premier says 
that civil servants should be supported when they take risks, thereby allowing them to 
be more entrepreneurial (innovative) and managerial (Timmins, 2006c). More recently, 
the government stated that its aim was “to make the UK the leading place in the world 
to be an innovative business, third sector organisation or public service” (Department 
for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2008, 11). However, Shepherd maintains that 
public services research is still not recognised as fundamental to society and points out 
that “there are few connections and little congruence [sic] between the research councils 
and public services” (Shepherd, 2008, 8-9). 
 
There are various reasons why some organisations are unable to identify and implement 
innovations. Drucker (1969) maintains that government is not good at innovation 
because of its conservatism, which places a premium upon “… doing with proper 
procedures what has been done before” (Drucker, 1969, 231). Innovation is not easy and 
does not emerge in a vacuum. What other organisations have and know is not easy to 
copy. They can be limited by the present and likely future state of technical knowledge, 
and by the limits of in-house competence (Tidd et al., 2005). Consequently, scholars 
argue that key considerations need to include the organisational context in which 
innovation is created and implemented: different organisational circumstances lead to 
different solutions. Put another way, the organisational culture or ‘the way we do things 
around here’ affects an organisation’s ability to innovate. Not surprisingly, a supportive 
environment is desirable to facilitate change and provide encouragement over the long 
term.  
 
To illustrate the difficulty of innovation in the public sector, Golden and Hughes (2001) 
present the example of a failed business process reengineering37 initiative in an Irish 
public sector organisation. The factors contributing to the failure included: a lack of 
senior management commitment; inadequate planning; limited project scope; lack of a 
high level project champion; and inadequate employee incentives. Morgan and 
Murgatroyd (1994, 43) describe a number of possible impediments to the application of 
quality improvement initiatives in the public sector. They include the absence of market 
pressures, resistance to change, disconnection between funding and outcomes, 
                                                          
37 Reengineering has been described as the radical redesign of business processes (Hammer and Champy, 
1994, 32). 
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management constraints associated with professionalism and status, complexity 
generated by ‘hidden’ customers who have divergent and possibly contradictory 
demands, and annual budget battles that create short-termism.  
 
All these obstacles, which seem equally applicable to innovations like Lean thinking 
and NPM, are categorised as challenges to be overcome (Morgan and Murgatroyd, 
1994, 56) and not as insurmountable obstacles. McNary (2008) identifies similar 
barriers that afflict quality initiatives in the US public sector and may also apply in the 
UK. They include, among other things, the short-term focus of politicians compared to 
the long-term focus of quality management, and the bureaucratic structure of 
government that inhibits the integration of quality initiatives. McNary maintains that, in 
the public sector, increased customer services can increase costs, and points out that it is 
difficult for public services to define the customer because government serves multiple 
and often competing stakeholders. 
 
Turning to the key enablers for change, Kotter (1996) maintains that they include: 
establishing a new sense of urgency; creating a guiding coalition; developing a vision 
and strategy; empowering broad-based action; generating short-term wins; 
consolidating gains and producing more change; and anchoring new approaches in the 
culture. Massey and Williams (2005) describe their experience with the implementation 
of CANDO/5S38, where the motivation of the people involved emerged as a key factor 
driving the success of each project. For this reason, it is important not to overlook cross-
functional buy-in, group decision making, roles and responsibilities, and people’s trust 
and fears around change. The authors also identify some key factors that might support 
or hinder the successful migration of Lean tools from manufacturing and retail into an 
NHS Trust. They conclude that formal organisational structures like hospital trusts are 
likely to be institutionalised, so that traditions gain rule-like status that renders them 
highly resistant to change. They explain that acceptance of change is likely to vary 
depending upon how long individuals have been employed and held their current 
positions. New employees bring fresh perspectives, diminish consensus and promote 
behaviour that questions and challenges taken-for-granted practices. Cultural constraints 
set boundaries on rationality, restricting the opportunities and alternatives perceived by 
                                                          
38 CANDO stands for clean up, arranging, neatness, discipline and ongoing improvement. It is also known 
as 5S, which means sort, simplify, sweep, standardize, and sustain (Bicheno, 2004, 52). 
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employees. Massey and Williams (2005) also maintain that isomorphic change 
(imitation) is often encouraged by uncertainty but can be unsuccessful if cultural 
differences are not understood. On the other hand, de-institutionalisation can occur 
when people consciously challenge previously accepted activities and strategies. From 
their pilot work in the NHS, the authors identified potential barriers to (and facilitators 
of) change, which may provide insights into the general problem of institutional 
resistance to change (see Table 3 below). 
 
Table 3: Factors that might support or hinder the migration of Lean thinking 
 
Barriers to implementing change Factors perceived to facilitate change 
 
• Insufficient top-level commitment, or 
middle and operational level support 
 
• Poor leadership, such as failing to gain 
support for changes, failing to support the 
participants and failing to take ownership 
of the changes 
 
• Weak management, such as adopting an 
unco-ordinated or fragmented approach 
 
• Organisational culture, such as change 
being seen as a threat 
 
• Inadequate communication, discussion, 
negotiation or planning 
 
• Resistance from colleagues within the 
same department (the lack of support 
shown by some people for new practices 
and policies is characterised as a form of 
“incomplete institutionalisation”) 
 
• The change being too emotional, stressful, 
disruptive, noisy or quick for some people 
 
• Some participants being over-zealous and 
others reluctant to let go of established 
procedures 
 
 
• Co-operation and agreement among the 
participants to action the plan 
 
• Education in CANDO/5S techniques 
 
• Participants understanding both positive 
and negative aspects of their situation 
 
• Agreeing via consensus the benefits that 
can be achieved 
 
• Thinking of processes as part of a holistic 
system 
 
• Management supporting the project and 
empowering the team to change 
procedures and practices and taking action 
that may sometimes be radical 
 
• Allowing time for reflection after the 
initial implementation 
 
• Allowing individuals to become involved 
and contribute to the debate 
 
• Collaboration between all parties 
operating the system/process 
 
• Informing other departments and services 
about the programme 
 
Source: Massey and Williams (2005). 
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McNabb (2007, 166) points out that, in the public sector, innovation is made possible by 
knowledge management. Learning, knowledge management, capabilities (for example, 
to convert new knowledge into good practice), competencies and organisational 
structure are just as relevant to the public sector as they are to the private sector. The 
next section of this review considers the theoretical relevance of knowledge 
management and learning to our conceptual framework. One way of looking at 
innovation is as a learning cycle involving experiment, experience, reflection and 
consolidation. For example, Japanese manufacturing techniques are said to exemplify 
sustained incremental problem solving and to exhibit “… an almost fanatical devotion 
toward learning” (Tidd et al., 2005, 505). The same authors go on to assert that 
“innovation is about knowledge” (Tidd et al., 2005, 15).  
 
Lean thinking: knowledge management 
 
The conflicts between NPM and Lean thinking have deeper underpinnings in the theory 
of knowledge and the means by which the accumulation and exchange of knowledge 
can be managed. The theoretical relevance of knowledge management to this thesis 
resides in two aspects of the research that help to explain potentially avoidable failure 
induced demand (PAFID) and ways in which the problem might be addressed: 
knowledge management as a means of distinguishing between types of knowledge 
work, and knowledge management expressed in terms of continuous improvement and 
organisational learning. 
 
A full discourse about the theory of knowledge is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it 
is notable that there appears to be no single definition of knowledge upon which 
scholars agree. In Theaetetus, Plato referred to justification, truth and belief, but 
acknowledged that these were not sufficient to define knowledge. The Oxford English 
Dictionary Online39 mentions “clear and certain mental apprehension”. The concept of 
knowledge management is similarly elusive. The Oxford English Dictionary Online 
mentions the management of the sharing and retention of information in an 
organisation. Elsewhere, connections with Lean thinking emerge, as one aim of 
knowledge management must be to deliver the right information to the right person ‘just 
in time’.  
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An appreciation of the value of knowledge in the workplace is not new. As Drucker 
points out, Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915) understood that the key to productivity is 
knowledge, not effort (Drucker, 1969, 271). Drucker defines knowledge workers as 
people who apply to productive work “… ideas, concepts and information rather than 
manual skill or brawn” (Drucker, 1969, 264). He argues that knowledge has become the 
central economic resource in the new ‘knowledge economy’, that the acquisition of 
knowledge has replaced experience as a key requisite for gainful employment and that 
human capital (competencies) is a key component in the value of a knowledge-based 
enterprise. 
 
Scholars such as Zeleny (1987) and Ackoff (1989) propose a taxonomy that helps to 
locate and explain knowledge. The DIKW model (data, information, knowledge and 
wisdom) structures the four elements40 in an information or knowledge hierarchy. 
Ackoff (1989) inserts another category (understanding) between knowledge and 
wisdom. Data are defined as raw observations and measurements that have no 
independent meaning; information as data that have been analysed to create meaning; 
knowledge as a collection of information that is intended to have a useful purpose; 
understanding as the ability to generate new knowledge from what is previously known; 
and wisdom as the ability to generate new understanding. It is argued that the principal 
purpose of accumulating data, information, knowledge and understanding is to make 
wise decisions. 
 
Polanyi (1967) distinguishes between two types of knowledge: tacit and explicit. 
According to this taxonomy, tacit knowledge is know-how that is complex, highly 
individual and difficult to formalise or communicate, such that “we know more than we 
can tell” (Polanyi, 1967, 4). Explicit knowledge is information that is easily codified 
(i.e. captured in records such as libraries and databases) and transmitted. While some 
scholars maintain that knowledge cannot be managed (Sveiby, 2001; Wilson, 2002), 
most seem to accept that tacit knowledge is accumulated through experience (or 
“indwelling”) and can be converted into explicit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995). The theory of organisational knowledge creation expounded by Nonaka and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
39 Available online at http://dictionary.oed.com accessed 21/07/09 
40 Stages of development that are described as know-nothing, know-how, know-what and know-why 
(Zeleny, 1987, 60). 
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Takeuchi (which they apply to both private and public sectors) argues that tacit and 
explicit knowledge are complementary, and can expand over time through a process of 
mutual interaction that is called the “spiral of organisational knowledge creation” 
(Nonaka, 1994, 20). Individuals accumulate tacit knowledge through direct, hands-on 
experience and reflection (Nonaka, 1994, 22). As McNabb asserts when talking about 
public sector services “… the type of knowledge learned on the job cannot be written in 
books or learned at the computer” (McNabb, 2007, 31). 
 
Cowan et al. (2000) challenge the “narrow” distinction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge described above by theorising the existence of a third dimension – tacit but 
unarticulated and ‘not-yet-codified’ knowledge – which seems to correspond with the 
argument that much valuable knowledge is retained within the workforce (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). There are also parallels and distinctions with the economists’ approach 
to the categorisation of knowledge work. As Manyika (2006) explains, since the 1930s 
economic activity has been mostly divided into transformations (making or growing 
things) and transactions (including services and most knowledge work), and 
transactions have become predominant. It is argued that a further distinction should be 
made between routine transactions and ‘tacit interactions’ that rely heavily upon 
judgement and context. Research suggests that, while the distinctions between the best 
and worst performing ‘transformation intensive’ and ‘routine transaction intensive’ 
businesses are relatively small, the differences between the best and worst ‘tacit 
interaction’ intensive firms are significant (Beardsley et al., 2006).  
 
The argument continues that transformations and transactions (like explicit knowledge) 
can be codified, but that ‘tacit interactions’ (like tacit knowledge) depend upon a 
complex mixture of judgement, problem-solving skills and information exchanges in a 
supportive environment that is difficult to reproduce. The assertion is that ‘tacit 
workers’ cannot be replaced by machines, and that management can get the best out of 
these valuable human resources by fostering change, learning, collaboration and 
innovation. As Manyika (2006) points out, the benefits that may flow from these latent 
productivity improvements are equally important in the public sector, where increasing 
the effectiveness of tacit interactions represents a major challenge and a significant 
opportunity. 
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Knowledge transfer is not easy (Szulanski, 1996). The factors that inhibit knowledge 
transfer and innovation (in addition to the difficulties of articulating tacit knowledge) 
include the internal conflicts and differing cultures that are prevalent within large 
bureaucracies like UK public sector services. Phelps (2007) appears to suggest that task 
risks41 may be increased and organisational learning inhibited by poor information 
flows. A knowledge management programme is required to convert internalised tacit 
knowledge into explicit codified knowledge, so that it can be shared, and to enable 
individuals and groups to internalise explicit knowledge after it has been distributed via 
the knowledge management system. Various approaches are identified for mobilising 
the tacit knowledge held by individuals and groups, including the communities of 
practice that are described below, and the self-organising teams that are prevalent in 
Japanese firms. The UK’s Local Authority Contact Centre Benchmarking Club is an 
example of a public sector community of practice. Members submit performance-
related data that can be used to gauge comparative performance. Quarterly meetings 
facilitate networking and exchange visits. Frequently asked questions and best practice 
tips are shared online. 
 
Wenger (2004) describes communities of practice as social structures that put the 
management of knowledge into the hands of practitioners. The key elements are likely 
to include: the area of knowledge that brings the community together; the people for 
whom the area knowledge is relevant; a supportive organisational environment; and an 
appropriate technological infrastructure (such as a website and/or Intranet). Smith and 
Blackman (2001) adopt a similar approach, discussing Customer Relations Management 
systems in the context of managing customer knowledge to understand the customer 
base, and concluding that having more information is not the same as having more 
knowledge. They too describe learning as an iterative process where new knowledge 
emerges from interactions between existing knowledge and new ideas. Empirical 
support for this approach is provided by Grunden (2007) in a small-scale interview 
study of County Administration in Sweden. Here, public sector respondents to a survey 
preferred a bottom-up strategy for the implementation of e-Government, and said that 
rigorous attention should be given to the social aspects of change. Factors such as 
participation, communication, structured problem analysis and development-oriented 
learning processes were among their key concerns. The evidence suggested that a web-
                                                          
41 The risks affecting a firm’s ability to perform tasks efficiently and effectively (Phelps, 2007, 24). 
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based study circle would offer the best opportunity for these people to learn together in 
an online community of practice. 
 
As an illustration of good practice, UK public sector knowledge management is 
underpinned by a guide produced by the British Standards Institute (2005). While 
acknowledging that some people consider knowledge management to be a ‘fad’,42 the 
BSI report identifies a range of knowledge and learning-oriented activities that are 
generating innovation and producing real benefits. Two key aspects of knowledge 
management theory reappear: the relationship between data, information and 
knowledge; and the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. According to the 
BSI report, data and information in the public sector become transformed into 
knowledge through the application of policy and administrative expertise. The benefits 
of a knowledge management approach in the public sector are said to include the 
avoidance of: duplication; inconsistency; lack of awareness; loss of knowledge and 
insight; weakness in the areas of best practice and innovation; lack of joined-up 
working; inaccurate and out of date information being given to customers; and failure.  
 
The above discussion has highlighted the integral role of knowledge management in 
helping to improve performance. As already noted, Lean thinking requires careful 
knowledge management for it to be an effective approach to improving service delivery. 
Yet good knowledge management by itself is insufficient for improved performance. A 
necessary companion to knowledge management is the ability of organisations to learn, 
so that performance may be optimised. 
 
Lean thinking: organisational learning and the learning organisation 
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) maintain that knowledge management and organisational 
learning,43 which are constituent parts of management theory, can also be regarded as 
important elements of Lean thinking, which have delivered significant competitive 
advantages. This view is supported by Dyer (2000) who reports that Japanese car 
                                                          
42 The differing perspectives taken by knowledge management critics and champions are discussed by 
McNabb (2007, 19). 
43 ‘Organisational learning’ studies models and theories about the way that organisations learn and adapt. 
Learning organisations then employ this theoretical output to identify ways in which they can 
continuously adapt and improve (Senge, 2006). 
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producers increased their market share from 3.6% to 25.5% between 1965 and 1985. 
The total cost of the components in a Toyota car was 30% cheaper than in a comparable 
Chrysler vehicle, while production was 35% quicker and customer satisfaction 50% 
higher. Dyer attributes this success to effective knowledge management and the extent 
to which Toyota shares knowledge with their suppliers. There is also clear evidence that 
Toyota’s practices resulted in a faster rate of learning. A key point for public sector 
service providers is that “the lessons that can be learned from Toyota are applicable 
beyond the automotive business” (David Brooks of Microsoft quoted in Dyer, 2000, 
18). Tidd et al. (2005) explain that the Japanese ‘quality miracle’ is based upon 
organisational learning and getting it right first time, or “doing what we do, but better” 
(Tidd et al., 2005, 18). 
 
Essentially, innovation is about learning (Tidd et al., 2005, 57). This thesis does not 
attempt a comprehensive review of the organisational learning literature, which is 
extensive, but there are seminal works on the concepts underpinning organisational 
learning and the learning organisation that reveal implications for change management. 
For example, Argyris and Schon (1978) consider how organisations learn, and they 
identify three types of organisational learning. Single-loop learning happens when the 
detection and correction of organisational errors (changes in the internal or external 
organisational environment that conflict with organisational theory-in-use that governs 
actions and accounts for organisational identity and continuity) enables organisations to 
continue existing policies and objectives. Double-loop learning requires the 
modification of underlying norms, policies and objectives. Deutero-learning consists of 
enquiry into the very learning system by which organisations detect and correct their 
errors. The authors conclude that organisational learning is typically restricted to single-
loop learning, and that organisations normally do not engage in double-loop learning or 
learn how to learn. The most important ingredient is said to be “good dialectic”, a 
process that enables members of organisations to reflect upon and inquire into their 
learning systems on a continuous basis. 
 
Senge (2006) maintains that reductionist approaches to problem-solving are ineffective 
because the world is not composed of separate unrelated forces. In other words, 
problems need to be examined from a holistic ‘whole system’ point of view. Senge 
identifies five new ‘disciplines’ that converge to innovate learning organisations: 
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systems thinking; personal mastery; mental models; building shared visions; and team 
learning. For Senge, learning is about continually enhancing the capacity of the 
organisation to realise its highest aspirations. Consequently, he characterises a learning 
organisation as “… an organisation that is continually expanding its capacity to create 
its future” (Senge, 2006, 14). The core learning capabilities are said to be fostering 
aspirations, developing reflective conversation, and understanding complexity. The 
learning disabilities of a failing organisation are portrayed like this: “… most of those 
inside the [failing] empire sense that all is not quite right, but their instincts are to more 
strongly defend their traditional ways of doing things than to question them – let alone 
develop the capacity to change their ways” (Senge, 2006, 26). From Senge’s 
perspective, one can infer an inherent infeasibility of the NPM model, because of its 
reductionist and hyper-modernist tendencies. 
 
Liker, J. K. (2004) reveals some learning-oriented principles underpinning Toyota’s 
system of Lean production, the last of which is “become a learning organisation through 
relentless reflection and continuous improvement” (Liker, 2004, 250). Liker maintains 
that the true value of continuous improvement is in creating an atmosphere of 
continuous learning and an environment that welcomes change. He also explains that 
Toyota establishes stable processes and then uses continuous improvement tools to 
determine the root causes of inefficiencies and apply countermeasures. A process of 
standardisation is used to transfer individual and team innovations into organisation-
wide learning, in order to convey the knowledge to the right people to make it part of 
the company’s inventory of understanding and behaviour. Liker explains this strategy in 
terms of capturing the accumulated learning about a process up to a point in time by 
standardising today’s best practice, then allowing people to improve on that and 
subsequently incorporating the further changes into a new standard operating procedure. 
 
Massey and Williams (2005) maintain that any method employed to implement a 
quality improvement initiative (such as Lean thinking) must have regard to the basic 
principles of organisational learning. Consequently, the method needs to be replicable, 
collaborative, requiring joint goals and effort, and adaptable to different organisational 
environments. Lewin’s action research model is highlighted as a vehicle for change, 
because it encourages a participative group method to re-educate participants and 
change values (Lewin, 1951). Training has to be action-based as “knowing-by-doing” 
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has to be experienced, learnt, shared and disseminated to other team-members. Revans 
(1976) maintains that “there can be no action without learning and no learning without 
action”, and describes the organisational learning sequence as: awareness of ignorance; 
developing a new idea; taking a chance (experimenting); watching the effect; and 
remembering for the next time (learning).  
 
The aspects of knowledge management and organisational learning described above 
constitute useful theoretical insights because, in my experience as a senior manager in 
local government with responsibility for both front-line and back-office services, the 
processes employed to distinguish between different types of knowledge work and to 
sustain the learning organisation are often unsatisfactory. For example, customers 
telephoning public sector contact centres are often connected via skills-based routing 
technology44 to agents with service-specific training, such as building control, 
environmental health, education, housing benefits and council tax. Information 
technologies such as Customer Relations Management systems are then deployed to 
provide these agents with information that they can use to resolve customer enquiries 
and log service requests.  
 
Contact centres develop online scripts45 to codify explicit knowledge about frequently 
asked questions (FAQs), but the level of analysis rarely extends beyond attempts to 
distinguish between routine and specialist calls. The most complicated enquiries are 
‘handed off’ to specialists, but the distinctive needs of all these ‘tacit workers’ are often 
overlooked. Furthermore, the online scripts developed for front-line staff are frequently 
not maintained and fall into disuse. Consequently, misinformation is distributed, and 
knowledge reverts to being ‘tacit but not-yet-codified’. Sir David Varney makes a 
similar point, maintaining that “… there needs to be a clearer rationale for where 
contact, either front-line or back-office, would occur most efficiently or effectively” 
(Varney, 2006, 14). These aspects will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 6, where 
the empirical work underpinning this research is described. 
                                                          
44 Call centre software applications usually incorporate databases that are capable of holding information 
about individual agents, including details regarding their current competencies. Calls are then 
automatically allocated to agents with the relevant skill sets. 
45 Online scripts usually consist of a series of questions and answers about rules-based enquiries that 
front-line staff are likely to encounter on a regular basis. Scripts may incorporate links to other online 
resources, instructions about handing off specialist enquiries to back offices, and guidance about handling 
and escalating complaints. 
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Despite the accolades of Lean thinking, caution is necessary because this approach (like 
New Public Management) could also have unintended consequences. If Lean thinking 
was comparable to a diet, then other factors that are crucial to the health of the 
organisation, such as learning and innovation, could be overlooked (Hertog and 
Huizenga, 2000, 7). There are also possible tensions between the perceived 
preoccupation with quality, cost and market focus, and the need to invest in knowledge. 
Lean thinking seeks to extract major efficiency gains by delivering ‘zero defects’, and 
this requires workers to accept responsibility for the analysis and solution of defects. In 
this environment, jobs cease to have firm boundaries. Explicit (or embodied) knowledge 
can be stored in materials, but tacit (or disembodied) knowledge is carried and 
transferred by people. The knowledge worker makes use of data and information to 
develop new information and knowledge, but data collection and information 
processing is part of the task. Consequently, it is difficult to tell where the boundary lies 
between knowledge work and other activities.  
 
In the public sector, the knowledge workers are “… the men and women in government 
with the skills and understanding that can only come with education and years of 
experience” (McNabb, 2007, 31). Knowledge workers are expensive and easily 
undervalued, but Hamel and Prahalad (1994) demonstrate that the Japanese car industry 
has successfully combined knowledge management with Lean thinking, to safeguard the 
‘core competencies’46 that remain key to their prosperity. The literature therefore 
provides some reassurance that the tensions within Lean thinking that might otherwise 
inhibit knowledge management and organisational learning can be resolved. 
 
Lean thinking: evidence of migration into the UK public sector 
 
The literature reveals that early experiments with Lean thinking have met with some 
success in the healthcare sector. For example, Jones and Mitchell (2006, 4) describe a 
business process redesign programme in the UK National Health Service that reduced 
end-to-end times in endocrinology and haematics by increasing staff productivity and 
improving the utilisation of assets such as accommodation and equipment. Similarly, 
                                                          
46 A core competence is something that a firm can do well, which meets the three criteria specified by 
Hamal and Prahalad (1994): it provides customer benefit; it is hard for competitors to imitate; and it can 
be leveraged widely to many products. 
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value stream mapping47 at the Wirral Hospital is said to have revealed wasted effort and 
resources during the treatment process; during a 31 week programme the time spent 
actually treating the patient was just 100 minutes. 
 
Jobcentre Plus is a government agency that aims to support people of working age from 
welfare into work, and to help employers to fill vacancies. A Jobcentre Plus office in 
North London started piloting Lean approaches to process improvement during 2007, in 
order to meet centrally imposed targets for reduced expenditure (personal conversation 
with the office manager during a site visit on 21st February 2008). Value Stream 
Mapping techniques were used to re-engineer procedures employed to interview large 
numbers of benefit claimants and job seekers. Efficiency improvements, such as group 
briefing sessions instead of individual appointments for lone parents, were developed in 
the North London office and then rolled-out across the whole Jobcentre service. 
Jobcentre Plus claims to balance ‘the voice of the customer’ with the needs of the 
business by treating other stakeholders, such as government ministers and local 
councillors, as customers whose needs have to be taken into account. 
 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) identified a need to improve its 
processes because of the significant impact that errors have on the department itself and 
individual taxpayers (National Audit Office, 2007b). Consequently, they embarked 
upon a national productivity improvement programme (called Pacesetter) that involves 
the introduction of Lean thinking across PAYE and self-assessment centres throughout 
the UK. Working in conjunction with Unipart,48 HMRC is also developing its own team 
of Lean experts, so that the benefits of the project are sustained and continuously 
improved (personal conversation with Peter Mackie, Business Development Manager, 
Unipart Expert Practices, 7th April 2008). HMRC’s Lean improvement programme has 
attracted some controversial publicity. The Public and Commercial Services Union 
                                                          
47 Value stream mapping is a form of analysis that can be used to provide diagrammatic representations of 
business processes. The technique helps to distinguish between value-adding activities and non-value-
adding step that may constitute unnecessary or wasteful operations. See for example Hines and Rich 
(1997). 
48 Unipart is a manufacturer and third party logistics provider that adopted Lean approaches in the early 
1990s by purchasing a supplier to Toyota for the specific purpose of learning about Lean via Toyota’s 
supplier support programme. Unipart’s Lean methodology, known as The Unipart Way, is distinguished 
from the Toyota Production System by the addition of an eighth waste; the waste of human potential 
(Personal conversation with Charles Gray, Unipart Group, during site visit to Unipart Headquarters, 
Cowley, Oxford, 7th April 2008). 
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criticised the programme for de-humanising staff by reducing them to nothing more 
than machines – the staff were allegedly banned from having photographs on their desks 
(BBC News, 2006). Seddon (2008, 62) is also critical of the Lean approaches employed 
at HMRC. Nevertheless, The National Audit Office says that HMRC’s initial 
experience of Lean working suggests that “… significant improvements in the accuracy 
and efficiency of processing Income Tax are possible” (National Audit Office, 2007b).  
 
Warwick Business School (WBS) surveyed a number of public sector organisations 
(mostly in Scotland) and investigated eight case-study sites and three pilot studies to 
evaluate the application of the Lean approach in the Scottish public sector (Radnor et 
al., 2006). WBS found that the methods employed by Toyota could be applied to 
Scottish public sector services with potentially beneficial effects on employee morale, 
customer satisfaction and process efficiency (Radnor et al., 2006). The research 
indicates that Lean is best suited to organisations with high volume transactions that 
allow greater standardisation and integration, supported by a management structure that 
allows empowerment and engagement of the workforce.  
 
WBS concluded that rapid improvement events have immediate impact, but the benefits 
of the full implementation of Lean thinking are more sustainable. In particular, WBS 
argued that Lean thinking cannot be maintained unless continuous improvement 
becomes an integral part of an organisation’s cultural norms. The authors also warned 
that Lean is not a ‘quick fix’, because it requires considerable adaptation from the 
approach employed in manufacturing. The WBS case-studies included two Scottish 
local authority settings, but neither of them adopted a comprehensive Lean philosophy: 
one undertook a series of rapid improvement exercises; and the other employed Lean 
thinking as a vehicle for cultural change. The pilot studies included one English local 
authority setting (a housing repairs service), but here again the main focus of attention 
was upon rapid improvement exercises. Consequently, the WBS research is arguably of 
limited value in terms of explaining the implementation of full Lean thinking in the 
public sector. Further work is required and this thesis seeks to reduce the gap. 
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NPM and Lean thinking: congruence and conflict 
 
This section summarises the points of congruence and conflict between NPM and Lean 
thinking that have been identified above. Essentially, they help to clarify the key 
difficulties of NPM as an effective approach for change management and improved 
performance, and they indicate the potential opportunities that Lean thinking has for 
improved service delivery. The two bodies of literature reflect congruence in the pursuit 
of greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Both methods emphasise the 
importance of quality, waste reduction, customer orientation, service automation, 
incremental improvement, and the better management of performance, information, and 
knowledge. However, NPM is said to have stalled or lost momentum. 
 
The literature identifies numerous adverse consequences of NPM, which is accused of 
harming public sector IT performance, hollowing-out staffing structures, creating 
contract-based risks and barriers, and making the IT industry more powerful than is 
desirable in a contractual relationship. It is said to have fragmented public institutions, 
created organisational silos, made joined-up working more difficult, increased policy 
complexity, and reduced citizens’ problem-solving capacities. Other criticisms of NPM 
address the micro-management of targets, the excessive imposition of inspection 
regimes, mechanistic approaches to service delivery, the de-skilling of staff, and the 
failure to respond to the specialist requirements of knowledge workers. It seems 
unlikely that key reform issues such as the need to address PAFID will be resolved in 
the current NPM context.  
 
In contrast to NPM, the literature describes Lean thinking as systems-oriented, holistic, 
integrative, interactive and co-ordinated. Lean thinking is also said to promote qualities 
such as simplicity, learning, respect, empowerment, participation, and consensus. The 
literature reveals at least one potential problem with Lean thinking, namely that the need 
to invest in innovation, organisational learning and knowledge management might be 
eclipsed by the very strong emphasis that Lean places on quality and cost. 
 
The theoretical and practical insights in this section help to compare and contrast NPM 
and Lean thinking. They begin to show how PAFID may be managed. Lean thinking, in 
particular, has been examined to reveal that it may have the potential to deliver 
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significant productivity improvements, but this has yet to be widely realised. The irony 
is that, in seeking to address perceived problems of administrative bureaucracy in the 
public sector, NPM may have exacerbated them. Consequently, this thesis argues that a 
new context, and a new innovative way of improving the services is required – the 
adoption of Lean thinking. 
 
Chapter summary 
 
The theoretical perspectives described in this chapter provide the foundations for a 
coherent framework and integrative approach to the investigation and management of 
PAFID. The framework embraces New Public Management and e-Government, Lean 
thinking and agency theory. Other approaches and streams of literature that have 
enriched the analysis include socio-technical systems theory, innovation, knowledge 
management, and organisational learning. 
 
Reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of NPM and e-Government to address 
service delivery and customer satisfaction, it appears that a case can be made for the 
utility of the Lean thinking approach in public sector reform of service delivery. 
However, there is insufficient evidence (particularly in the area of UK local councils) to 
support any firm conclusions. In the literature, NPM and e-Government are associated 
with some benefits but also many adverse effects that have rendered the UK public 
sector unable to address key reform issues such as the eradication or reduction of 
PAFID. E-Government is shown to lack a cohesive theory that facilitates an evidence-
based analysis of likely success or failure, leading to the conclusion that the adoption of 
ICTs by UK public sector services may be attributable to other (arguably irrational) 
influences, such as hyper-modernism and isomorphism. The government IT project 
failures and information security breaches described in Chapter 2, pages 26-27, 
underline the weaknesses of the current approach. Consequently, the literature supports 
the contention that ICT-based systems built upon modernist managerial assumptions 
alone cannot be relied upon to produce the savings and improvements required by 
government. Alternative methods are needed, but the current NPM-based approach is 
disguising the potential of other less costly and lower risk solutions.  
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In this chapter, Lean thinking is revealed as an alternative management philosophy that 
may have the potential to address key reform issues like the eradication or reduction of 
PAFID. Lean thinking encourages a holistic approach to problem-solving and focuses 
on the elimination and prevention of waste. While the literature demonstrates that the 
principles of Lean thinking are reasonably well established in manufacturing and private 
sector services, and are spreading into UK public sector services via healthcare and 
central government, evidence of its successful application in the public sector is still 
scarce. Reliable evidence of its deployment in UK local government is even rarer. Much 
of the available information consists of anecdotal opinion and evidence offered by the 
providers of Lean-oriented consultancy services. Research undertaken by Warwick 
Business School throws some light on the application of Lean approaches in Scotland 
but seems to focus on rapid improvement interventions rather than the assimilation of 
Lean thinking or the integration of continuous improvement, and is insufficient to 
support any firm conclusions. Two examples of the deployment of Lean thinking by UK 
central government departments are mentioned in this chapter as evidence of the 
possible value of Lean thinking in the UK public sector.  
 
Change management, knowledge management and organisational learning are identified 
as key aspects of Lean thinking, expressed in terms of continuous incremental 
innovation. A potentially useful distinction emerges from the literature between routine 
transactions and tacit interactions. The argument is that tacit interactions, like tacit 
knowledge, are highly complex. Consequently, improving their effectiveness by, for 
example, nurturing ‘tacit workers’, represents a significant opportunity for productivity 
improvement. The possible parallels are with the management of customer contacts that 
can result in PAFID and the public servants who are employed by local councils to 
resolve complex enquiries about housing and council tax benefits, planning policy, 
environmental health, homelessness and so on. The literature reveals that knowledge is 
embedded in organisations through learning, and that Lean thinking promotes the 
concept of ‘knowing by doing’. Indeed, Japanese industry is identified as an exemplar 
of the benefits of combining Lean thinking and knowledge management to safeguard 
‘core competencies’. 
 
Agency theory is introduced in this chapter because it may help to explain why the 
current NPM reform path is not delivering the required improvements and savings. For 
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example, problems with principal-agent relationships between various stakeholders 
involved in the delivery of public services (because of factors like conflicting interests 
and information asymmetry) may be contributing to the unintended adverse 
consequences of NPM and loss of momentum described in the literature. 
 
The theoretical insights and practical approaches summarised above generate a number 
of possible explanations and questions about Lean thinking and the management of 
PAFID that need to be addressed and elaborated in subsequent chapters. They indicate 
the need for empirical understanding of current problems in the NPM context, and the 
possibilities for reform offered by Lean thinking.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the specific questions that the empirical research seeks to answer. It 
also discusses the method employed, and explains the principal phases of the empirical 
research. Finally, the next chapter describes the research design and the techniques that 
were developed to collect, validate, analyse and interpret data. 
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CHAPTER 4:   METHOD 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that it was unlikely that the installation of ICT-based 
systems built upon modernist managerial assumptions alone would deliver the public 
service performance improvements and efficiency savings mandated by central 
government. I hypothesised that a better approach would be to improve the services by, 
for example, eliminating or reducing customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by 
earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and 
potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services. I called this 
phenomenon potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID). Lean thinking was 
identified as a possible alternative to NPM for addressing key reform issues of this 
nature. 
 
PAFID may be interpreted very broadly to encompass virtually any service where 
delivery quality and effectiveness is an issue. Thus it may be applied to inter-
governmental co-operation or prime contractor relations. However, in this thesis a 
principal focus of analysis is services that involve significant numbers of clients and are 
negotiated and delivered locally. In this context, the apparently unnecessary activity of 
PAFID seems to be particularly prevalent in high-volume transactional services such as 
housing and council tax benefits. In Chapter 2, I observed that the literature had 
revealed a number of key concepts (including contact cause, value, avoidability and 
resolution) that could be investigated empirically in order to improve our 
comprehension of the underlying problem. 
 
This chapter begins by further developing and clarifying the main purpose of this thesis 
and identifying a series of questions that the research seeks to answer. It also describes 
the principal phases of the empirical research, which were a pilot exercise and three 
substantive case-studies in local authority settings. The research design of the pilot 
project was comprised of four key elements: document review, non-participant 
observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey mapping. The chapter 
goes on to describe methods and techniques developed during the pilot study to collect, 
validate, analyse and interpret data.  
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Research Questions 
 
As already noted in the introduction to this chapter, the central goal of this thesis is to 
investigate, understand and explain why the phenomenon called potentially avoidable 
failure induced demand occurs. Accordingly, I scrutinised a subset of UK public sector 
services (housing and council tax benefits services administered by a cross-section of 
local councils in south-east England) and examined examples of failure (such as 
duplication, delay, misinformation and error) in order to answer the following Research 
Questions: 
 
Q1. What is potentially avoidable failure induced demand, and why does it occur in 
public service delivery? 
 
Q2. What does an examination of the failure mode tell us about improving the 
exchange process, diagnosing avoidable failure and resolving it ‘ex ante’? 
 
Q3.     How and under what better conditions could the public sector successfully 
exploit Lean thinking in order to manage potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand? 
 
The findings will help to: (1) contribute to a theory explaining the occurrence of 
PAFID; (2) suggest ways in which avertible failure can be eradicated or reduced; and 
(3) identify conditions under which UK public services can manage PAFID through the 
successful exploitation of Lean thinking. 
 
Principal phases of the empirical research 
 
There were four principal phases of empirical research, all undertaken in local authority 
settings:  
• Pilot work 
• Case-study A 
• Case-study B 
• Case-study C 
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The objective was to produce a defensible account of the answers to the Research 
Questions and to make a contribution to public sector management theory and practice. 
I adopted a case-study approach as this is a research design that embraces a variety of 
methods, including document review, interview and observation. It was also the most 
appropriate way to empirically examine the issue, given the absence of commonly 
agreed standards for measuring and reporting key elements of PAFID or the actions 
undertaken to reduce it.  
 
Case-studies 
 
Case-studies are said to be the most flexible and pluralistic of all research designs, 
potentially overlapping with many other approaches and offering their combined and 
complementary strengths (Hakim, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 1994). They can also 
be characterised as a method of exploring elements of the social world through 
comprehensive description and analysis of a single individual, setting, group, episode or 
event (O'Leary, 2005, 79).  
 
Limited sample organisational studies, such as this thesis, are vulnerable to the 
accusation that the findings are not generalisable but Yin (1994, 39) maintains that the 
argument lies in their generalisability to theoretical and analytical concerns. It has been 
said that legitimate, valid and worthwhile solutions to research questions may be 
obtained from case-studies because the answers “… may lie in the rich history of an 
event or the day-to-day practices of a workplace” (O'Leary, 2005, 79). I maintain 
(following Trow, 1957, 33) that “the problem under discussion properly dictates the 
method of investigation”. Bryman (1984) explains that even research that claims to rely 
heavily on one methodology or the other (quantitative or qualitative) often contains 
elements of both, and there is no necessary correlation in social science research 
between methodology and technique. Following Caplan (2007), I argue that is it 
important to use multiple theoretical lenses, and that it is legitimate to employ 
quantitative approaches to identify concepts (issue areas) and then qualitative methods 
to unpack them. 
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The literature reveals that indicators of good research49 can be satisfied by maintaining a 
high degree of rigour (Collis and Hussey, 2003, 58) and incorporating appropriate 
mechanisms into the research design - such as documenting the procedure so that later 
investigators could repeat the study and arrive at the same findings and conclusions 
(Yin, 1994, 36). Allan (1991, 181) gives particular emphasis to the merits of a 
rigorously explicit and systematic approach. Eisenhardt (1989b) highlights the benefits 
to be derived from the triangulation (the combination of research methods) made 
possible by multiple sources of evidence, which provide stronger substantiation of 
constructs and hypotheses. The literature on ethnographic and participant-observer 
approaches to data collection suggests the importance of concepts such as building trust, 
retaining an analytical perspective, and maintaining meticulous contemporaneous 
records (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Such records can even include the researcher’s own 
views and experiences, as these data will aid critical reflection on the factors influencing 
the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991, 57).  
 
On site, the case-study approach enabled me to strive for reliability and absence of bias 
by asking different questions of different people, by checking earlier responses with 
subsequent respondents and by obtaining a wide range of data from key informants. I 
sought to achieve validity through the “richness and depth in understanding” (O'Leary, 
2005, 80) that emerged from the co-operation that I received from the case-study 
councils, and from the access that I was given to the knowledge and meaning of those 
involved. 
 
Local councils 
 
The exploratory phase of this research was concerned with the conceptualisation of the 
research problem in a local authority setting. English local authorities can be separated 
into three categories, and Annex 1 on pages 265-266 contains a full list of councils 
segregated according to the following typology: 
 
                                                          
49 O'Leary (2005, 74-76) identifies and describes fifteen indicators of good research: objectivity, 
neutrality, transparency, reliability, dependability, validity, authenticity, generalisability, transferability, 
reproducibility, auditability, usefulness, legality, morality and ethicality. 
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• County councils, which have responsibility for strategic planning, highways, 
social services, education, libraries, fire, refuse disposal and consumer protection. 
• District councils, which run local planning, housing, environmental health, 
markets and fairs, refuse collection, cemeteries, crematoria, leisure services and 
parks, tourism and electoral registration. 
• London borough, metropolitan borough and unitary councils, which are single-
tier authorities that run all services in their areas. 
 
I selected services administering housing and council tax benefits for the case-studies 
because these two statutory schemes are administered by local councils, but financed 
and controlled by central government’s Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
More than £16 billion was paid to some 9 million claimants during 2004/05 (Zebedee et 
al., 2007, 2), which prompts Seddon (2008, 27) to describe housing benefits as a non-
trivial example of a problematical public service. The legislation governing the 
assessment and payment of housing and council tax benefits is similar to other means-
tested benefits such as Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance, which are 
administered centrally by the DWP. The high degree of commonality between these 
schemes, which operate both centrally and locally, is likely to enhance the 
transferability of the findings that emerge from this research. A further potential 
advantage to be gained from the study of housing and council tax benefits services is 
that there is already anecdotal evidence to suggest that high levels of PAFID occur in 
these areas (Seddon, 2003, 2008; Caulkin, 2005; Green, 2006). 
 
Three types of local councils administer housing and council tax benefits services and 
one example of each was investigated: a district council, a London borough council and 
a unitary council. As previously explained, I am a part-time student in full-time work. It 
was therefore necessary to aim for economy of time and effort by restricting the 
selection to councils in the south-east Region, which has sufficient variety of councils to 
provide some basis for generalisation.  
 
Contact centre environments 
 
Government argues that “what happens in a contact centre is often indicative of an 
organisation’s overall service delivery capability” (HM Treasury, 2007b, 15). As 
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corporate contact centres are currently at the heart of public sector service provision, 
attention was given to housing and council tax benefits services that could be observed 
in these environments. Contact centres strive for high levels of first time resolution. The 
‘one and done’ mentality that they employ is similar to the ‘get it right first time’ 
philosophy underpinning Lean thinking, which is typically deployed to prevent defects, 
remove waste and eliminate non-value-adding activities, principally in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. Lean thinking and its potential importance for the 
management of PAFID was described in Chapter 3. 
 
In spite of the vulnerability of contact centres to the various unintended consequences of 
NPM for the implementation and management of ICT (described in Chapter 3), contact 
centre environments are useful as ‘laboratories’ in which to study customer service and 
PAFID. The literature distinguishes between call centres and contact centres. A call 
centre combines people and technology to enable the delivery of services via the 
telephone, whereas a contact centre supports additional access channels,50 such as e-
mail, fax, web pages, and web chat (Gans, Koole and Mandelbaum, 2003; Graumann, 
Arnold and Beltjes, 2003). Digital television, video conferencing, mobile telephones, 
SMS text, letters, and face-to-face visiting should be added to the list of access 
channels. The aim of call centres and contact centres is to provide end-to-end services 
without having to connect customers to other units within the organisation, or undertake 
any additional work. Calls resolved in this way, on first contact, are referred to as ‘one 
and done’. Providers seek to offer comprehensive services through constant availability, 
short response times and competent staff (Graumann, Arnold and Beltjes, 2003). 
 
Call centres and contact centres are not new; they were devised some 30 years ago when 
the US manufacturer Rockwell integrated the call handling capabilities of a telephone 
switchboard with the processing power of a computer to produce an automatic call 
distributor system (Parkes, 2000). The automatic call distributor’s main function is to 
distribute calls among contact centre staff, and is likely to incorporate skills-based 
routing technology. An automatic call distributor system will normally place callers in a 
queue if all the agents are busy, and ask them to hold the line. Some systems provide 
callers with predictions of their anticipated waiting time. The callers who have been 
                                                          
50 Access channels are alternative methods or media, such as face-to-face visits and telephone calls, which 
customers can use to make contact with service providers. 
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waiting the longest will normally be the first served when appropriately skilled agents 
become free, in accordance with the ‘first in first out’ or FiFo principle (Graumann, 
Arnold and Beltjes, 2003). 
 
The effective implementation of a contact centre can improve interactions, such as 
telephone conversations with customers, through the deployment of new technologies 
and working practices. The Improvement and Development Agency (2004) maintains 
that a contact centre solution has the ability to deliver three benefits simultaneously: 
better customer service; improved effectiveness; and cost savings. Service 
improvements can occur because agents have all the information and authority they 
need to resolve enquiries at the point of first contact. Effectiveness can be enhanced by 
redefining, improving, standardising and automating some business processes; this may 
create opportunities to re-deploy back-office staff to the front line. Cost savings may 
arise from more effective working practices, the release of expensive accommodation, 
better process efficiency, and increased productivity (Improvement and Development 
Agency, 2004). However, “the costs, risks and efforts required are quite high and the 
benefits, although real, are difficult to achieve” (Morey, 2003). 
 
Case-study councils 
 
Three councils fulfilled the criteria outlined above and responded with enthusiasm for 
the research project. Council A is a district council in south-east England, Council B is a 
London borough council, and Council C is a unitary council in south-east England. By 
developing a better understanding of PAFID in housing and council tax benefits 
services, the research facilitated an appreciation of the PAFID that is likely to affect 
other high-volume transactional services such as State Pensions, Income Support, 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, Tax Credits, Pension Credits and Child Support. 
 
Council P was identified as the most suitable location for the pilot work because I was 
employed there in a senior capacity. The choice was also partly serendipitous51 in that 
the Chief Executive shared my passion for improvement of the customer experience. 
The advantages of this location for the pilot study (which included the aforementioned 
                                                          
51 Bryman (1988, 10) describes luck and serendipity as one of many ‘untidy episodes’ in social research 
that are omitted from the standard systematic representation of the research process. 
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support from top management, easy access, an appreciation of interactions that might be 
obscure to someone without experience in context, minimal cost and productive use of 
time) significantly outweighed the difficulties that could have arisen out of my dual role 
as researcher and senior practitioner.52 For example, ethical challenges could have 
occurred because of clashes between personal and professional interests (Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991, 98) but I developed protective measures to guard against these 
potential problems, which are described later in this chapter. I was also acutely aware 
that the dignity and well-being of the respondents was central to the integrity of the 
research. 
 
This doctoral research was facilitated by my membership of two public sector 
professional organisations: the Institute of Revenues Rating and Valuation, and the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. I also participate in three local 
authority benchmarking clubs53 (including the Local Authority Contact Centre 
Benchmarking Club) and the CRM National Projects ‘Service Transformation 
Experience Programme’, which is a ‘community of practice’ around CRM. These 
constitute an extensive network of councils and other public agencies. Contact details 
are shared, and effective mechanisms exist for sharing information and communicating 
enquiries. My senior professional capacity in local government provided privileged 
access to these sources, and the availability of these networks facilitated objectivity in 
the investigation of success and failure. 
 
During the pilot study, which is described in the next section of this chapter, I focused 
upon the housing and council tax benefits sub-components of the organisation at 
Council P. Here, I was able to combine specialist knowledge with good access to 
informants and respondents.  
 
                                                          
52 O'Leary (2005, 14) defines practitioner-based research as “an engagement in a rigorous research 
protocol with a clear goal of obtaining credible data and producing trustworthy results”. 
53 My role was limited to the submission of data (call volumes, response rates, abandon call rates and unit 
costs) to an officer in a London Borough Council. The data were analysed, along with the returns from 
many other councils, and the output was circulated to participants in the form of charts illustrating 
comparative performance. I had no involvement with, or influence over, the analysis of the data or their 
distribution among the membership. 
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Pilot study 
 
Pilot document review 
 
The purpose of the pilot document review was to identify useful and accessible sources 
of historical and contextual data that would facilitate the compilation of ‘service 
biographies’ describing the organisational environments in which the substantive case-
studies were to be conducted. Publications such as budget books, annual accounts and 
corporate plans were available online, via the corporate websites of the case-study 
councils. Data about the performance of housing and council tax benefits services 
(measured in terms of centrally imposed performance indicators) were submitted 
electronically by councils to the Department for Work and Pensions on a quarterly basis 
between June 2001 and March 2008.54 Data collection ceased in 2008, due to concerns 
about the security of the electronic links between councils and central government, and 
the connection has not been restored. 
 
Pilot observations 
 
The aim of this phase of the pilot project was to: (1) develop, test and refine a method of 
observing,55 recording, validating and analysing customer enquiries in contact centre 
environments; and (2) to identify preliminary issues for subsequent exploration during 
key informant interviews. An attempt was made to obtain information from Council P’s 
Customer Relationship Management system (an ICT system that enables customer 
services staff to record brief details about customer contacts), but it did not facilitate the 
collection of data about multiple contacts relating to individual enquiries, and records of 
individual contacts were either entirely absent from the system or not sufficiently 
informative to be useful.56 
 
                                                          
54 This material is publicly available online at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hobod/ (accessed 29/08/09). 
55 David Hume asserted that “we must glean our experiments in this science from a cautious observation 
of human life and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in 
company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and 
compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be 
much superior in utility to any other human comprehension” (from the Introduction to Volume 1 of 
Hume’s ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ available online at http://www.gutenburgh.org/etext/4705  
accessed 29/08/09).  
56 It subsequently transpired that none of the case-study sites could generate useful data from their CRM 
systems because the records were incomplete, incomprehensible or inaccessible. 
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Key features of customer contact (i.e. cause, value, avoidability and resolution) were 
identified during the literature review that preceded this empirical research and I 
designed an instrument (called here a data collection sheet) to capture data about these 
characteristics (see Annex 2, pages 267-268). In the interests of transparency (and to 
guard against researcher bias) I also drafted guidance notes explaining how cause, 
value, avoidability and resolution could be categorised, and then shared these proposed 
parameters with managers, team leaders and staff.  
 
Consensus about the meanings of key concepts was reached through an iterative process 
of discussion, reflection and revision. For example, a discussion arose about the most 
appropriate way to refer to the apparently unnecessary customer contact that was being 
investigated, because some staff said that terms such as failure, waste and defect 
implied criticism of their work. After several iterations, the expression ‘potentially 
avoidable contact’ was chosen for use in the workplace. Examples included the 
provision of supporting evidence after housing benefits claim forms have been 
submitted, customers enquiring about the progress of claims, customers seeking 
explanations or making complaints, enquiries caused by officer errors or omissions, and 
duplication (customers being asked to do the same thing more than once). These 
transactions were characterised as potentially avoidable because they appeared to be 
caused by earlier failures that might have been prevented (see Table 4 below). 
 
Table 4: Illustrations of PAFID likely to be encountered during the research 
 
Examples of PAFID Possible failures causing PAFID 
Customers are providing supporting 
information and evidence after their original 
housing and council tax benefits claims have 
been submitted. 
The council is failing to adequately explain 
what information and evidence is required. It 
has ineffective administrative arrangements 
for collecting and recording information and 
evidence provided by customers. 
Customers are enquiring about the progress of 
outstanding housing and council tax benefits 
claims. 
The council is taking too long to process 
benefit claims. The council is failing to keep 
customers adequately informed about the 
progress of benefit claims.  
Customers are asking for explanations about 
benefits awarded, refused or recalculated. 
The council is obliged to issue notices 
explaining awards but they are not sent 
promptly and the content is confusing, so they 
are not understood by the recipients. 
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Similarly, four possible categories of contact resolution were identified: one stop 
(enquiries resolved on first contact); returned (enquiries passed back to customers for 
them to take some action); service requests (such as requests for bank details to be 
updated that would be referred to the back office for action later); and passed over 
(enquiries beyond the competence of customer services staff that would be immediately 
handed off to the back office). Consequently, a trial data collection sheet (see Annex 2 
on pages 267-268) was used to facilitate the collection of these details and to convey 
(on the reverse side) basic information about the purposes of the research. The intention 
here was to be transparent about the criteria employed by reproducing them on the 
instrument. The information placed on the sheet included hypothetical examples of 
contacts that (if they arose) would be considered as valuable, and enquiries that (if 
encountered) would be categorised as potentially avoidable. 
 
Pilot telephone contacts 
 
Thirty-five telephone calls from customers about housing and council tax benefits were 
monitored during one working day. I sat next to several different customer service 
agents and monitored calls using a ‘splitter’ cable that enabled me to listen to 
conversations (using headphones) but not to participate in them. Housing and council 
tax benefits telephone calls were focused on the agents being observed by adjusting 
skills-based routing settings on the computerised contact centre system (a Siemens Hi-
Path ProCentre) to exclude all other agents. This was only partly successful, as some 
benefits customers still got through to other agents by making incorrect push-button 
selections in response to the welcome message on the call centre system. These mis-
routed callers were automatically transferred to the agents if they were free. 
Alternatively, the agents called them back later the same day. An operational impact of 
this arrangement was that the agents involved in the pilot research took fewer calls than 
usual (they would normally cover several service areas simultaneously), and this may 
have affected the way in which they handled calls. For example, it seems likely that the 
agents who were able to spend more time on calls would have achieved better rates of 
contact resolution and customer satisfaction than those who were under pressure due to 
high call volumes.  
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I completed the trial data collection sheets during or immediately after the telephone 
calls, and categorised the contacts between cause, value and resolution. Some contacts 
were initially ambiguous, but I was able to discuss and clarify them with the agents 
between calls. To guard against researcher bias, I shared the completed data collection 
sheets with the agents and two volunteer research assistants (graduates employed in 
responsible positions who were willing and able to undertake work of this nature to a 
high standard), and sought agreement that the contacts were correctly coded. No 
changes were required, but I would have made amendments if we had agreed that my 
initial interpretations were incorrect.57 
 
I was aware that my presence during these transactions was likely to have some impact. 
There are many well-documented problems with observation, including observer bias 
and the potential impact of the observer upon the observed. For example, psychologists 
have identified a phenomenon called ‘demand characteristics of the experimental 
situation’ (Orne, 1962), which refers to the situation where participants (subjects) in 
experiments form preconceptions about desired outcomes and change their behaviours 
accordingly, normally in an unconscious effort to be ‘good subjects’ and to help the 
experimenters achieve the ‘right’ results. Similarly, in management theory, the so-called 
‘Hawthorne Effect’ is usually described as the possibility that individuals singled out 
for a study may improve their performance because of the added attention they receive 
from the researchers, and not necessarily because of any variables being explored 
during the study (Bartol and Martin, 1994, 30). However, an examination of the 
literature reveals inadequacies in this interpretation of what happened during the 
Hawthorne studies and the ‘illumination studies’ that preceded them. Reappraisals of 
the research describe seemingly contradictory results that are open to a variety of 
explanations (see for example Landsberger, 1961; Greenwood et al., 1983; Adair, 1984; 
Greenwood and Wrege, 1986). Whilst observing people handling customer contacts and 
experimenting upon ‘subjects’ are clearly different activities, it seems likely that similar 
psychological factors are involved. Consequently, I took precautions to address this 
potential methodological problem.  
 
                                                          
57 This interactive approach is consistent with the overall methodology, which employs quantitative 
approaches to identify concepts for subsequent exploration using qualitative methods and not for the 
purpose of demonstrating statistical significance. 
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My principal strategy was to emphasise at every opportunity that I was simply 
monitoring customer contacts and that I had no interest (from a research point of view) 
in the staff or their performance. I remained as inconspicuous as possible and dressed 
casually to reinforce the message that I was just an observer. I sat well back from the 
workstations, took no part in contact handling, and made no comment about how they 
were handled – even if I thought that they should have been handled differently. I took 
notes discreetly, sometimes turning away and feigning disinterest while still listening to 
what was happening. I showed the completed data collection sheets to the staff and their 
team leaders, to provide reassurance that the record did not refer to them or their 
activities. When the agents were not taking telephone calls or answering my questions 
they were wrapping up earlier enquiries, initiating call-backs or engaging in banter with 
colleagues - so it was not difficult to remain detached.  
 
In parallel with the pilot observation work described above, I developed a spreadsheet-
based model for capturing and analysing the data. The spreadsheet facilitated the 
generation of charts like those illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 below. The categories of 
customer contacts reported in the figures (e.g. customers providing documents, 
customers advising changes of circumstances, etc.) were representative of actual 
customer enquiries observed during the pilot research and thus contributed toward the 
process of identifying the nature and causes of PAFID. 
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Figure 3: Pilot study – illustrative presentation of causes of customer contact 
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Channel Date Sheet Row Cause High Low Avoidable Off Remit One Stop Returned Service Request Passed On
Telephone 09/05/2007 0001 01 wrong number call transferred 1
02 customer querying overdue payment 1 1
03 customer progress chasing outstanding claim 1 1
04 customer representative notifying change of circumstance 1 1
05 customer representative progress chasing outstanding claim 1 1
06 customer representative querying overdue payment 1 1
07 landlord complaining about delayed payment 1 1
08 landlord progress chasing outstanding claim 1 1
09 customer progress chasing outstanding claim 1 1
10 customer progress chasing outstanding claim 1 1
11 customer advising change of circumstance 1 1
12 customer seeking estimate of entitlement 1 1
COUNT 3 1 7 1 2 1 5 3
12 11
PERCENT 25 8.3 58.3 8.3 18.2 9.1 45.5 27.3
99.9 100.1
Value Resolution
Contact Value
25%
8%
59%
8%
High
Low
Avoidable
Off Remit
Contact Resolution
18%
9%
46%
27%
One Stop
Returned
Service Request
Passed On
Figure 4: Pilot study - illustrative analysis of contact value and resolution 
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The outcome of the pilot observation work on the telephones was that 35 calls were 
monitored, 74% of them were classified as potentially avoidable (i.e. attributable to 
failures that might have been prevented), and 70% appeared to be resolved on first 
contact. A variety of causes of customer contacts were identified, ranging from 
customers providing information about changes of circumstances through to customers 
complaining about officer errors. The most frequent cause of contact was customers 
seeking clarification about further information and evidence that they were required to 
produce in support of outstanding housing and council tax benefits claims – and this 
was a class of activity that had been categorised in advance as unnecessary and 
potentially avoidable. However, no statistical significance was attached to the outcomes 
of the pilot project, the purpose of which was to test and improve the research design for 
the subsequent case-studies. 
 
Pilot face-to-face contacts 
 
The following week, I spent one full day observing face-to-face customer contacts at the 
public enquiry counter in the civic centre at Council P. I sat with customer service 
agents covering three interview booths and a ‘fast flow’ reception desk. The same 
agents were on duty at the same workstations both morning and afternoon. They dealt 
with a range of service enquiries, but the purpose of the research was to monitor only 
those enquiries relating to housing and council tax benefits. 
 
I monitored 53 face-to-face enquiries, using the data collection sheets and criteria for 
classifying contacts that were generated during the pilot work on the telephones. As 
before, in order to guard against observer bias, I sought clarification from the agents as 
necessary, and shared the completed data collection sheets with them to ensure that the 
codings were correct. Otherwise, I remained as unobtrusive as possible, sat well back 
from the counter and took no part in the proceedings. I took notes discreetly and moved 
away to avoid being drawn into conversations with customers when agents left their 
workstations (e.g. to take photocopies, obtain stationery and take comfort breaks). It 
was not difficult to remain detached because we were separated from the customers by a 
substantial glass screen. 
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The spreadsheet that I developed to capture the data about telephone contacts (see 
Figure 4 above) was also used to secure the data about face-to-face enquiries. The 
outcome of the pilot observation of face-to-face contacts was that 53 contacts were 
monitored, 49% of them were classified as potentially avoidable, and 36% appeared to 
be resolved on first contact. As before, a variety of reasons for the customer enquiries 
were identified, the most frequent being customers providing information and evidence 
in support of outstanding housing and council tax benefits claims. This activity had 
previously been categorised as unnecessary. It was noted that more of the face-to-face 
contacts than the telephone contacts were categorised as valuable, and fewer of them 
were resolved on first contact. While no statistical significance was attached to these 
outcomes, the data helped me to frame questions for the subsequent interviews. 
 
An investigation of incoming customer correspondence about housing and council tax 
benefits proved to be unproductive. It transpired that most of the material (257 
documents received on one working day) had originated at the public enquiry counter, 
where it had been deposited by customers who did not want to wait for interviews. 
Consequently, there was no information about contact cause, value, avoidability or 
resolution. Other customer access channels such as e-mail, online enquiries and text 
messages were investigated but none were received during the period of the pilot 
research, which highlighted the very limited penetration of electronic service delivery at 
that point in time. 
 
Pilot interviews 
 
The objectives of the pilot interviews were to clarify the characteristics of the issues 
under consideration, to identify some preliminary concepts for subsequent exploration, 
and to help frame suitable questions for the substantive case-studies. The questions 
addressed three principal themes: potentially avoidable failure induced demand, contact 
resolution and Lean thinking. I sought to establish what was known about these 
concepts, how they might be explained, what actions had been taken, and how 
successful any previous improvement programmes were perceived to have been.  
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I began by circulating an e-mail asking for volunteers from among the contact centre 
staff and received three responses. I contacted the respondents by e-mail to secure their 
informed consent, to settle the administrative arrangements, and to finalise agreements 
about confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
The pilot questionnaire protocol, reproduced in Annex 3 on pages 269-270, consisted of 
a brief explanation of the research, which was read to each participant at the beginning 
of each interview. There were also 11 questions on the sheet, together with possible 
prompts in case participants were initially unable to respond. The interviews (which 
lasted between 20 and 50 minutes each) were conducted in a private office, and were 
captured in the form of digital recordings. All of the respondents said that they were 
comfortable with this approach. I attempted to maximise the content of the feedback and 
give some structure to the events by providing advance notice of the questions. 
However, it was apparent during the interviews that the participants were more 
comfortable and forthcoming when allowed to range across the topic at their own pace. 
Consequently, I limited myself to ensuring that each of the key concepts was discussed 
at some point in the conversation.  
 
The interview recordings were subsequently transcribed verbatim using a convention 
based on Schenkein (1978, xi–xvi) and illustrated in Annex 4 on pages 271-272. The 
transcripts and recordings were then copied electronically to the respondents for 
comment and correction, but they did not request any alterations.  
 
An auditable procedure was required that would identify the key points contained in the 
data without losing the richness of this mass of information. I was reluctant to employ a 
formal coding scheme because this could have obscured the meaning of the data to the 
point where it became fragmented and de-contextualised. For example, a seven-step 
sequential approach to qualitative data analysis is identified by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) but techniques like this have been criticised for being “idealised, linear [and] 
goal-directed” (Bryman, 1988, 8) as a result of which they fail to capture the quirkiness 
and messiness of real-world social research.  
 
Turner (1988) explains how the potential disadvantages of a sequential approach to 
qualitative data analysis can be avoided. He describes a process of going through 
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interview transcripts, numbering paragraphs for reference purposes and writing down 
the titles of preliminary concepts. Examples of the occurrence of these concepts are then 
recorded. When a number of instances of an occurrence have emerged, an attempt is 
made to define the overarching concept in plain English. Inter-relationships between 
concepts then start to emerge. Turner describes these activities as iterative and 
overlapping in a continuous cycle of observation, analysis and theorising that stops 
when it becomes exhausted (Turner, 1988, 110).  
 
I employed an adaptation of Turner’s method that involved scrutinising the interview 
transcripts, giving each paragraph a unique identification number for reference 
purposes, highlighting what appeared to be key phrases, and copying these into a 
separate column. The two research assistants (previously described on page 98 above) 
then examined the transcripts independently and the three of us worked towards a 
consensus about the sections of narrative that were to be regarded as significant. An 
illustration of the output from this first phase of analysis is set out below at Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Pilot study - illustration of sequential analysis stage 1 
 
Row ID Narrative Key Comments 
222 MS Experienced staff have to make a 
lot of call-backs when 
inexperienced staff cannot take 
incoming calls. 
Experienced staff have to make a lot 
of call-backs when inexperienced 
staff cannot take incoming calls 
223 KM So it results in call-backs, OK.  
224 MS Which is still a better service than 
a lot of companies provide. A lot of 
companies tell the customers to 
phone back, but it still means 
{mm} that the experienced staff 
have got to call back and 
consequently the enquiry is not 
dealt with on first contact. 
 
 
 
 
consequently the enquiry is not dealt 
with on first contact 
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In the next phase of the analysis, each respondent’s key comments were clustered into 
concept areas using the ‘mind mapping’ technique illustrated in Figure 5 below. Mind 
mapping has been described as a note-taking method that seeks to mimic the brain’s 
function with the use of colours, branches and pictures (Abbott, 1992; Anderson, 1993; 
Oslapas, 1993), but it was also a very useful technique for sorting and categorising the 
mass of information contained in the interview transcripts. 
 
 
Figure 5: Pilot study - illustration of sequential analysis stage 2 (mind mapping) 
 
 
© Reproduced with the permission of Phil Chambers who can be contacted via www.learning-tech.co.uk 
 
I then transferred the data to a new document and realigned the key phrases with 
frequently occurring concepts such as resources, communication, quality and 
technology. The data were also separated into two categories called ‘Diagnosis’ and 
‘Prevention’ with a view to clarifying what happened, why and how it might be 
avoided. The presentation of the re-assembled data is illustrated in Table 6 below, using 
the concept area of ‘resources’ as an example. 
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Table 6: Pilot study - illustration of sequential analysis stage 3 
 
Preliminary concept: Resources 
Diagnosis (what happened and why) Prevention (how it might be avoided) 
 
222 
 
experienced staff have to make a 
lot of call-backs because 
inexperienced staff cannot take 
incoming calls 
 
256 
 
 
286 
 
 
581 
 
revenues and benefits training 
would stop some of the call-backs 
 
there should be more assessors 
instead of pre-assessors 
 
we need more benefit assessors on 
the front line and better trained 
customer services staff – but do we 
have the spare assessment staff and 
space to do this? 
 
 
 
Finally, the preliminary concepts were reorganised by aligning implicit standards of 
customer care with the consequences of breaching those standards (i.e. how PAFID is 
manifest), and the ways in which those breaches might be prevented. Here again, in an 
iterative process, the analyses were read, interpreted, adjusted and re-read by myself and 
the two research assistants. I ensured that the resulting output remained well-grounded 
in the original interview material by sharing it with the interviewees, but again no 
alterations were suggested (see Table 7 below). 
 
The pilot questions about Lean thinking yielded insufficient information because the 
interviewees had little understanding of the concept. Consequently, in the substantive 
case-studies, the questions sought to investigate the penetration of the Lean techniques 
introduced in Chapter 3, such as continuous improvement, defect prevention, knowledge 
management and business process redesign.  
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Table 7: Pilot study - illustration of sequential analysis stage 4 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
 
There should be sufficient 
front-office staff to deal with 
customer demand. Front-
office staff should be 
knowledgeable, skilled and 
experienced in the handling 
of housing and council tax 
benefits claims. 
 
 
Inexperienced staff are 
unable to deal with housing 
and council tax benefits 
enquiries. If experienced 
staff are not available to 
take calls, they are having to 
call customers back at a 
mutually convenient 
opportunity. The double-
handling of these enquiries 
increases administration 
costs, damages customer 
relations and reduces 
resolution on first contact. 
 
 
More staff, better training 
(including cross-training 
between the front and back 
offices) and more 
comfortable surroundings 
would help the organisation 
to recruit and retain 
experienced staff.  
 
Care should be taken not to 
over-skill staff for the work 
that is required from them. 
 
Staffing resources should be 
redistributed to improve the 
balance between pre-
assessors, assessors and the 
front line. 
 
 
Pilot customer journey roadmaps 
 
As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the literature contains references to opportunities for 
improvement and innovation available from customer journey mapping (Cabinet Office, 
2008). During the pilot study, I established that there were 16 different types of housing 
and council tax benefits claims. I selected a sample of five claims with the longest end-
to-end customer journey times completed in the preceding six months, because these 
seemed most likely to display recent examples of the phenomenon under investigation. I 
then examined all available records, tabulated details of the associated customer 
journeys, and formulated ‘challenge questions’ regarding any potentially avoidable 
contacts. These questions were incorporated into a tabulation that captured the claim 
history and then submitted to the service head for consideration and response. Finally, 
the details about each customer’s experiences, the challenge questions and responses 
were all converted into a pictorial presentation, called here a ‘customer journey 
roadmap’. The causes of potentially avoidable contacts (i.e. service failures that might 
have been prevented) were arranged in decreasing order of frequency to highlight the 
most common occurrences. Illustrations of a claim history, customer journey roadmap 
and summary of contact causes are set out below at Table 8, Figure 6 and Table 9. 
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Table 8: Pilot study - illustration of a housing benefits claim history 
 
Claim Ref: FITLXF99 Claim Type: Local Authority Tenant - Standard 
DATE DAY ACTION OFFICER COMMENT RESPONSE 
07/01/2008 1 Claimant phoned office as sick pay from 
employer had run out and was only 
receiving SSP [statutory sick pay] a HBF 
[housing benefits form] was sent. 
MA   
16/01/2008 9 LA [local authority] claim form received 
along with proofs (covering letter, partial 
bank statements, letter showing IS [income 
support] claim date, PAYE [pay as you 
earn] coding letter, one pay slip showing 
SSP [statutory sick pay] and passport). 
MA   
17/01/2008 10 LAID [local authority input document] 
received for IS [income support] claim 
from DWP [Department for Work and 
Pensions]. 
MA   
07/02/2008 31 FIL [further information letter] sent to 
claimant requesting bank statements, tax 
credit award letters, proof of ongoing SSP 
[statutory sick pay], information about the 
date of accident and start date of SSP 
[statutory sick pay] 
AP Should the FIL [further 
information letter] have asked for 
proof of IS [income support]?  
Why wasn’t the FIL [further 
information letter] sent shortly 
after 16/01/2008? Did the AO 
[assessment officer] telephone 
the customer at the same time? 
No, LAID [local authority input document] received 
17/01/2008 advising IS [income support] claim 
made 15/01/2008. AO [assessment officer] needed 
confirmation of IS [income support award] award 
before assessing claim. Was probably awaiting DWP 
[Department for Work and Pensions] decision. 
NHB3 [notification letter from DWP] then received 
06/02/2008 advising ineligible for IS [income 
support] as income too high. Hence FIL [further 
information letter] sent out 07/02/2008 asking for 
details of income etc. No notes to suggest AO 
[assessment officer] contacted CL [claimant]. 
However, at the time of initial claim only needed 
official confirmation of IS [income support]. 
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Table 8 (continued): 
 
Claim Ref: FITLXF99 Claim Type: Local Authority Tenant - Standard 
DATE DAY ACTION OFFICER COMMENT RESPONSE 
08/02/2008 32 Claimant phoned chasing claim, advised of 
FIL [further information letter] sent on the 
previous day, she mentioned that she might 
have trouble getting proofs on time as she 
was about to go into hospital. 
GK   
12/02/2008 36 Proofs received with a covering letter, pay 
slips, bank statements for partner’s 
Nationwide account, proof of personal 
injury claim, tax credit letter and tenancy 
agreement. 
GK   
14/02/2008 38 Further information letter sent to claimant 
requesting her bank statements and proof 
of her partners IIB [invalidity benefit] if he 
is still receiving it. 
AP Was this extra information to the 
FIL [further information letter] 
letter sent 07/02/2008?  If so, 
why was it missed the first time? 
Original FIL [further information letter] asked for 
ALL bank statements but not all submitted. IIB 
[invalidity benefit] was mentioned on HBF [housing 
benefits form] but does not show on partner’s case 
on CIS [Department for Work and Pension’s 
computer information system]. This should have 
been requested in initial FIL [further information 
latter] dated 07/02/2008. 
18/02/2008 42 Claimant phoned, the proofs sent in on 
previous claim are still relevant for partners 
IB [invalidity benefit]. 
GK   
19/02/2008 43 FIL [further information letter] sent to 
remind claimant we still need her bank 
statements. 
AP   
21/02/2008 45 Claimant phones regarding her bank 
statements, states she posted them on 
20/02/2008 
RL   
21/02/2008 45 Proof of partners account received    
26/02/2008 50 Claim calculated and HB [housing 
benefits] awarded 
AP   
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Figure 6: Pilot study - illustration of a ‘customer journey roadmap’ 
 
 
DAY 1 
Claimant phoned office as sick pay from 
employer had run out and was only re-
ceiving SSP [statutory sick pay] an HBF 
[housing benefit form] was sent.  
DAY 9 
LA [local authority] claim form received at Priory House along with 
proofs (covering letter, partial bank statements, letter showing IS 
[income support] claim date, PAYE [pay as you earn] coding letter, 
one payslip showing SSP [statutory sick pay] and passport).  
DAY 10 
LAID [local authority input document] 
received for IS [income support] claim 
from DWP [Department for Work and 
Pensions].  
DAY 31
FIL [further information letter] sent to claimant 
requesting bank statements, tax credit award 
letters, proof of ongoing SSP [statutory sick 
pay], information about the date of accident and 
start date of SSP [statutory sick pay]  
DAY 38 
Further information letter sent to claim-
ant requesting her bank statements and 
proof of her partners IIB [invalidity 
benefit] if he is still receiving it.  
DAY 42
Claimant phoned, the proofs 
sent in on previous claim are 
still relevant for partners IIB 
[invalidity benefit].  
DAY 36 
Proofs received with a coving letter, 
payslips, bank statements for part-
ner’s Nationwide account, proof of 
personal injury claim, tax credit 
letter and tenancy agreement.  
DAY 32
Claimant phoned chasing claim, advised 
of FIL [further information letter] sent on 
the previous day, she mentioned that she 
might have trouble getting proofs on time 
as she was about to go into hospital. 
DAY 43 
FIL [further information letter] sent to remind 
claimant we still need her bank statements. 
DAY 45 
Claimant phones regarding her bank state-
ments, states she posted them on the 20th 
DAY 50 
Claim calculated and HB [housing benefit] awarded  
DAY 45 
Proof of partners account received  
Should the FIL [further information letter] have asked for proof of IS [income sup-
port]?  Why wasn’t the FIL [further information letter] sent shortly after 16.1.08? 
Did the AO [assessment officer] telephone the customer at the same time?  
No, LAID [local authority input document] received 17/01/2008 advising IS 
[income support] claim made 15/01/2008. AO [assessment officer] needed confir-
mation of IS [income support award] award before assessing claim. Was probably 
awaiting DWP [Department for Work and Pensions] decision. NHB3 [notification 
letter from DWP] then received 06/02/2008 advising ineligible for IS [income sup-
port] as income too high. Hence FIL [further information letter] sent out 
07/02/2008 asking for details of income etc. No notes to suggest AO [assessment 
officer] contacted CL [claimant]. However, at the time of initial claim only needed 
official confirmation of IS [income support]. 
Was this extra information to the FIL [further 
information letter] letter sent 7/2/08?  If so, why 
was it missed the first time?  
Original FIL [further information letter] asked for 
ALL bank statements but not all submitted. IIB 
[invalidity benefit] was mentioned on HBF 
[housing benefit form] but does not show on 
partner’s case on CIS [Department for Work and 
Pension’s computer information system]. This 
should have been requested in initial FIL [further 
information latter] dated 07/02/2008.  
Claim Ref: FITLXF99 Claim Type: LA Tenant: Standard
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The value of the customer journey mapping technique was demonstrated by the 
revelation of an additional category of PAFID that was not identified during the 
observation or interview stages of the research, namely process delays within the 
organisation itself. Table 9 below reveals that 20 out of 22 examples of PAFID (from 
five sample claims) were attributable to internal delays. 
 
 
Table 9: Pilot study - illustrative summary of contact causes 
 
Causes of potentially avoidable failure induced demand identified 
during customer journey mapping 
Number of 
occurrences
Delays assessing claims 8 
Delays requesting further information 5 
Delays dispatching notification letters 3 
Requests for unnecessary information 2 
Delays conducting visits 1 
Delays creating council tax accounts 1 
Delays suspending claims 1 
Delays receiving documents from outstations 1 
 
It would have been preferable if the data from the mapping exercises could have been 
supplemented by conversations with the actual customers concerned. This would have 
constituted a more sophisticated process that sought to validate the information recorded 
by the council, confirm the customers’ expectations, and identify the most positive and 
negative aspects of the journey. The council could, if it had wished, then sought to 
move toward a situation in which it was getting it right where it mattered most to its 
customers. However, the detailed enquiry that was necessary to establish exactly what 
happened during the assessment of the selected claims caused anxiety among the 
benefits assessors, who seemed unused to such close scrutiny of their work. For 
example, this nervousness manifested itself in long delays between the submission of 
challenge questions and the provision of answers, and in conspicuously incomplete 
responses. I therefore decided to restrict the deployment of this tool. 
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Critical analysis of the pilot study 
 
The pilot study highlighted some methodological problems, which I sought to minimise 
during the subsequent case-studies. The issues identified and the responses to them are 
set out in Tables 10, 11 and 12 below. The interview questions about Lean thinking 
elicited few detailed responses, and it was necessary to redraft the interview schedule 
for subsequent use. Direct references to Lean thinking were removed, as the expression 
was not meaningful to the respondents, but questions about sub-categories of Lean 
(such as continuous improvement, waste prevention and getting it right first time) were 
included. The revised questions also acknowledged the possibility that different staff in 
different places would have different perceptions of concepts such as failure, value, 
avoidability and resolution. The revised data collection sheets and questionnaire 
protocols that emerged from the pilot study are reproduced at Annex 5 on pages 273-
274 and Annex 6 on pages 275-276 respectively. 
 
Table 10: Pilot study - critical analysis of the non-participant observations 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-
studies 
Precautions were taken during the pilot 
study to guard against potential ‘demand 
characteristics’ but it is unlikely that any 
such influences were entirely negated. For 
example, some agents seemed anxious 
about the quality of their responses and 
sought reassurances from me that they had 
answered correctly. It appeared to me that 
some particularly diligent wrap-up work 
was done (e.g. checking system 
information with the back office and 
ringing back customers to verify details) 
that might not have been done in normal 
circumstances. 
Particular care was taken to explain to 
management and staff that data were being 
gathered about customer contacts and not 
about staff or their performance. I sought 
to establish in their minds that it was not 
an experiment, they were not ‘subjects’ 
and there were no anticipated outcomes 
that they could help me to achieve. I 
endeavoured to minimise the impact of my 
presence upon the staff by being as 
inconspicuous as possible and by 
restricting my interaction with them to the 
minimum amount necessary to secure their 
ongoing co-operation.  
I took no part in contact handling or 
problem resolution and made the process 
of collecting the data as transparent as 
possible, to reinforce the message that I 
was not monitoring the customer services 
agents but simply observing the contacts 
they were handling. 
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Table 10 (continued): 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-
studies 
Precautions were taken during the pilot 
study to guard against observer bias, but 
according to Nagel (1986) there is no such 
thing as a view from nowhere. 
 
 
The research design does not rely upon 
data from the observation work alone, nor 
was there any pretence that the 
quantitative results were statistically 
significant or generalisable. Other 
techniques were employed, including 
semi-structured interviews and customer 
journey roadmaps. 
The pilot study revealed that concepts 
such as failure, value and avoidability 
mean different things to different people. 
For example, management were generally 
of the opinion that customer contacts 
should be defined from the perspective of 
the organisation. So, for example, a 
repetition of an earlier enquiry was not 
valuable and was potentially avoidable. 
But a number of staff argued that contacts 
were valuable, even if they were 
potentially avoidable, if they mattered to 
customers. Consequently, it became clear 
that the identification of contact 
categories, and the subsequent allocation 
of contacts between those categories, 
would involve a degree of subjective 
judgement that was likely to vary in 
significance from site to site. 
At each case-study site, I took particular 
care to explain that the output from the 
quantitative research would have to be 
treated with caution, that structure and 
quantification were no guarantee of 
accuracy, and that the key informant 
interviews should be seen as the principal 
methodological tool.  
I explained why the meanings attributed to 
concepts such as contact cause, value, 
avoidability and resolution were important 
and would vary from one council to 
another. I obtained agreement about what 
cause, value, avoidability and resolution 
meant to each council before data 
collection began, and I publicised the 
agreed meanings by reproducing them in 
guidance notes on the reverse of the data 
collection sheets.  
Subsequently, during the research, I 
collected the data openly, asked for 
clarification whenever contacts seemed 
ambiguous, and shared the completed data 
collection sheets with the agents. Finally, I 
secured the services of two competent 
research assistants at each site, who 
scrutinised the completed data collection 
sheets and highlighted potential errors. We 
were able to reach agreement about the 
coding, but I would have relied upon my 
own judgement if there had been 
disagreement, on the basis that people 
employed by the case-study councils were 
likely to have conflicting interests. 
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Table 10 (continued): 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-
studies 
The telephone contact centre and public 
enquiry counter were both challenging 
environments in which to collect data. 
During the pilot study, the volume of 
telephone calls was lower than usual 
because enquiries about services other 
than housing benefits were diverted to 
agents other than those that I was sitting 
with. Consequently, it was sometimes 
difficult to maintain concentration. On the 
other hand, the public enquiry counter was 
so busy that it was sometimes difficult to 
follow what was happening. Agents 
sometimes became involved in more than 
one enquiry at a time and moved on to 
new enquiries before completing old ones, 
returning to finish earlier enquiries during 
quieter periods. 
Prior to the substantive case-studies, I 
explained to all the participants that I 
wanted them to maintain ‘business as 
usual’, with no special arrangements for 
filtering or redirecting customer enquiries. 
During quiet periods, I took the 
opportunity to clarify ambiguous contacts. 
During particularly busy periods I 
concentrated upon, and captured the 
details of, one contact at a time. 
The design of the pilot data collection 
sheet was cluttered. The recording of 
contact identifiers endangered the aim of 
not collecting personal data. There were 
two ambiguous categories of contact 
resolution: ‘service request’ and ‘passed 
over’. The format of the guidance note on 
the reverse of the data collection sheet was 
over-complicated, with several layers of 
indentation. 
During the substantive case-studies, a 
redesigned data collection sheet and 
guidance note was employed (see Annex 
5, page 273-274). Any details that could 
be used to identify the customers or 
customer service agents were removed. 
Seven columns of data were reduced to 
four: row number, contact cause, contact 
value and contact resolution. Contact 
value was revised to better reflect the 
typologies identified during the literature 
review: high value, low value, potentially 
avoidable and off remit. Contact resolution 
was redefined to better reflect the range of 
outcomes experienced during the pilot 
observations: one stop resolution; repeat 
contact; passed back to the customer; and 
passed on to the back office. 
Council P’s CRM system contained 
information about many customer 
transactions, but it was not structured in 
ways that facilitated investigation of 
contact cause, value or resolution. 
Ample data was collected during the 
substantive case studies, when more than 
1250 customer contacts were observed and 
analysed. 
 
 
117 
Table 11: Pilot study - critical analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-studies 
The administrative arrangements that 
preceded the pilot interviews (e.g. 
sending explanations about the 
research and invitations to interviews 
by e-mail and then confirming 
appointments via Outlook) worked 
well. However, it seemed to me that 
electronic communication might be 
too impersonal in different settings, 
where ICT systems might be less 
reliable and misunderstandings about 
the nature and purpose of the research 
were more likely to arise. 
During the case-studies, I specified what sort 
of people I wanted to interview (staff 
constituting cross-sections from top to bottom 
and front to back of each organisation) and 
management selected the individual 
candidates. I took control as soon as possible 
by sending my own explanations, invitations 
and contact details to the potential respondents 
by e-mail. I followed-up the first message with 
at least two others, one confirming the 
timetable and meeting place for the interviews, 
and the second containing a simplified list of 
the questions that I intended to ask. I also 
spoke to most of the candidates in person 
during the preceding week, to confirm their 
attendance and address any concerns. 
Additional correspondence was necessary 
where appointments had to be rearranged or 
first-choice candidates were substituted with 
others.  
The location of the pilot interviews (a 
private office environment) was 
effective in terms of being clean, tidy, 
spacious, quiet and uninterrupted. The 
respondents seemed to be relaxed, but 
the arrangement (face-to-face across a 
large table) was formal, and the power 
relationship unequal because the staff 
were aware that I was a senior 
practitioner. 
My preliminary communications with the case-
study sites detailed the facilities that I would 
need, including quiet and comfortable rooms 
for interviews. All three councils provided 
generous facilities, but these were restricted to 
normal office accommodation. I sought to 
reduce the formality of the situation by 
dressing informally, rearranging the furniture 
to remove barriers between the respondents 
and myself, and by providing refreshments 
such as tea, coffee, bottled water and biscuits.  
The power relationships were more equal 
during the substantive case-studies than during 
the pilot study, particularly at Councils B and 
C where I did not know the respondents and 
they only knew that I was doing research that 
was intended to help them improve the 
services. 
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Table 11 (continued): 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-
studies 
Open questions were effective in terms of 
avoiding yes/no answers. I sometimes 
abbreviated the introduction to reduce 
formality, but one respondent subsequently 
asked for clarification, which suggested that 
she wasn't as familiar with the purpose of 
the study as I had expected.  I tried to avoid 
suggesting answers while asking questions, 
but it was initially difficult not to fill 
silences when respondents were not as 
forthcoming as expected. The answers to 
some questions were less detailed and 
coherent than expected. 
During the case-studies, I was more 
persistent in response to incomplete answers 
and offered more examples in order to elicit 
more detailed replies. I was less 
uncomfortable with silences, and restricted 
my humour to those occasions when some 
levity seemed necessary to put respondents 
at ease. Later in each sequence of questions 
I sought to validate some of the ideas that 
emerged from earlier interviews – but only 
after I had allowed time for these ideas to 
emerge spontaneously. 
The recording arrangements (digital recorder 
and discreet microphone) were effective. All 
of the respondents were willing to be 
recorded but, on one occasion only, I forgot 
to activate the recorder and was 
subsequently obliged to rely upon hand-
written notes. Immediately after each 
interview, I saved the audio file to a PC or 
lap-top computer and a USB stick.  
During the case-studies, all of the 
respondents were content to be recorded. I 
developed a routine (a sequence of essential 
actions) for ensuring that the recording 
machine was switched on and working 
before each interview commenced. This 
included recording and playing back a short 
sequence of my own words. I maintained a 
supply of replacement batteries for the 
recorder. Finally, after saving each file in 
two locations, I e-mailed the data to myself 
at home. 
Transcribing the recordings and analysing 
the data was more time-consuming than 
anticipated. The process of sequentially 
analysing the data was successful in terms of 
identifying key phrases and preliminary 
concepts while retaining the connection with 
the original interview material. I kept the 
respondents connected with the process by 
asking them to check and agree the 
transcripts. There was a danger that they 
would ask for inappropriate changes but 
they did not do so. 
During the case-studies, I took notes of key 
issues as they arose during the interviews, so 
that it was easier to ask follow-up questions 
and identify key concepts that had not been 
raised. This device made it easier to 
complete the subsequent analyses because I 
had a contemporary record of the main 
points that arose during each conversation. 
This enabled me to maintain a connection 
between the data and the subsequent 
analyses, and to retain the character of the 
feedback provided by individual 
respondents. 
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Table 12: Pilot study - critical analysis of customer journey mapping technique 
 
Issues arising during the pilot study Precautions taken during the case-
studies 
The number of benefit claims selected and 
the sampling method employed were not 
adequate for the production of 
generalisable results. 
It was not intended that the quantitative 
results of the case-studies should be 
statistically reliable. The customer journey 
mapping exercise was just one of several 
techniques employed which, when taken 
together, sought to identify and unpack 
relevant concepts. 
The record of officer actions and customer 
contacts maintained by the staff was 
sometimes incomplete. This was 
illustrated by responses to challenge 
questions that elicited information not 
recorded on computer systems.  
During the case-studies, it was sometimes 
necessary to accept explanations offered 
by staff that were not evidenced by 
information recorded on relevant computer 
or paper-based systems. 
The challenge questions necessitated 
detailed enquiries into the causes of 
PAFID. This process highlighted errors 
and oversights by individual assessors, 
who then became anxious about being 
held to account for their actions. 
Responses to challenge questions were 
sometimes incomplete and delayed. 
Managers were reluctant to allow 
customers to be interviewed about their 
experiences, or to progress detailed 
enquiries into individual claims, because 
of misgivings articulated by staff. 
During the case-studies, challenge 
questions were directed at management, 
on the assumption that they were more 
likely to be candid about the failures that 
they identified because they were not 
directly involved in benefits assessment 
work. Managers were asked to compile 
and submit responses themselves, and to 
be as open as possible about failures and 
their causes. Personal contacts developed 
during the observation work were used to 
obtain essential information, but care was 
taken not to jeopardise the positions of 
respondents. Management’s reluctance to 
involve customers in this phase of the 
research, or to conduct anything more than 
light-touch investigations into any failures 
they identified, was respected. 
Little information was available from the 
council’s records about the extent to which 
housing and council tax benefits claimants 
interacted with other agencies (e.g. the 
DWP, HMRC, Citizens Advice Bureaux 
and local authority housing departments) 
during the end-to-end journey of their 
claims.  
During the case-studies, a variety of 
records were accessed in order to extract 
as much information as possible about 
entire customer journeys. Assessment 
officers were asked to identify potentially 
avoidable contacts that appeared to be 
attributable to other agencies. 
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Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, I described the research purpose underlying this thesis and set out the 
Research Questions that it seeks to answer. I explained why I adopted the case-study 
approach and selected as case-study sites three housing and council tax benefits services 
administered by local councils. I then described four phases of pilot work (document 
review, non-participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey 
mapping) conducted in a local authority contact centre, and illustrated tools and 
techniques that I developed for capturing, analysing and displaying relevant data. 
Finally, I critically analysed the pilot work, described the precautions taken to prevent 
potential methodological problems arising during subsequent case-studies (described in 
Chapters 5 and 6), and explained a number of changes that were introduced following 
the pilot study to improve the research design. 
 
During the pilot observation work, it emerged that perceptions about concepts such as 
contact value, avoidability and resolution depended upon the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders involved. This preliminary finding echoes the discussion in Chapter 3 
about agency theory (see pages 55-57) and the potential adverse consequences of 
conflicts of interest between principals and agents. It also resonates with the observation 
made by Jowett and Rothwell (1988) reported in the same chapter (see page 57) 
regarding the interest-related nature of the definition of performance, as a consequence 
of which the authors maintain that there are circumstances in real life in which 
performance cannot be accurately gauged. 
 
Chapter 5 will explain how the research methods and techniques developed during the 
pilot study were applied during three substantive case-studies. The aim of conducting 
three case-studies was to capture data that: (1) facilitated the analysis of more than 1250 
customer enquiries (from the three case-studies) according to contact cause, value and 
resolution; and (2) enabled the findings from the case-studies to be compared and 
contrasted, to further illuminate the problem of PAFID and to reveal similarities and 
differences that might determine the extent to which generalisability could be inferred 
from the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 5:   DATA COLLECTION, VALIDATION & FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 4, I described a case-study approach and four-phase research design that was 
tested and adapted during pilot work conducted in the housing and council tax benefits 
services department of a local council in south-east England. In this chapter, I will 
describe the collection and preliminary analysis of data captured during three 
substantive case-studies that were conducted in similar local authority settings, using 
the research tools and techniques described in Chapter 4. Detailed analysis and 
discussion of the primary data, examination of their inter-relationships with the 
concepts and theories identified during the literature review, and consideration of the 
extent to which the research has addressed the Research Questions is reserved for 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Case-study A 
 
This case-study involved the investigation of customer contacts handled by housing and 
council tax benefits services provided by a district council in south-east England, which 
is called Council A in this thesis. Four phases of research were conducted during the 
summer of 2007: document review, non-participant observations, semi-structured 
interviews, and customer journey mapping. 
 
The methods employed to collect, analyse and validate the data during this case-study 
were developed during the pilot study described in Chapter 4. For example, the 
precautions needed to guard against potential ‘demand characteristics’ described in 
Chapter 4 on page 98, and against observer bias described in Table 10 on page 114, 
were re-employed during this case-study. The process of securing agreement about the 
meaning of key concepts (i.e. contact cause, value, avoidability and resolution) and the 
discipline required to ensure the consistent application of the associated criteria, was 
derived from the pilot study. Data about cause, value, avoidability and resolution were 
recorded using the revised data collection sheet template and guidance notes that 
emerged from the pilot work (see Annex 5 on pages 273-274). Examples of PAFID 
were included in the guidance notes on the reverse of the data collection sheets, to 
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clarify its meaning and convey that information to staff before the process of collecting 
the data began. In an iterative process, the data and analyses generated during the case-
study were studied, discussed, interpreted and adjusted if necessary by myself and two 
volunteer research assistants, who were graduates possessing the necessary skills to 
undertake work of this nature to a high standard. 
 
Document review 
 
A ‘service biography’ was developed in order to capture key data about the organisation 
within which the research was subsequently conducted. The analysis involved a survey 
of online information about the council and its housing and council tax benefits services 
covering the period from 2000 to 2007. I obtained data from websites maintained by 
Council A, the Department of Work and Pensions, and the Audit Commission. The 
council provided me with organisation charts, inspection reports and benchmarking 
data. 
 
The documentary record revealed housing and council tax benefits services that were 
performing well in both absolute and comparative terms. For example, in 2006/07, new 
benefit claims were processed within an average of 32 days, changes of circumstance 
were resolved within 14 days and some 99% of benefit assessments were calculated 
correctly. The services scored highly following a Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment by the Audit Commission in 2003. In 2005/06, the services scored above 
(i.e. better than) average in a wide range of measures compiled by the Institute of Public 
Finance’s housing and council tax benefits benchmarking club. The services were an 
integral part of a department that was awarded a Charter Mark58 for customer service 
excellence. 
 
There was some evidence that the services had suffered an increase in caseload of new 
housing and council tax benefits claims between 2002 and 2007 without an associated 
increase in staffing resources, and this appeared to be associated with a deterioration of 
new claim turn-around times over the same period. The implementation of a new 
                                                          
58 Charter Mark was an award (now replaced by Customer Service Excellence) offered by central 
government to UK public sector organisations achieving high standards of customer service 
(http://cabinetoffice.gov.uk/chartermark/about.aspx  accessed 10/09/09). 
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corporate contact centre service in 2006 appeared to have adversely affected staff 
morale. However, a careful examination of end-to-end processes, viewed from the 
customers’ perspective, suggested reduced variation and improved performance after 
November 2006. This encouraging picture of recent progress was consistent with 
outstanding workloads (which were historically low), but the data did not explain the 
development. Nevertheless, the services were on target to achieve ‘top grade’ status 
across several central government performance measures during 2007. In other words, 
there was nothing to suggest that the subsequent research would discover high levels of 
PAFID. 
 
Non-participant observations 
 
To collect the data, I sat with customer service staff in the corporate contact centre and 
public service area at Council A for two full weeks. During this time, they dealt with 
more than 330 telephone calls and face-to-face enquiries about housing and council tax 
benefits services. 
 
Categorisation of customer enquiries by cause of contact 
 
Categorisation by contact cause (e.g. customers advising changes of circumstances, 
customers making new claims for benefits, customers not understanding notices 
received) generated the displayed in Figure 7 below, which revealed the most 
frequently occurring causes, sorted in order of decreasing frequency. The chart excludes 
some of the least frequent causes of contact (those that occurred only once) because this 
enhances the display, but it is still apparent that the top four causes accounted for the 
majority (84%) of the total contact. More than one in three of the contacts (37%) were 
attributable to the provision of supporting documentation (such as tenancy agreements, 
pay slips, bank statements and evidence of entitlement to other state benefits) by 
claimants or other agencies that should have been supplied with original claim forms at 
earlier stages in the process. 
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Figure 7: Council A - analysis of customer enquiries by contact cause 
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Categorisation of customer enquiries by value of contact 
Categorisation of the customer enquiries by contact value indicated the proportion of 
those enquiries that were characterised as PAFID. The overall level of potentially 
avoidable contact was more than half (53.5%), but this varied between nearly 68% on 
the telephones and more than 46% face-to-face (see Table 13 below). 
 
 
Table 13: Council A - categorisation of customer enquiries by value of contact 
 
Access 
Channel 
Number of 
Contacts 
Valuable 
Demand 
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Demand 
Other 
Telephone 109 23 (21.1%) 74 (67.9%) 12 (11.0%) 
Face-to-face 224 107 (47.8%) 104 (46.4%) 13 (5.8%) 
Total 333 130 (39.0%) 178 (53.5%) 25 (7.5%) 
 
Categorisation of customer enquiries by resolution of contact 
 
Categorisation of customer enquiries by contact resolution revealed that a relatively 
small proportion (about 19%) of the telephone and face-to-face enquiries were resolved 
while the contacts were taking place (see Table 14 below). More than half the enquiries 
(about 54%) were passed back to customers for them to take some further action, such 
as completing claim forms or producing further documentary evidence of entitlement. 
Just over a quarter (about 28%) of the contacts resulted in the transmission of service 
requests into the housing and council tax benefits back office, such as requests to 
complete the assessment of new claims or process changes of circumstances where all 
necessary documentation had been received. The lowest proportion of one-stop 
resolution, and the highest level of referral back to the customer was observed in 
connection with the value (i.e. valuable) contact, while the highest amount of one-stop 
resolution, and lowest level of referral back applied to the potentially avoidable and off 
remit contact. 
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Table 14: Council A - categorisation of customer enquiries by contact resolution 
 
Contact 
Value 
Resolved 
One Stop 
Passed Back Passed On Repeat but 
now Resolved 
Total 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. 
Valuable 3 0.9 89 26.7 38 11.4 0 0 130 
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failures 
43 12.9 84 25.2 50 15.0 1 0.3 178 
Off Remit 8 2.4 4 1.2 5 1.5 8 2.4 25 
Total 54 16.2 177 53.1 93 27.9 9 2.7 333 
 
 
While the quantitative data did not fully explain the situation, it seemed likely that the 
low levels of contact resolution were themselves at least partly attributable to failures of 
some description. For example, staff would be unable to consistently collect or dispense 
correct and complete information to customers if they were inadequately trained. Staff 
would be unable to explain benefit awards or deal with customer enquiries about award 
letters if the letters were incomprehensible. Similarly, it seemed likely that high levels 
of PAFID would be associated with low levels of contact resolution, as customers 
contact the organisation repeatedly seeking satisfaction. The key informant interviews 
described below were expected to throw some further light on these issues. 
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Semi-structured key informant interviews 
 
To enrich the quantitative analysis, ten volunteers were interviewed from among the 
front-line and back-office staff at Council A, in order to capture a cross-section of 
opinions. The participants included managers, supervisors and junior assistants. The 
techniques employed in this case-study for conducting, transcribing, analysing and 
validating the data were developed during the pilot study described in Chapter 4.  
 
The first Research Question seeks an explanation for PAFID: what happens and why? 
The respondents at Council A offered numerous illustrations of potentially avoidable 
contact. Building upon the work initiated during the pilot study described in Chapter 4, 
Stage 3 of the sequential analysis involved sorting the responses into ten categories that 
represented the most frequently occurring concepts. They were communication, value, 
processes, quality, resolution, attitudes, knowledge, resources, targets and technology. 
 
The second Research Question asks how PAFID can be avoided. Applying the fourth 
phase of the sequential analysis, as developed during the pilot study, Table 15 below is 
a distillation and reorganisation of the responses. For detailed responses, see Annex 7 
pages 277-295. As before, implicit standards of customer care were aligned with the 
consequences of breaching those standards to generate a schedule of ways in which 
failures might be prevented. The output in Table 15 below addresses Research 
Questions 1 and 2. 
 
Finally, Table 16 below presents examples of Lean thinking in practice that were 
identified during the interviews at Council A. These examples address Research 
Question 3 regarding the deployment of Lean thinking as a possible means of 
addressing PAFID. 
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Table 15: Council A - sequential analysis stage 4 
 
Implicit standard Consequences of 
breaching standard 
Prevention 
Logging letters, 
notices and forms 
sent to customers 
should be clear, 
consistent and 
concise. 
Customers telephone the 
call centre or visit the 
public enquiry counter 
seeking clarification 
when they do not 
understand letters and 
forms sent to them. 
Telephone or face-to-face communication 
with customers is more effective than 
correspondence because it is easier to explain 
complexities and requirements. 
A customer-friendly approach, combined 
with attention to detail by staff at every stage 
(particularly with regard to the production 
and despatch of logging letters), will 
ultimately speed up the process and reduce 
the overall workload by decreasing the 
number of times that customers need to 
contact the service. 
All customer 
enquiries should be 
valuable from the 
organisation's 
perspective and 
resolved on first 
contact. 
Currently, the 
organisation 
communicates with 
individual customers 
several times in order to 
elicit information. 
Customers make 
repeated and potentially 
avoidable contacts with 
the service. This activity 
adds to administration 
costs, reduces customer 
satisfaction and slows 
down processes. 
The housing and council tax benefits scheme 
is inherently complicated, but staff should be 
encouraged to take their time, ‘get it right 
first time’, and deal with foreseeable 
problems as they arise. 
The process would benefit from the earliest 
possible involvement of experienced housing 
and council tax benefits assessors. 
 
 
The various parts of 
the organisation 
involved in the 
administration of the 
housing and council 
tax benefits service 
should be co-
ordinated and 
consistent. 
A ‘them and us’ 
mentality in some 
sections of the 
organisation inhibits 
improvement and 
innovation by impeding 
the flow of information 
and ideas. 
Staff guidance notes and standardised 
procedures should be generated, 
communicated and implemented throughout 
the organisation. 
Systems should be developed to encourage 
co-operation, learning and knowledge 
sharing. 
Communication with partner agencies like 
the Department for Work and Pensions and 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs should 
be improved. 
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Table 15 (continued): 
 
Implicit standard Consequences of 
breaching standard 
Prevention 
Workloads should 
reasonable so that 
staff can help each 
other and pay 
attention to detail. 
Actions taken in parts of 
the organisation cause 
unnecessary customer 
contacts to impact upon 
other parts of the 
organisation. 
The organisation should look for simple and 
effective ways of doing things. 
Barriers that have arisen between front and 
back-office staff, and between back-office 
staff and customers, should be reduced 
through some form of co-location. 
Information 
communicated to 
and collected from 
customers should be 
of a consistently 
high quality. 
Back-office staff are 
duplicating the work 
undertaken by front-
office staff (in case it is 
not correct), and 
claimants are being 
asked for superfluous 
information that 
generates unnecessary 
customer contacts. 
Front-office staff should be encouraged and 
enabled to take their time with customers and 
to pay attention to detail. 
 
 
Both back and front-
office staff should 
be comfortable in a 
customer service 
environment. 
Some back-office staff 
are not at ease when 
dealing with customers 
and can be unhelpful, 
which causes delays and 
unnecessary contacts. 
Checks should be conducted during the 
recruitment process to ensure that job 
applicants are willing and able to 
communicate effectively with customers. 
There should be 
sufficient front-
office staff to deal 
with customer 
demand. Front-
office staff should 
be knowledgeable, 
skilled and 
experienced in the 
handling of housing 
and council tax 
benefits claims. 
 
Inexperienced staff are 
unable to deal with 
housing and council tax 
benefits enquiries. If 
experienced staff are not 
available to take calls, 
they are having to call 
customers back at a 
mutually convenient 
opportunity. The double-
handling of these 
enquiries increases 
administration costs, 
damages customer 
relations and reduces 
resolution on first 
contact. 
More staff, better training (including cross-
training between the front and back offices) 
and more comfortable surroundings would 
help the organisation to recruit and retain 
experienced staff.  
Care should be taken not to over-skill staff 
for the work that is required from them. 
Staffing resources should be redistributed to 
improve the balance between pre-assessors, 
assessors and the front line. 
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Table 15 (continued): 
 
Implicit standard Consequences of 
breaching standard 
Prevention 
Targets should 
encourage staff to 
resolve enquiries on 
first contact. 
 
Staff feel pressured to do 
things quickly, which 
generates errors and 
omissions, resulting in 
additional customer 
contacts. 
Staff should be encouraged and enabled to 
take their time with customers, to pay 
attention to detail and to ‘get it right first 
time’. 
 
Information and 
communication 
technologies should 
be limited to those 
situations in which 
they provide clear 
advantages over 
other solutions. 
 
Inadequate facilities for 
the automated 
production of letters to 
customers result in 
confusing 
communications that 
generate large numbers 
of additional and 
potentially preventable 
contacts. 
Care should be taken to understand what 
Information and Communication 
Technologies can achieve, and to review and 
revise existing working procedures to ensure 
that present problems are not ‘stove piped’, 
before new technologies are implemented. 
 
 
Research Question 3 provides an opportunity to link up the answers to the two previous 
Research Questions, i.e. does Lean thinking address the problems identified by the 
research? The questions about the penetration of Lean thinking in the public sector that 
were put to the interviewees during Case-study A provoked mostly indirect responses. 
However, one volunteer did offer the reasonably cogent explanation that “Lean thinking 
is a systematic approach to eliminating waste via continuous improvement, looking at 
processes to see if they can be simplified or made more efficient and less costly”. Other 
contributors simply mentioned existing practices or proposed improvements that were 
consistent with Lean approaches. Table 16 below matches practices and improvements 
at Council A with Lean techniques, to illustrate the consonance between them. 
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Table 16: Council A - examples of Lean thinking in practice 
 
Existing practices or proposed innovations Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Pre-assessment of benefit claims to ensure 
assessors get correct and complete information 
first time. 
Removing waste, improving flow, 
economies of time, thinking small by 
avoiding technology in excess of 
requirements, right first time. 
Communicating directly with customers face-to-
face or via the telephone, instead of writing to 
them. 
Maximising value to the customer, 
simplicity, flow by keeping the work 
moving at the customer rate, economies 
of time. 
Processing claims more quickly by accessing the 
paperwork instead of waiting for documents to 
be distributed via the electronic document 
management system. 
Simplicity, managing constraints, 
economies of time, thinking small 
instead of over-processing, worker 
empowerment. 
Reducing the reliance upon computer-produced 
letters that customers do not understand 
Simplicity, improvement, maximising 
value to customer, not automating 
waste, defect prevention, avoiding 
unnecessary motions, managing 
demand variation 
Deploying better trained and more experienced 
staff in the front line to resolve customer 
enquiries correctly first time. 
Worker empowerment and training, 
waste prevention, skill flexibility, right 
first time, maximising value to 
customer, building knowledge in a 
systematic and scientific way 
Creating a rota for routine tasks that makes the 
work more orderly and up-to-date. 
Visual management, clean and tidy, 
team-working on improvement, worker 
empowerment, variation prevention, 
economies of time.  
Producing new explanatory leaflets and 
application forms, improving the wording of 
reminder letters. 
Customer first, waste and variation 
prevention, reducing complexity, 
improving product design. 
Coaching staff to improve the quality of work. Knowledge management, worker 
empowerment and training, continuous 
improvement, defect prevention. 
Producing flow charts. Mapping to understand processes, 
business process redesign, fast flexible 
flow, preventing and removing waste, 
eliminating unnecessary movement. 
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Table 16 (continued): 
 
Existing practices or proposed innovations Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Holding quality improvement meetings. Continuous improvement, team-
working, consensus building, shared 
decision-making, trust, creativity, 
standard work. 
Passing customer complaint letters to the people 
best able to deal with them. 
De-layering, skill flexibility, 
maximising value to customer. 
Compiling a procedure book for the 
concessionary fares service. 
Policy deployment, process design, 
standard work, waste and variation 
prevention, visibility, defect prevention. 
Introducing laminated desk aids Visual management, clean and tidy, 
continuous improvement, simplicity, 
knowledge management, thinking 
small, defect prevention. 
Implementing a corporate contact centre and 
Customer Relationship Management software 
system. 
Automation, mass customisation, value 
stream mapping, business process 
redesign, breakthrough innovation, 
visual management, demand 
management, cross-functional working, 
resolution on first contact, right first 
time. 
 
The respondents were asked to comment upon the conditions under which Lean 
thinking could be successfully exploited. Interviewee I asserted that staff were resistant 
to change and observed that “it’s how we deal with the management of change that is 
the most important aspect – transparency in the whole process – information as to the 
reasons why – communication at every stage and with everything on the table”. 
Interviewee F said that all staff should be involved because “some could be resentful 
about not being included in the project work”. Suggested approaches included providing 
feedback after projects were completed and recognising good ideas. Interviewee E said 
“if you want people to co-operate with change, ask them what they think – involve the 
staff”.
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Customer journey mapping 
  
Using the approach developed during the pilot work described in Chapter 4, all possible 
permutations of benefits claims and accommodation tenure types were identified. One 
example of each was then chosen from among the applications completed during May 
2007. The claims with the longest resolution times were chosen on the basis that they 
were most likely to display PAFID. Case histories were then compiled by examining all 
available records to chart the customers’ journeys. The manager was invited to explain 
the problems that had occurred, the responses were arranged in decreasing order of 
frequency to highlight the most common incidents, and end-to-end roadmaps were 
generated to capture all relevant details. The following tabulations reveal the number of 
days that elapsed on each claim from end-to-end (Table 17 below) and the explanations 
offered by management for any associated failures and potentially avoidable customer 
contacts (Table 18 below). 
 
Table 17: Council A - benefit claim types and end-to-end processing times 
 
  
Owner 
occupiers 
 
 
Private 
tenants 
 
Tenants of 
Registered 
Social 
Landlords 
 
Former council 
tenants (now 
tenants of Council 
A Homes Limited) 
Claimants receiving income-
based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance59 from the DWP 
111 days  
end-to-end 
73 days  
end-to-end 
44 days 
end-to-end 
- 
Claimants receiving 
Guaranteed Pension 
Credit60 from th
Tenure type 
Claim type 
e DWP 
100 days 
 end-to-end 
87 days 
end-to-end 
79 days 
end-to-end 
47 days 
end-to-end 
Claimants receiving Income 
Support61 from the DWP 
77 days 
end-to-end 
127 days 
end-to-end 
68 days 
end-to-end 
46 days 
end-to-end 
Standard claims62 for 
housing and council tax 
benefits 
85 days 
end-to-end 
87 days 
end-to-end 
38 days 
end-to-end 
- 
                                                          
59 Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) is a means-tested benefit administered by the DWP for 
unemployed working-age customers. 
60 Guaranteed Pension Credit (GPC) is a means-tested benefit administered by The Pension Service (part 
of the DWP) for customers aged 60 & over. 
61 Income Support (IS) is a means-tested benefit administered by the DWP for lone parents and working-
age disabled customers. 
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Table 18: Council A - summary of contact causes 
 
Causes of PAFID (i.e. failures that might have been prevented) 
identified during customer journey mapping 
Number of 
occurrences 
Delays attributed to a backlog of work 6 
Claims not refused at the earliest opportunity (when customers failed to 
provide necessary details) because customer service was given a higher 
priority than government targets 
4 
Delays attributed to errors committed by the Benefits Service 3 
Claims not refused at the earliest opportunity (when customers failed to 
provide necessary details) because of statutory restrictions 
2 
Delays attributed to outstanding referrals to the Rent Officer Service 
that were not progress-chased due to a reduced focus on monitoring 
activities 
1 
Delays attributed to the Local Pension Service visiting officer 1 
 
 
The pilot customer journey mapping exercise described in Chapter 4 revealed 
circumstances in which council staff might feel compromised by detailed investigations 
into the nature and causes of failures leading to PAFID. The precautions described in 
Table 12 on page 119, which entailed restricting the amount of investigation and not 
seeking to interview customers, were effective in terms of avoiding controversy, but it is 
likely that the data would have been enriched by the inclusion of the customer 
perspective. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
62 A standard housing and council tax benefit claim is one based on income other than JSA, GPC or IS.  
Customers must provide evidence of their income and capital, and a means assessment is undertaken to 
determine housing and council tax benefit entitlement.  Administration is therefore more complex and 
resource-intensive. When calculating housing and council tax benefit entitlement for customers in receipt 
of JSA, IS or GPC all other income and capital is disregarded. This results in less documentary evidence 
being required and maximum benefit being awarded, but processing times are dependant on DWP turn-
around times. 
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Summary and critical analysis of case-study A 
 
The document review in Council A portrayed a housing and council tax benefits service 
that was good and improving. There was little (if anything) in that data to suggest that 
the service had underlying problems with the quality of the customer experience. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent non-participant observations revealed high levels of 
PAFID (68% on the telephones, 46% face-to-face, and 53% overall) and low levels of 
contact resolution (28% on the telephones, 14% face-to-face, and 19% overall). The 
proportion of valuable contacts resolved was even lower, at around 2%. The principal 
causes of these problems (failures that might have been prevented) were associated with 
the production by claimants of supporting information and evidence that was 
incomplete or not supplied at the right time. The data garnered from the observations 
did not explain why the problems with documentation arose or how they might be 
prevented, and these issues were explored during the subsequent interviews.  
 
A typical housing and council tax benefits application form is a substantial document. 
The style and content of these forms is similar throughout the UK because minimum 
standards have been established by the Benefits Fraud Inspectorate, which is now part 
of the Audit Commission. The potential complexity of the situation is significant. 
Applicants need to digest several pages of guidance notes and then answer hundreds of 
detailed questions about their households, finances and housing costs. Additional 
information regarding the documentation that must be produced to support each claim is 
set out in the leaflet. These are the requirements that the front-line staff found difficult 
to explain face-to-face or on the telephone, that back-office staff preferred to explain in 
writing, that different officers interpreted in different ways, that customers appeared not 
to understand, and that were so rarely satisfied without significant amounts of repeat 
contact. 
 
The techniques and tools that emerged from the pilot research were deployed during this 
case-study. These were: (a) a data collection sheet and criteria for categorising customer 
contacts; (b) a spreadsheet-based model for capturing and displaying information about 
customer contacts; (c) an interview schedule and sequential approach to qualitative data 
analysis; (d) a process for mapping and analysing ‘customer journeys’; and (e) a 
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schedule of precautions designed to eliminate or reduce potential methodological 
problems like ‘demand characteristics’ and observer bias. 
 
One new methodological issue was identified, namely that my initial openness with the 
data sparked a debate among the staff about the potential consequences of the findings. 
The categorisation of customer enquiries by contact cause was uncontroversial, but 
different interest groups (such as managers, supervisors and customer services staff) 
expressed different opinions about the categorisation of contacts according to value, 
avoidability and resolution. For example, managers remained optimistic about the scope 
for reducing avoidable contact, and adhered to their original fairly strict definitions of 
avoidability. On the other hand, supervisors and staff expressed concern about job 
security in the event of reducing call volumes, and migrated toward an interpretation of 
avoidability that placed greater value upon the welfare advice dimension of their work, 
such as helping claimants to complete forms, make appeals and understand letters and 
notices.  
 
Front-line staff argued that customers were entitled to as much help as they needed, and 
that it was entirely reasonable for disadvantaged and vulnerable people to require a lot 
of support while they negotiated their way through a complex process that even staff 
had difficulty comprehending. There was an implication that reducing potentially 
avoidable contact would constitute a reduction in service standards by way of an 
attempt to prevent customers from contacting the council. I responded by 
acknowledging these concerns and by pointing out the benefits to customers if more 
transactions could be resolved correctly at the first time of asking. It was necessary to 
discuss individual contacts and how they might be categorised to ensure that they were 
correctly interpreted and coded, but I became more cautious about sharing the emerging 
analyses (such as the daily proportions of avoidable contact and contact resolution), and 
held these back until the observation work was complete in order to limit the extent to 
which this information might bias subsequent data. The learning gained from this 
experience (about the treatment of emergent data) was carried forward into the 
remaining case studies. 
 
 
137 
The semi-structured interviews reaffirmed that, in spite of their self-interested concerns, 
the staff did perceive the PAFID problem to be real and significant. The respondents 
offered detailed descriptions and explanations, together with numerous suggestions for 
avoiding unnecessary contact. It was notable that the concerns about job security that 
surfaced during the observation work did not reappear during the interviews. Taking 
frequency of occurrence as an indication of significance, the interview data was 
analysed in terms of concepts such as: communication (having structured meetings, 
talking to each other and eliminating the “them and us” mentality that separated front 
and back-office staff); knowledge (improving revenues and benefits training, 
introducing cross-training between front and back-office staff, making information 
available on the intranet and constructing libraries of laminated desk aids); quality 
(taking the time and trouble to edit outgoing letters and to get things right first time); 
and resources (having the right people in the right place at the right time). 
 
Some respondents attributed the problems revealed by the research to what they 
perceived as the unavoidable complexity of the housing and council tax benefits 
scheme, which is a statutory scheme that applies to councils throughout the UK. Some 
went so far as to suggest that a degree of repeat customer contact was necessary and did 
not therefore constitute any kind of failure, echoing the discussion about the meaning of 
‘failure’ introduced in Chapter 4.  
 
Other respondents said that aspects of the repeat contact were self-inflicted (by the 
service) because internal procedures were over-complicated, and some staff adopted 
inflexible attitudes toward the production (by customers) of supporting information and 
evidence. Customer services staff felt that they were inadequately trained and under 
pressure to do things quickly. Computer-produced letters were said to be difficult for 
customers to understand. It was said that customer enquiries were not dealt with 
adequately on first contact, and that staff in the front and back offices were “not singing 
from the same hymn sheet”. 
 
The interview data confirmed a limited role for additional information and 
communication technology. For example, while new mobile working arrangements had 
generated some enthusiasm, the computer system’s inability to facilitate good (clear and 
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concise) standard letters for customers was identified as a major cause of PAFID. This 
was an ICT problem that had afflicted the service for more than a decade, a finding that 
is supportive of the argument developed earlier in this thesis about an over-reliance on 
ICT systems built upon modernist managerial assumptions, and the potential benefits of 
less technical solutions. 
 
Few respondents could identify service improvement initiatives that were explicitly 
aligned with Lean principles. However, a number of existing practices and proposed 
innovations were matched with corresponding Lean techniques to illustrate their 
consonance. 
 
The end-to-end customer journey roadmaps were developed as a supplementary tool for 
providing a better understanding of the customer experience, and identifying catalysts of 
PAFID that impact upon the assessment of real-life claims. The principal cause of 
PAFID that emerged from this sample of cases (namely operational delays attributable 
to the council and other agencies) did not surface during the observations and 
interviews, and demonstrated the value of representing the customer perspective in the 
research design. This aspect of the substantive case-study research proved to be less 
controversial than the comparable phase of the pilot study in Council P because of the 
precautions that were adopted to avoid compromising the staff that may have been 
responsible for the failures that resulted in PAFID. 
 
The next section of this chapter describes a case-study that was conducted in the 
housing and council tax benefits section of a London borough, called here Council B. 
An interesting feature of this particular study was that Council B had experimented with 
a systems-oriented approach to performance improvement, but was struggling to 
reconcile the need to manage customer waiting times with the desire to resolve 
enquiries at the first point of contact. 
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Case-study B 
 
This case-study involved the investigation of customer contacts handled by housing and 
council tax benefits services provided by a London borough council. Four phases of 
research were conducted during the winter of 2007: document review, non-participant 
observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey mapping. 
 
The methods employed to collect, analyse and validate the data captured during this 
case-study were those developed during the pilot study described in Chapter 4 and then 
applied and improved (by restricting the distribution of emergent findings) during Case-
study A. 
 
Document review 
 
The purpose of this work was to create a ‘biography’ of the housing benefits service 
provided by Council B, containing contextual information and historical data such as 
key performance indicators. The analysis involved a survey of online information about 
the council and its housing and council tax benefits service, covering the period from 
1999 to 2007. I obtained data from websites maintained by the council, the Department 
of Work and Pensions, and the Audit Commission. Council B also provided me with 
organisational charts, inspection and benchmarking reports, and the findings of a 
comprehensive service review that was completed in 2006. 
 
The biography revealed that the scale and complexity of the task confronting Council 
B’s housing and council tax benefits service is daunting. The Borough is one of the 
most deprived in England and Wales. Nearly half of all households (44% or 41,000 
claimants) receive help from the council with their housing costs. The population is 
ethnically diverse (more than 50% of the residents are non-white), and so are the people 
that the council employs. In these circumstances, high levels of repeat contact and low 
levels of resolution on first contact were to be expected. A study conducted in 2004/05 
revealed that nearly three-quarters of all benefits calls into Council B’s corporate 
telephone contact centre were unnecessary and only 4% of enquiries received by local 
service centres were resolved on first contact.  
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The record also revealed that during 2004 the council had attempted to improve 
performance through the adoption of some ‘systems thinking’ operating principles. For 
example, staff were encouraged to use the most effective and efficient means of 
communicating with customers. One lasting outcome of this short experiment was some 
re-integration of back and front-office services, a process that management called 
“putting the best resources where they will be most effective”. The council anticipated 
that this would facilitate end-to-end working of claims by expert benefits staff, thereby 
reducing waste and increasing one-stop resolution. However, the initiative was not 
sustained due to a lack of funding. 
 
Non-participant observations 
 
During Case-study A, concerns among the staff about job security led to some 
differences of opinion about the characterisation of customer contacts. For example, 
managers said that customer contacts generated by the need for help with the 
completion of claim forms were avoidable (the forms were not clear enough), whereas 
staff said that the housing benefits scheme was complex and claimants needed their 
help. To minimise the potential bias in data collection and analysis that might have 
arisen from a debate of this nature during this second case-study, I withheld the 
emerging results (especially the proportions of avoidable contact and levels of 
resolution on first contact) until the work was complete. The issue of job security did 
not arise during this case-study. This was probably because Council B employed large 
numbers of agency staff who moved freely between local councils in the area, and 
because Council B appeared to have no plans to reduce the number of permanent staff.  
 
To collect the observation data, I sat with customer service staff in Council B for two 
weeks during November and December 2007. I observed and analysed more than 400 
customer enquiries distributed across two access channels: a telephone call centre, and a 
public enquiry counter service. I listened to 283 incoming telephone calls and observed 
148 face-to-face visits over ten working days, recording brief details of each customer 
contact using the data collection sheet and guidance notes developed during the pilot 
study (see Annex 5 on pages 273-274). The aim was to gain an understanding of PAFID 
by investigating the causes of customer contacts, the value of those contacts, and the 
extent to which they were resolved. 
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The categorisation of customer enquiries at Council B by contact cause facilitated the 
production of Figures 8 and 9 below, which reveal the most frequently occurring 
causes (most of the causes that occurred only once are excluded to improve the clarity 
of the presentation). 
142 
 
Figure 8: Council B - telephone calls analysed by cause of contact 
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Figure 9: Council B – face to face visits analysed by cause of contact 
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Table 19 reveals that the ten most frequent causes of contact across both access 
channels accounted for 70% of the enquiries. Six of these top ten causes were 
categorised by Council B as off remit or potentially avoidable before the study 
commenced. These included enquiries about the collection and recovery of council tax, 
which were outside the scope of this research. 
 
 
Table 19: Council B - ten most frequent causes of customer contacts 
 
Volume Cause 
Phone F2F Total 
Percentage 
of total 
contacts 
Customers progress chasing claims* 60 15 75 17.5 
Council tax enquiries* 17 35 52 12.1 
Customers advising changes of circumstances 17 18 35 8.2 
Calls requiring redirection* 28 - 28 6.5 
Customers querying overpayments* 15 7 22 5.1 
Customers responding to requests for 
information 
9 13 22 5.1 
Customers making new claims for benefits 5 12 17 4.0 
Customers querying payments received* 11 5 16 3.7 
Customers querying missing payments* 9 7 16 3.7 
Customers producing documents - 14 14 3.3 
*Off-remit and other customer contacts categorised as potentially avoidable. 
 
Categorisation of customer enquiries by contact value 
 
The categorisation of customer enquiries at Council B by contact value revealed the 
proportion of customer contacts that appeared to be high value, low value, potentially 
avoidable and off remit (see Table 20 below). The data was gathered and analysed using 
a data collection sheet and guidance notes that were designed and agreed with 
representatives of the council tax and benefits service before the research began. 
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Periodically, as the monitoring progressed, forms were collected together, reviewed and 
discussed with a view to achieving consistency of approach. For example, contacts 
attributed to ‘customers responding to the suspension of benefits’ and ‘customers 
responding to requests for information’ were originally described as potentially 
avoidable but were subsequently re-categorised as high value after it was acknowledged 
that these contacts were desirable in terms of enabling the council to resolve outstanding 
enquiries. Contacts attributable to council tax collection and switchboard calls were 
described as off remit because the study focused on housing and council tax benefits 
services. 
 
 
Table 20: Council B - telephone and face-to-face enquiries by contact value 
 
Volumes/Proportions Contact 
Channel 
High 
Value 
Low 
Value 
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failures 
Off Remit Total 
Telephone 46 
(16%) 
24 
(9%) 
136 
(48%) 
77 
(27%) 
283 
Face-to-face 51 
(35%) 
7 
(5%) 
45 
(30%) 
45 
(30%) 
148 
Total 97 
(23%) 
31 
(7%) 
181 
(42%) 
122 
(28%) 
431 
 
 
Overall, more than 40% of the contacts observed were categorised as potentially 
avoidable (caused by failures that might have been prevented), and only 30% were 
considered to be of some value, high or low. Not surprisingly, given the emphasis that 
Council B places upon responding to customer demand, the lowest levels of potentially 
avoidable contact (30%) and highest proportions of value-work (40%) were to be found 
in the local service centres that dealt with face-to-face enquiries. 
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Categorisation of customer enquiries by contact resolution 
 
The categorisation of customer enquiries at Council B by contact resolution suggests 
that only a small proportion of enquiries were being resolved in the front line (see 
Tables 21 and 22 below). 
 
Table 21: Council B - all contacts analysed by resolution 
 
Volumes (Proportions of all contacts in brackets) 
Contact 
Channel One Stop Repeat 
Now 
Resolved 
Passed 
Back 
Passed 
On 
Off 
Remit 
Total 
Telephone 
 
40 
(9%) 
3 
(1%) 
115 
(26%) 
48 
(11%) 
77 
(18%) 
282 
(65%) 
Face-to-
face 
 
15 
 
(3%) 
0 
 
(0%) 
39 
 
(9%) 
50 
 
(12%) 
45 
 
(10%) 
149 
 
(35%) 
Total 
 
55 
(12%) 
3 
(1%) 
154 
(35%) 
98 
(23%) 
122 
(28%) 
431 
(100%) 
 
 
 
Table 22: Council B - value work analysed by resolution 
 
Volumes (Proportions of value contacts in brackets) 
Contact 
Channel One Stop Repeat 
Now 
Resolved 
Passed 
Back 
Passed On Total 
Telephone 
 
7 
(5%) 
1 
(1%) 
54 
(42%) 
8 
(6%) 
70 
(54%) 
Face-to-face 
 
7 
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
28 
(22%) 
23 
(18%) 
58 
(45%) 
Total 
 
14 
(11%) 
1 
(1%) 
82 
(64%) 
31 
(24%) 
128 
(100%) 
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The distinctions drawn above between telephone and face-to-face enquiries, and 
between value and non-value (i.e. potentially preventable) contacts, are important. High 
levels of contact resolution via the telephone were not expected, as customers could not 
be put ‘on hold’ for long periods of time while transactions were processed online. 
Consequently, agents were required to take ownership of the enquiries they received 
and various forms of call-back were prevalent. In the local service centres, Council B’s 
policy was to give priority to the resolution of the work that was categorised as valuable 
to claimants and other key stakeholders. Nevertheless, the overall level of resolution 
(11%) seemed very low and the proportion of contacts passed on for subsequent 
resolution in the back office (24% overall and 18% in the local service centres that dealt 
with face-to-face contacts) seemed high. The evidence suggested that, in Council B, the 
failure to resolve enquiries on first contact (and subsequent repeat contacts) was causing 
PAFID. 
 
The data from the observation work helped to reveal what was happening in Council 
B’s contact centre. Semi-structured interviews were then employed to find out why it 
was happening and how the problem might be managed. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
To enrich the quantitative analysis, eight volunteers from housing and council tax 
benefits services at Council B were interviewed for an average of 45 minutes each. The 
contributors included a senior manager, three middle managers, a team leader and three 
assessment officers. Four of the participants worked in the back office and the others 
were from local service centres situated throughout the Borough. The aim of the 
selection was to obtain a vertical and horizontal cross-section of opinion. In the analysis 
that follows this preamble, the interviewees are simply described as managers and 
assessment officers to protect their anonymity. 
 
A few days before the interviews were due to take place, the interviewees were 
provided with a simplified list of the questions that were to be asked so that they could 
give prior consideration to their answers. The interviews were recorded and respondents 
were subsequently provided with transcripts of their interviews. At the beginning of 
each interview, the purpose of the research was explained and the preliminary outcomes 
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of the observation work conducted during the preceding two weeks were described. A 
schedule of questions was employed to ensure that similar issues were raised with each 
respondent, but the interviewees were also encouraged to discuss any aspects of 
customer contact handling that seemed important to them. 
 
The techniques employed to conduct, record, transcribe, analyse and validate the 
interview data were those developed during the pilot work described in Chapter 4 and 
then applied and improved during Case-study A. As before, the output from the 
interviews consisted of contributions by respondents, which were clustered into 
preliminary concept areas (see Annex 7, pages 277-295) and then reorganised to align 
implicit standards of customer care with the consequences of breaching those standards 
to generate a schedule of ways in which the breaches might be prevented (see Table 23 
below). Finally, examples of Lean thinking employed by Council B and identified by 
the interviewees are detailed in Table 24 below. 
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Table 23: Council B - implicit standards and consequences of breaching them 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
Officers should establish 
direct contact with 
customers to explain 
their requirements and 
deal with enquiries as 
they arise. 
Officers use more expensive and 
less successful forms of 
communication such as 
correspondence. Letters are less 
likely to be understood by 
customers and less likely to result 
in the resolution of outstanding 
issues. Letters are more likely to 
prolong the claims process and to 
generate repeat customer contact. 
Telephone or face-to-face 
contact with customers 
would be less expensive 
than correspondence and 
more effective too, because 
it is easier for staff to 
explain complications and 
requirements verbally than 
in writing. 
There should be enough 
officers in the front line 
(i.e. on the telephones 
and in the local service 
centres) to enable them 
to resolve customer 
enquiries fully and from 
end-to-end. 
Work not completed during 
contact with the customer is 
retained for subsequent attention; 
it then joins an accumulation of 
other outstanding work and may 
not get done immediately. Delays 
generate additional customer 
contact in the form of progress 
chasing. If other officers become 
involved, customers may be given 
inconsistent information and 
advice, and may be asked for 
different information and evidence 
to support their claims. 
Resolution on first contact 
would reduce unnecessary 
activity and speed up the 
payment of benefits. End-
to-end working (where the 
same officer deals with a 
claim from beginning to 
end) is more satisfying for 
staff and more efficient 
because customers do not 
have to keep explaining 
their circumstances to 
different officers and 
satisfying their differing 
requirements. 
Letters and notices sent 
to customers should be 
necessary, clear, 
consistent and concise. 
Officers should pay 
particular attention to the 
needs of people whose 
first language is not 
English. 
Customers often do not understand 
the content of the council’s letters 
and notices, so they make 
unnecessary telephone calls and 
visits to local service centres; they 
may also suffer hardship because 
of delays or loss of benefits. If 
staff do not understand letters and 
notices sent by their colleagues, 
they give or seek incorrect 
information that results in further 
delays and unnecessary customer 
contacts. There are costs 
associated with this wasteful 
activity, and the reputation of the 
organisation suffers if the staff 
appear to be incompetent. 
Attention to detail during 
the production and despatch 
of letters and notices will 
ultimately speed up the 
process and reduce the 
overall workload by 
decreasing the number of 
times that customers need to 
contact the service. 
Telephone calls and face-to-
face meetings are more 
effective and less expensive. 
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Table 23 (continued): 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
Staff should be able to 
access telephones when 
they need them, and 
customers should be able 
to contact officers by 
telephone quickly and 
easily. 
If staff cannot get access to 
telephones they revert to 
correspondence, which is an 
expensive and less successful 
method of communicating with 
customers. If customers cannot 
contact officers by telephone they 
use more expensive access 
channels such as local service 
centres. Some customers abandon 
attempts to seek or provide 
information, which causes them 
hardship because of delay or loss 
of benefit. Lost calls may be 
detrimental to the council if they 
relate to benefit fraud prevention 
or detection.   
The council should provide 
telephone systems that 
facilitate good 
communication between 
customers and staff. 
Officers should be 
trained to similar 
standards and should 
employ the same 
policies and procedures. 
Inconsistent standards among 
officers and inconsistent policies 
and procedures (or the inconsistent 
application of policies and 
procedures) result in poor service 
and unnecessary activity, as 
claimants make repeat contacts to 
establish the correct situation or 
requirement.   
Staff guidance notes and 
standardised procedures 
should be generated, 
communicated and 
implemented throughout the 
organisation. Systems 
should be developed to 
encourage co-operation, 
learning and knowledge 
sharing. 
 
Customers should be 
kept informed about the 
progress of their claims 
and any outstanding 
requirements. 
Unnecessary contacts occur when 
customers enquire about the 
progress of their claims, or fail to 
provide outstanding information or 
evidence that subsequently delays 
or affects the amount of their 
benefit entitlements.  
Technology should be 
exploited to keep 
customers informed in 
ways that compliment their 
life-styles. For examples, 
e-mails and SMS texting 
are familiar forms of 
communication for 
younger people. 
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Chapter 3 explored the topic of Lean thinking as innovation in the public sector and 
identified some reasons why organisations are often unable to recognise and implement 
innovations; government was said to be poor at innovation because of its conservatism. 
The literature also revealed some factors that might encourage innovation in the public 
sector (e.g. supporting civil servants if they take risks) and others that might inhibit it 
(e.g. annual budget battles that create short-term thinking). Some of the interviewees in 
Council B had participated in a short service transformation exercise that applied Lean 
approaches such as waste reduction, failure avoidance and resolution on first contact. 
The exercise focused attention upon changes such as moving expert staff to the front 
line and managing processes end-to-end. Consequently, the staff at Council B had some 
limited experience of the application of Lean thinking in their component of the public 
sector. In Table 24 below, recent practices and improvements at Council B are matched 
with Lean techniques to illustrate the associations between them. 
 
 
Table 24: Council B - examples of Lean thinking in practice 
 
Existing practices or proposed 
innovations 
Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Communicating directly with customers 
face-to-face or via the telephone, instead of 
writing to them, and reducing the 
requirements placed upon customers to the 
necessary minimum. 
Maximising value to the customer, flow by 
keeping the work moving at the customer 
rate, avoiding over-specification, managing 
constraints, simplicity, economy of time. 
Giving assessment officers responsibility for 
seeing through to completion all the queries 
they receive while working in the front line. 
Managing the process end-to-end, 
improving flow instead of ‘batch and 
queue’, maximising value to the customer, 
eliminating unnecessary motions, worker 
empowerment, thinking small, trust. 
Requiring all the assessment officers to 
work in the front line, dealing with 
customers on the telephone and in the local 
service centres, as well as assessing claims 
in the back office. 
Moving experts to the front of the flow, 
improving flow, defect prevention, right first 
time, removing waste, managing constraints, 
avoiding unnecessary motions, skill 
flexibility. 
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Table 24 (continued): 
 
Existing practices or proposed 
innovations 
Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Reducing the reliance upon computer-
produced letters that customers do not 
understand 
Simplicity, improvement, maximising value to 
customer, not automating waste, defect 
prevention, avoiding unnecessary motions, 
managing demand variation. 
Introducing a training academy, training and 
coaching staff to improve the quality of work. 
Knowledge management, worker 
empowerment and training, building 
knowledge in a systematic and scientific way, 
continuous improvement, defect prevention, 
waste reduction. 
Producing flow charts. Mapping to understand processes, business 
process redesign, fast flexible flow, preventing 
and removing waste, eliminating unnecessary 
motions. 
Implementing a contact centre and installing 
call handling software system. 
Automation, mass customisation, value stream 
mapping, business process redesign, 
breakthrough innovation, visual management, 
demand management, cross-functional 
working, resolution on first contact, right first 
time. 
Documenting office procedures (such as the 
requirement to contact customers by 
telephone instead of writing to them) and 
obliging assessment officers to adhere to 
them. 
Process design, policy deployment, standard 
work, waste and variation prevention, 
visibility, improving quality by getting staff 
to work ‘in the way that we expect you to 
work’. 
 
The respondents were asked to comment upon the conditions under which methods like 
Lean thinking could be successfully introduced and exploited to manage potentially 
avoidable contact. An assessment officer said that there was always loads of change, 
staff had no say about it, they [management] had “started telling you stuff” but whether 
you liked it or not it was happening, you couldn’t really change much. A manager said 
that people who liked working in the local service centres were being pulled out and top 
management was returning people to the back office who didn’t like working there. An 
assessment officer said that staff felt quite detached from management, there were a lot 
of meetings but not a lot of feedback, staff had become distrustful, change would be 
more welcome if there were more staff to support end-to-end working, as well as extra 
telephones and additional training.  
 
153 
Overall, the interviews indicated that staff wanted management to: adopt more 
traditional and inclusive approaches that secured buy-in at all levels; roll-out changes 
one team at a time, and give the staff time to adjust; motivate and support the staff; 
allocate time away from the front line for assessment officers to work on their in-trays; 
and reduce the pressure on officers who were being asked to do too much. The staff said 
that managers should keep them informed, be honest and build on best practice. 
 
The fourth and final stage of the case-study research involved the deployment of the 
technique called customer journey mapping. The aim was to identify the causes of 
PAFID affecting a sample of recently completed benefit claims. 
 
Customer journey mapping 
 
Sixteen permutations of claim and accommodation tenure types were identified, and one 
example of each was then chosen by the council from among the claims completed 
during November 2007. The claims with the longest resolution times were selected on 
the basis that these were most likely to display the phenomena under investigation (see 
Table 25 below). End-to-end roadmaps like that illustrated in Figure 6 on page 111, 
were then generated by examining all available records to chart the customer 
experience, or “customer journey”. Finally, the manager was asked to explain the 
problems that had occurred. In the event, this work was delegated to the team leader 
with responsibility for the staff that had originally assessed the sample claims, creating 
a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, there were delays in obtaining 
explanations for the failures highlighted by the research. Table 26 displays the failures 
that were identified, in decreasing order of frequency. The most common causes of 
failure (i.e. internal delays) were consistent with the outcomes from Case-study A, 
suggesting that the potential conflict of interest experienced in Case-study A had not, 
after all, obscured the results. 
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Table 25: Council B – benefit claim types and end-to-end times. 
 
  
Owner 
occupiers 
 
 
Private 
tenants 
 
Registered 
Social 
Landlords 
 
 
Council 
tenants 
Claimants receiving 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance from the 
DWP 
192 days  
end-to-end 
91 days 
end-to-end 
54 days 
end-to-end 
147 days 
end-to-end 
Claimants receiving 
Guaranteed 
Pension Credit 
from the DWP 
132 days  
end-to-end 
20 days 
end-to-end 
72 days 
end-to-end 
41 days 
end-to-end 
Claimants receiving 
Income Support 
from the DWP 
288 days  
end-to-end 
113 days 
end-to-end 
49 days 
end-to-end 
148 days 
end-to-end 
Standard housing 
and council tax 
benefits claims 
212 days  
end-to-end 
138 days 
end-to-end 
91 days 
end-to-end 
111 days 
end-to-end 
Tenure type 
Claim type 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Council B - summary of contact causes 
 
Causes of potentially avoidable failure induced demand identified 
during customer journey mapping 
Number of 
occurrences 
Delays assessing claims 6 
Delays requesting information 6 
Claims not refused at the earliest opportunity 5 
Delays requesting home visits 1 
Technical problems with Pericles 1 
Excessive reminders and requests for information 1 
Unnecessary reminder letters 1 
Delays reminding claimants about outstanding information/evidence 1 
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Summary and critical analysis of case-study B 
 
The service ‘biography’ for Council B served to highlight the extremely challenging 
socio-economic environment in which the organisation’s housing and council tax 
benefits service operated. At the beginning of the period under review (1999 to 2007) 
the service was in difficulty, with substantial backlogs and excessive turn-around times. 
An examination of performance measures suggested that significant progress had been 
made in some areas and that improvement continued, in spite of set backs attributable to 
events such as the unsuccessful outsourcing of assessment work during the period 1999 
to 2001, the adoption of a government-sponsored verification framework in 2004/05, 
and the implementation of new software systems in 2004/05 and 2006/07. A business 
process improvement initiative based upon systems-oriented operating principles had 
led to some reintegration of front and back-office services, but the programme had not 
been sustained. It was notable that the gross total administration cost per weighted live 
case in Council B was nearly double the Institute of Public Finance benchmarking 
group’s average in 2006/07 (£122.60, compared to an average of £68.00), suggesting 
that the performance improvement initiative described above had entailed significant 
revenue expenditure. 
 
The techniques and tools that emerged from the pilot research were deployed during this 
case-study. These were: (a) a data collection sheet and criteria for categorising customer 
contacts; (b) a spreadsheet-based model for capturing and displaying information about 
customer contacts; (c) an interview schedule and sequential approach to qualitative data 
analysis; (d) a process for mapping and analysing ‘customer journeys’; and (e) a 
schedule of precautions designed to eliminate or reduce potential methodological 
problems such as ‘demand characteristics’ and observer bias. 
 
The data revealed a shared perception (among managers and staff) that a lot of customer 
contact was potentially avoidable. However, this served to inflate the amount of activity 
that was classified as non-value work and limited the scope for improving the resolution 
of the valuable work (because non-value work, such as providing information, is often 
easier to resolve than valuable work such as assessing benefit claims). Consequently, 
the observation of more than 400 customer contacts during November and December 
2007 revealed substantial amounts of potentially avoidable contact (48% on the 
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telephones, 30% face-to-face, and 42% overall) and apparently low levels of contact 
resolution (10% on the telephones, 3% face-to-face, and 13% overall). First contact 
resolution of the valuable work (activity that the council identified as high priority) was 
slightly lower, at 6% on the telephones, 5% face-to-face, and 12% overall. 
 
Key informant interviews were again employed to supplement the quantitative data. 
Some respondents argued that a degree of unnecessary customer contact was inevitable 
but that much of the potentially avoidable contact was caused by officers ignoring 
instructions to resolve queries directly by telephoning customers or making 
appointments to see them in person. Instead, they were sending letters because this 
quickly and easily removed problematical cases from their in-trays. Officers maintained 
that they did not have enough time to resolve enquiries ‘end-to-end’ because they were 
constantly moving between the back office, telephones and local service centres. 
Similarly, the workload of the officers in the local service centres had expanded, and 
this had eroded their ability to focus on contact resolution. Much of the work was now 
being passed back to officers in the back office and generated yet further customer 
contact (in the form of progress chasing) before it could be completed. The respondents 
said that more benefit officers and more accommodation in the front line would increase 
resolution rates there and reduce the pressure on the back office, while confining staff to 
the back office would cause them to revert to “knocking out letters”. System letters 
(especially overpayment letters) continued to be seriously problematical and the system 
templates that were used to generate standard outgoing letters over-specified 
requirements (i.e. ask for too much information). These problems were compounded by 
the application of inconsistent standards, with the result that different requirements were 
placed upon different customers by different benefit assessors, leaving the front-line 
staff unsure how to respond. 
 
Some of the benefits services staff in Council B were familiar with concepts such as 
Lean thinking, failure demand and defect prevention. For example, work flow had been 
changed by moving expert staff into the front line alongside customer services 
specialists, with the aim of improving resolution on first contact and encouraging end-
to-end working. However, the council’s failure to sustain its systems-oriented 
programme had generated some scepticism about the approach, and there was some 
criticism of the external consultants. This evidence highlights the importance for 
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councils of having robust procedures for managing ‘experts’ who are selected to provide 
external support, and of the need to sustain such interventions, or to communicate to 
staff compelling reasons for their abandonment. 
 
As in Case-study A, the customer journey roadmaps highlighted failures (including 
delays assessing benefit claims, delays requesting information required to assess claims, 
and delays in refusing claims) that were not detected during the observation work or key 
informant interviews. A potential conflict of interest was created by the participation of 
staff that may have been responsible for the service failures under investigation, but this 
did not appear to affect the results. 
 
The next section of this chapter describes the third and final case-study, which was 
conducted in the housing and council tax benefits section of a unitary council, called 
here Council C. An interesting feature of this case-study site was the particularly good 
relationship that seemed to exist between the management team and most of the staff. 
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Case-study C 
 
This case-study involved the investigation of customer contacts handled by housing and 
council tax benefits services provided by a unitary council in south-east England. Four 
phases of research were conducted during February 2008: document review, non-
participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey mapping. 
The methods employed to collect, analyse and validate the data captured during this 
case-study were those developed during the pilot study described in Chapter 4 and 
employed during the case-studies at Councils A and B. 
 
Document review 
 
A short ‘biography’ of the housing and council tax benefits services delivered by 
Council C was prepared in order to capture contextual information and historical data. 
As before, the research work included a survey of online information about the council 
and its housing and council tax benefits services covering the period from 2000 to 2007. 
I obtained data from websites maintained by the council, the Department of Work and 
Pensions, and the Audit Commission. The council provided me with organisation 
charts, inspection reports, benchmarking data, and access to business plans via their 
Intranet service. 
 
The data describe a city with a very high proportion of young working age residents, a 
large student population, and an economy supported by tourism. At the time of the 
research, a £2 billion programme of physical regeneration was being progressed. 
Nevertheless, the city had areas of high social and economic deprivation. 
Unemployment was above national and regional rates, while earnings were below the 
national average. The lowest levels of educational attainment were in areas with high 
proportions of substandard council housing stock. More than 40,000 adult residents did 
not have any qualifications and the number of people not in education, employment or 
training was well above the regional average. Similarly, the number of people 
experiencing mental health problems, the suicide rate and the number of injecting drug 
users were among the highest in the country. It was against this complex and 
challenging background that Council C was providing housing and council tax benefits 
services to some 49,000 residents at a cost of £150 million a year. 
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Data compiled and presented by the Department for Work and Pensions reveal that 
Council C achieved substantial performance improvements between 2001 and 2007 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hobod/ . For example, the average time taken to process 
new benefit claims reduced from about 60 days to 30 days, while the percentage of 
claims calculated correctly increased from 92% to 98%. However, these levels of 
improvement were not exceptional in comparative terms, as the benchmarking data 
showed that councils throughout the sector were advancing at similar rates during this 
period. 
 
With the assistance of staff, I was able to compile a list of the principal initiatives taken 
by Council C to modernise, improve and develop its benefits services since 2001. A 
notable feature of the list was the regular injection of central government funding that 
supported the council’s participation in national pilot projects such as the Local 
Housing Allowance (LHA) scheme.63 The Department for Work and Pensions also 
provided resources to sustain a staff training and induction team, a benefits take-up 
team, and the development of mobile working technologies. 
 
Overall, the documentary evidence portrayed a benefits service that was good and 
improving towards levels of performance characterised as “top grade” by the DWP. 
There was little (if anything) to suggest that the service had underlying problems with 
the quality of the customer experience. 
 
Non-participant observations 
 
During a period of ten working days during February 2008, I listened to 259 incoming 
telephone calls and observed 229 face-to-face visits received by Council C’s housing 
and council tax benefits services. I recorded brief details of each transaction using the 
data collection sheet and guidance notes developed during the pilot project (a copy of 
which appears at Annex 5 on pages 273-274). The aim was to establish the cause of 
each contact (e.g. a customer asking about the progress of a claim), the value of each 
                                                          
63 The LHA scheme, which now applies throughout the UK, simplifies the assessment of housing benefit 
claims and makes tenants responsible for paying their rents by replacing previously sophisticated 
arrangements for establishing eligible rents with flat rate allowances that reflect the size of the 
accommodation. The LHA rate is not directly related to the rent that is charged, so the housing benefit 
may be more or less than the amount payable to the landlord. 
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contact to the claimant and other key stakeholders (i.e. high value, low value, 
potentially avoidable, off remit), and the extent to which the contact was resolved 
(resolved one stop, repeat resolved, passed back, passed on). 
 
Telephone contacts 
 
Key data about telephone contacts were recorded between approximately 9am and 5pm 
daily. I sat next to agents who were taking calls and listened to both sides of the 
conversations without intervening. This was tiring work because the call content was 
repetitive and the ventilation poor. It was possible to ask questions between calls, but 
the telephone agents seemed less confident about their technical knowledge than 
comparable staff on the public service enquiry counter. Several people commented upon 
unusually low call volumes, and it seemed at the time that these remarks were 
indications of their anxiety about the possible outcomes of the research (i.e. that it might 
result in job losses). 
 
A rota was produced with the intention of enabling me to sit with different agents each 
morning and afternoon, but these arrangements broke down from the outset because of 
unplanned staff absences due to heavy colds. Consequently, I was able to move around 
freely (after checking with senior staff) and speak to agents directly. Even so, it was not 
possible to sit with all the agents, due to the constant arrival and departure of part-time 
staff. 
 
A senior officer explained that staffing was reasonably stable, with some capable people 
having accumulated several years’ experience on the team. This unusual state of affairs 
was attributable to the fact that the normal procedure for recruiting benefits assessors 
had been suspended (due to financial constraints), and the telephone staff were 
temporarily prevented from progressing into more senior posts. Apparently the turn-
over of staff in the telephone team was normally higher and consequently their skills 
were normally less well developed. 
 
Pay appeared to be a controversial issue, as nearly all the agents mentioned the 
perceived unfairness of their situation. They said that other staff doing comparable work 
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were better paid, and they expressed dissatisfaction with the training regime, which they 
said put them at a disadvantage. 
 
The team leader explained that there were seven telephone lines into the contact centre 
but five were being used, due to reduced call volumes now that backlogs of assessment 
work had been reduced. Apparently the council advertised dedicated landlord and 
translation lines, but in practice these were simply diverted to the telephone team. The 
section aimed to keep telephone waiting times to five minutes but I was aware that 
industry standard performance would be around 90% of calls to be answered within ten 
or 20 seconds, so Council C’s target seemed generous. During the observation work, 
waiting times of up to ten minutes were not exceptional, and this timescale appeared to 
be the trigger point for management intervention. 
 
Agents spoke about calls being transferred to them by the council tax team. I saw 
several examples of calls being transferred from housing benefits to council tax without 
introduction; this technique is called ‘cold hand-off’ and is not normally considered to 
be good practice. Housing benefits staff claimed to deal with council tax enquiries but I 
saw no evidence of this happening, and there appeared to be a wide gulf between the 
two teams, which are part of the same organisational unit. 
 
As before (during the previous case-studies), data collection sheets were completed 
contemporaneously with customer contacts, and the data were transferred at the end of 
each day from the data collection sheets into spreadsheets. As in Case-study B, I 
withheld the emerging analyses so that they would not bias subsequent data collection, 
but the categorisation (or coding) of the telephone calls was still more controversial than 
the face-to-face contacts. For example, with regard to contact avoidability (perceived 
failures that might have been prevented), staff said that contacts might be of no value to 
the council (e.g. requests for the clarification of letters and notices) but of real value to 
customers. This could be because letters and notices needed to be improved 
(simplified), but the staff insisted that many customers were vulnerable and would 
always need help to understand the council’s requirements and decisions. Consequently, 
even the apparently innocuous label ‘potentially avoidable contact’ caused some 
controversy because some staff said that the elimination of this activity implied a 
service reduction. Similarly, contact resolution was viewed from a variety of 
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perspectives. From the perspective of the public service officers, a request for a housing 
benefits claim form was resolved by giving the customer a claim form. But from the 
claimant’s perspective, this was arguably just the beginning of a potentially difficult 
‘customer journey’ that could involve numerous contacts with benefits services, and 
which might or might not result in the award of benefits several weeks or months later. 
However, when the data analysis was shared with the staff there were no complaints, 
from which I inferred that they were satisfied with the findings. 
 
Telephone contacts: categorisation by cause 
 
Figure 10 below reveals that 172 (or 66%) of the telephone calls were attributable to 
seven causes, the top four of which (customers progress chasing, seeking advice, 
querying payments, seeking explanation of notices) had previously been categorised as 
potentially avoidable (i.e. failures that might have been prevented). 
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Figure 10: Council C – telephone calls analysed by cause of contact 
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Telephone contacts: categorisation by value and resolution 
 
259 contacts were observed. A minority (41%) were categorised as valuable, and nearly 
one-quarter (22%) were resolved during the contact with the customer; 14% were 
passed on for the council to take action and 57% were passed back to the customers. 
Only 20 calls were off remit. If the transactions classed as valuable are taken in 
isolation, 19% were resolved on first contact, slightly less than the proportion of 
contacts overall (see Table 27 below). 
 
Table 27: Council C – telephone calls analysed by value and resolution 
 
 Valuable and Non-Value 
Contacts Combined 
Valuable Contacts Only 
 Number Proportion Number Percentage 
Value   
High 88 34% 88 84%
Low 17 7% 17 16%
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failures 
134 51%  
Off Remit 20 8%  
Total 259 100% 105 100%
  
Resolution  
One Stop 54 21% 20 19%
Repeat Resolved 2 1% 0 0%
Passed Back 147 57% 72 69%
Passed On 36 14% 13 12%
Sub-total 239 93% 105 100%
Off Remit 20 7%  
Total 259 100%   
 
 
 
165 
 
Face-to-face contacts 
 
In Council C, Mondays and Thursdays each week were ‘drop-in’ days when customers 
(principally housing and council tax benefits claimants) could have private interviews 
with ‘seniors’ (experienced assessors) without appointments. Alternatively, they could 
go to a reception desk for general advice or to get documents copied. Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays were ‘interview days’ when seniors could be seen by 
appointment. Council C’s office was closed on Wednesday mornings for training, and 
this meant that Wednesday afternoons were exceptionally busy. Friday afternoons were 
hectic too, with customers trying to resolve issues before the weekend. The council also 
provided a reception service at a satellite office, but this facility was closed at the end of 
March 2008. 
 
Data were collected by completing data collection sheets contemporaneously with 
customer contacts. At the end of each day, the data were transferred from the data 
collection sheets into spreadsheets. The categorisation of contact cause and resolution 
was uncontroversial. The majority of contacts were passed back to customers for them 
to take action (such as completing forms or producing supporting documentation), or 
passed on for the council to take action (such as conducting interviews or assessing 
claims). As before, deciding contact value took longer because opinions varied about 
the characterisation of contacts such as the provision of information and evidence that 
had not been supplied with original claim forms. 
 
Face-to-face contacts: categorisation by contact cause 
 
Figure 11 below reveals that 163 (or 71%) of the contacts observed were attributable to 
just four causes, two of which (claimants providing information to support claims, and 
customers querying payments) had previously been categorised by the organisation’s 
own staff as potentially avoidable, i.e. failures that might have been prevented. As in the 
previous case-studies, causes arising only once are excluded to enhance the presentation 
of the data. 
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Figure 11: Council C – face to face visits analysed by cause of contact 
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Face-to-face contacts: categorisation by value and resolution 
 
229 face-to-face contacts were observed. Less than half (49%) were categorised as of some 
value, but few (10%) were resolved during the contact with the customer; 45% were 
passed on for the council to take further action, and 39% were passed back to the 
customers for them to take action. Some councils seek to maximise the first time resolution 
of the valuable work. Of the 113 contacts that were classified as valuable only 5% were 
resolved, so a higher proportion of non-value than value contacts was resolved (see Table 
28 below). 
 
Table 28: Council C – face to face contacts analysed by value and resolution 
 
 Valuable and Non-Value 
Contacts Combined 
Valuable Contacts Only 
 Number Proportion Number Percentage 
Value   
High 100 44% 101 89%
Low 12 5% 12 11%
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failures 
107 47%
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
Applicable 
Off Remit 10 4%
Not 
Applicable 
Not  
Applicable 
Total 229 100% 113 100%
  
Resolution  
One Stop 21 9% 6 5%
Repeat Resolved 3 1% 0 0%
Passed Back 90 39% 59 52%
Passed On 104 45% 48 43%
Sub-total 218 94% 113 100%
Off Remit 11 6%  
Total 229 100%   
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Telephone and face-to-face contacts: categorisation by value and resolution 
 
Further analysis reveals that the ten most frequent occurrences accounted for 368 out of 
488 contacts (75.4% of all contacts). More than half of these were categorised as 
potentially avoidable failures (see Table 29 below). 
 
Table 29: Council C – ten most frequent causes of customer contacts 
 
Number of Contacts  Cause of Contact Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failure Phone F2F Total 
Percentage 
of Total 
Contacts 
1 Claimants providing 
information and evidence to 
support claims [following the 
submission of original 
application forms] 
Yes - 63 63 12.9 
2 Customers advising changes 
of circumstances 
No 20 40 60 12.3 
3 Customers claiming housing 
and council tax benefits 
No 5 47 52 10.7 
4 Customers progress chasing 
claims 
Yes 37 5 42 8.6 
5 Customers querying housing 
and council tax benefits 
payments 
Yes 26 13 39 8.0 
6 Customers seeking advice 
about outstanding 
information and evidence 
Yes 33 1 34 7.0 
7 Customers seeking 
explanations of council 
notices and letters 
Yes 23 2 25 5.1 
8 Customers enquiring about 
possible entitlement to 
housing and council tax 
benefits 
No 18 6 24 4.9 
9 Customers responding to 
requests for information and 
evidence 
No 15 5 20 4.1 
10 Customers dialing wrong 
numbers 
Yes 9 - 9 1.8 
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Semi-structured interviews 
 
A total of sixteen volunteers from Council C’s housing and council tax benefits service 
were interviewed for about one hour each. Four of the participants were based in the public 
service office. There were three representatives from the telephone contact centre, two 
members of the staff induction team, three senior assessment officers, two managers, an 
assessment officer and a visiting officer. As in the previous case-studies, the aim of the 
selection was to obtain a vertical and horizontal cross-section of opinion. In the analysis 
that follows, the interviewees are simply described as managers, assessment officers and 
customer service officers, to preserve their anonymity. 
 
A few days before the interviews were scheduled to take place, the interviewees were 
reminded by e-mail about the administrative arrangements. They were also provided with a 
list of the questions that were to be asked, so that they could give prior consideration to 
their answers. Some people did not receive or open these messages and were therefore less 
well-prepared than others. At the beginning of each interview, the purpose of the research 
was explained and the preliminary outcomes of the observation work that had been 
conducted during the preceding two weeks were described. A schedule of questions was 
employed to ensure that similar issues were raised, but the respondents were encouraged to 
discuss any aspects of customer contact handling that seemed important to them, and novel 
points of interest were explored in conversation as they arose. 
 
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The respondents were then provided with 
copies of the recordings and transcripts. They were invited to clarify any parts of the 
conversations that had not been correctly interpreted, and to correct any errors or 
omissions. Two respondents offered points of clarification that did not affect the 
transcripts. 
 
The techniques employed during this case-study to record, transcribe, analyse and validate 
the interview data were developed during the pilot work described in Chapter 4 and applied 
during Case-studies A and B. As before, the output from the interviews was clustered into 
preliminary concept areas (see Annex 7 on pages 277-295) and then reorganised to align 
implicit standards of customer care with the consequences of breaching those standards, to 
facilitate the generation of a schedule of ways in which the breaches might be prevented 
 
170 
(see Table 30 below). Finally, examples of Lean thinking exhibited at Council C and 
identified by the interviewees are detailed in Table 31 below.  
 
Table 30: Council C - implicit standards and consequences of breaching them 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
Letters, notices and 
forms sent to customers 
should be necessary, 
clear, consistent and 
concise. This 
documentation should be 
designed to meet the 
needs of a diverse and 
disadvantaged 
population. 
Complicated and confusing 
letters, notices and forms 
cause customers and staff to 
make errors and generate 
unnecessary customer contact. 
Customers do not understand 
letters requesting information 
and evidence, so they do not 
respond or they respond 
incorrectly. Claimants fail to 
identify or report errors in 
benefit award notices, and 
receive incorrect payments. 
Forms are completed 
incorrectly, and the evidence 
required to support claims is 
not provided. 
Benefit claim forms should be 
clear and simple. If the 
organisation lacks the 
appropriate skills, organisations 
such as The Plain English 
Campaign will provide 
assistance, support and training 
at a price. 
Staff should invest more time in 
drafting and editing letters and 
notices so that they explain the 
council’s requirements 
carefully. The council should 
ensure that its staff are 
sufficiently numerate and 
literate. 
A step-by-step guide for 
customers, explaining the 
process of claiming benefits 
and helping them to determine 
where they currently are in the 
sequence, should reduce 
unnecessary enquiries and 
encourage valuable contact. 
Officers should establish 
direct contact with 
customers to explain 
their requirements and 
deal with enquiries as 
they arise. 
Officers use more expensive 
and less successful forms of 
communication such as 
correspondence. Letters are 
less likely to be understood by 
customers or to result in 
resolution of outstanding 
issues. Letters are more likely 
to prolong the claims process 
and generate repeat contact. 
Telephone or face-to-face 
contact with customers would 
be less expensive than 
correspondence and more 
effective too, because it is 
easier for staff to explain 
complications and requirements 
verbally than in writing.  
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Table 30 (continued): 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
Business processes 
should be updated 
regularly to ensure 
that they fulfill the 
current needs of the 
organisation and its 
customers. 
Outdated business processes 
(such as the deployment of 
customer services staff to create 
a buffer between customers and 
assessment officers when there 
are serious backlogs of work) 
create delays, frustrate current 
policies and demotivate staff. 
They cause customer enquiries 
to be passed around inside the 
organisation instead of being 
resolved by assessment officers 
at the first point of contact. 
Incremental change is less likely 
to disrupt the services but, where 
radical improvements are 
necessary, they should be 
implemented when workloads are 
historically low. Sometimes 
revised processes can be 
presented as necessary adjuncts to 
centrally imposed changes in the 
legislative scheme, such as the 
new Local Housing Allowance. 
The various services 
provided by 
different 
departments within 
the council should 
be joined up so that 
customer enquiries 
can be resolved end-
to-end. 
Customers are inconvenienced 
by being passed back and forth 
between different departments. 
The information and advice 
provided to customers may be 
inconsistent, incorrect or 
incomplete. Unnecessary contact 
is generated by the need for 
customers to provide the same 
information to the council more 
than once. 
Council tax services, housing and 
council tax benefits services, and 
housing services normally work 
in close co-operation with each 
other. Benefits ease the financial 
burden that would otherwise be 
imposed upon vulnerable people, 
and they make the task of 
collecting rents council taxes 
easier. Benefits are funded by 
central government grants. They 
bring financial resources into the 
local economy without impacting 
upon the level of council tax. 
Customers should 
be given clear 
advice about the 
information that 
they have to provide 
in support of benefit 
claims.  
Unnecessary customer contact 
(including repeat calls, repeat 
visits, complaints and appeals) is 
generated when customers 
provide incorrect or incomplete 
information. 
A simple but resonant message 
would help claimants to 
understand what documentation 
is required to support a claim. 
Similarly, a clear and consistent 
check-list of the information 
required to support claims would 
help staff to ensure the 
documentation is complete. 
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Table 30 (continued): 
 
Implicit standard Consequence of breaching 
standard 
Prevention 
Staff should be 
adequately compensated 
so that they feel valued. 
The grading of posts 
should properly reflect 
the responsibilities 
shouldered by the post-
holders. Grievances and 
anomalies should be 
addressed. 
Staff turnover is high. The costs 
of filling vacancies and training 
replacements are high. Service 
standards are sub-optimal 
because new staff are 
inexperienced. Disaffected staff 
may be inflexible, unhelpful and 
possibly disruptive. 
Improved efficiency, through 
measures such as the 
elimination or reduction of 
potentially avoidable 
customer contact, would 
release financial resources. 
The council would need fewer 
front-line staff because there 
would be fewer contacts, and 
the remaining staff would be 
dealing with a higher 
proportion of value work. 
Consequently, it would be 
possible to improve their 
remuneration. 
Customers should be 
able to contact officers 
quickly and easily to 
provide any information 
that has been requested. 
Unnecessary customer contact 
is generated and customers use 
more expensive access channels 
(such as walk-in services) when 
they cannot make contact via 
economical methods such as 
telephone and e-mail. 
Customers abandon their 
attempts to provide information 
that the council has requested, 
which results in delays, benefit 
cancellations, overpayments, 
complaints and appeals. 
The elimination or reduction 
of potentially avoidable 
customer contact, combined 
with the prioritisation of high 
value contact (such as 
customers providing 
information that the council 
has requested) should 
improve communication, 
reduce delays and help to 
control the costs of 
administration. 
All customer-facing staff 
should be trained to 
similar standards. 
Policies and procedures 
should be kept up-to-
date and implemented 
consistently throughout 
the organisation. 
Inconsistent standards, policies 
and procedures result in poor 
service and unnecessary 
activity, as claimants make 
repeat contacts to establish the 
correct situation or requirement. 
Standardised procedures 
should be generated, 
communicated and 
implemented throughout the 
organisation. Systems should 
be developed to encourage 
co-operation, learning and 
knowledge sharing. 
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In Table 31 below recent practices and improvements at Council C are matched with 
corresponding Lean techniques to illustrate the penetration of Lean thinking. 
 
 
Table 31: Council C - examples of Lean thinking in practice 
 
Existing practices or proposed innovations Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Redesigning, re-equipping and redecorating the 
public service area to take account of customer 
feedback. 
Customer first, maximising value to the 
customer, clean and tidy. 
Introducing a dedicated copying service for 
customers who do not want to queue but just 
want to hand in documents. 
Customer first, maximising value to the 
customer, business process redesign, 
fast flexible flow, economies of time, 
managing constraints, managing 
demand variation. 
Obtaining and maintaining Charter Mark 
accreditation. 
Policy deployment, customer first, 
team-working, continuous 
improvement. 
Implementing a new ‘system notification pack’ 
to generate computer-produced letters and 
notices. 
Customer first, improving product 
design, automation, mass customisation, 
defect prevention. 
Participating in the pilot phase of central 
government’s Local Housing Allowance scheme.
Breakthrough innovation, building 
knowledge in a systematic and scientific 
way, team-working on improvement. 
Implementing an electronic document 
management system. 
Breakthrough innovation, automation, 
removing waste, fast flexible flow, 
economies of time, managing 
constraints, avoiding unnecessary 
motions, team-working on 
improvement, business process 
redesign, standard work. 
Piloting new mobile working technology in the 
form of tablet PCs and electronic claim forms. 
Breakthrough innovation, automation, 
removing waste, fast flexible flow, 
economies of time, managing 
constraints, avoiding unnecessary 
motions, team-working on 
improvement, business process 
redesign, standard work. 
 
 
174 
Table 31 (continued): 
 
Existing practices or proposed innovations Examples of corresponding Lean 
techniques 
Implementing a new telephone system and 
call centre style contact handling 
arrangements. 
Automation, mass customisation, managing 
constraints, process redesign, improving 
flow, managing demand variation, skill 
flexibility, waste prevention, knowledge 
management. 
Encouraging assessment officers to contact 
customers by telephone instead of sending 
letters and notices. 
Simplicity, thinking small, improving flow, 
moving at the customer rate, process 
redesign, eliminating unnecessary motions, 
preventing defects, removing waste. 
Deploying back-office staff in the public 
service area. 
Moving experts to the front of the flow, 
improving flow, defect prevention, right first 
time, removing waste, managing constraints, 
avoiding unnecessary motions, skill 
flexibility. 
Creating an induction training team to 
provide standardised training for up to 
fourteen new entrants at a time and to 
provide ongoing training for established 
staff. 
Knowledge management, worker 
empowerment and training, building 
knowledge in a systematic and scientific way, 
standard work, team-working on 
improvement, continuous improvement, 
defect prevention, waste reduction. 
Improving service-specific pages on the 
corporate website to include downloadable 
forms, a benefit calculator and feedback 
facilities. 
Mass customisation, automation, managing 
demand variation, avoiding unnecessary 
motions. 
Investing in staff selection, recruitment, 
training and development to help staff feel 
part of an improving culture where people 
think intelligently about the things that they 
do. 
Policy deployment, worker empowerment 
and training, skill flexibility, continuous 
improvement. 
Enabling team leaders to hold assessment 
strategy meetings to identify and pilot new 
and better ways of doing things. 
Worker empowerment and training, building 
knowledge in a systematic and scientific way, 
knowledge management, team-working on 
improvement, continuous improvement, 
consensus building, trust, creativity. 
Relaxing the requirements placed upon 
customers to provide information and 
evidence in support of claims by accepting 
some details over the telephone. 
Simplicity, avoiding unnecessary motions, 
improving flow, moving at the customer rate, 
economies of time, removing over-
specification, customer first. 
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The interviewees were asked about the conditions under which change initiatives such as 
Lean thinking could be successfully exploited. The participants here had strong views on 
this subject, but they were often indirect and focused on the relationships between the 
workforce and their management team: 
 
• The service had a very solid workforce that accepted changes very well. There was a 
good combination of new and long-serving staff who were keen to be doing things 
right and would welcome changes that enabled them to get on with their work. Staff 
were not set in their ways, but it was important that the council was not seen to be 
throwing money at problems by, for example, employing consultants. There were staff 
who could still remember local government reorganisation and who had been through 
several backlog situations. They remembered getting through these and had developed 
some resilience in the face of change. 
 
• It was a good, friendly office to work in. The relationship between management and 
staff was very good. Management was not overbearing; they were considered to be 
flexible, approachable, and trusted the staff as adults. The management team was quite 
positive and willing to listen. It operated an open door policy and normally consulted 
before implementation. Management tried to be honest and open. There was “a good 
change culture and such good change managers” with a lot of people who were used to 
change and used to success. 
 
• Management would need to explain the reasons for changes, consult staff to get a range 
of ideas, and seek volunteers to get involved. The majority of people would be very 
receptive, and the organisation was geared up to provide the necessary training and 
support. 
 
• Staff liked to feel involved, so that it was not just a management initiative, especially if 
the staff were going to be doing the bulk of the work. New initiatives should be tried 
and tested, and then staff would be accepting. 
 
• Communication was said to be the main deciding factor. For example, the public 
service team responded positively to this research (into PAFID) because of the way it 
was communicated to them, whilst initially the telephone team responded badly. The 
difference in attitudes was attributed to the quality of the communication effort.  
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Customer journey mapping 
 
As with Case-studies A and B above, all possible permutations of claim and 
accommodation tenure type were identified. The claim in each category with the longest 
end-to-end time was selected from among the claims received between October 2007 and 
February 2008 (see Table 32 below).  
 
 
Table 32: Council C – claim types and end-to-end times 
 
  
Owner 
occupiers 
 
Private 
tenants 
 
Registered 
Social 
Landlords 
 
 
Local 
authority 
tenants 
Claimants in 
receipt of 
Jobseeker’s 
Allowance from 
the Department 
for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) 
111 days 
end-to-end 
73 days 
end-to-end 
44 days 
end-to-end 
- 
Claimants in 
receipt of 
Guaranteed 
Pension Credit 
from the DWP 
100 days 
end-to-end 
87 days 
end-to-end 
79 days 
end-to-end 
47 days 
end-to-end 
Claimants in 
receipt of Income 
Support from the 
DWP 
77 days 
end-to-end 
127 days 
end-to-end 
68 days 
end-to-end 
46 days 
end-to-end 
Standard claims 
for housing and 
council tax 
benefits 
85 days 
end-to-end 
87 days 
end-to-end 
38 days 
end-to-end 
- 
Tenure type 
Claim type 
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Next, thirty roadmaps were generated by examining all available records to chart the 
customer experience end-to-end during each claim. Finally, the service manager was 
challenged to explain the problems that had occurred, and categories of responses were 
arranged in decreasing order of frequency to highlight the most common incidents (see 
Table 33 below). 
 
 
Table 33: Council C – summary of contact causes 
 
Causes of PAFID (i.e. failures that might have been prevented) 
identified during customer journey mapping 
Number of 
occurrences
Delays assessing claims 8 
Delays requesting further information 5 
Delays despatching notification letters 3 
Requests for unnecessary information 2 
Delays conducting visits 1 
Delays creating council tax accounts 1 
Delays suspending claims 1 
Delays receiving documents from outstations 1 
 
 
The same phenomenon arose here as was observed during the customer journey mapping 
phases of Case-studies A and B. The exercise highlighted categories of failure such as 
internal delays assessing benefit claims and unnecessary requests for information from 
claimants, not identified during the preceding stages of the research.  
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Summary and critical analysis of case-study C 
 
The document review in Council C revealed housing and council tax benefits services that 
were good and improving, in an increasingly crowded city with affluent and deprived 
communities juxtaposed. There was nothing in the biography to suggest that the services 
had underlying problems with the current quality of the customer experience, but the 
observation work revealed high levels of potentially avoidable contact (47% on the 
telephones, 52% face–to-face, and 49% overall), and low levels of resolution on first 
contact (22% on the telephones, 10% face-to-face, and 16% overall). The proportion of 
valuable contacts resolved was lower, at 19% on the telephones, 5% face-to-face, and 12% 
overall.  
 
The data suggest that the principal cause of the potentially avoidable contact and the low 
rate of resolution was the production by claimants of information and evidence (such as 
pay slips, bank statements and tenancy agreements) that was incomplete or not supplied at 
the right time (i.e. with original claim forms or notifications of change of circumstances). 
Other frequent causes of unnecessary contact included customers who were chasing 
outstanding claims, querying payments due or received, seeking advice about information 
and evidence they needed to produce, and asking for explanations of notices and letters 
sent to them by the council.  
 
Key informant interviews were conducted to supplement the document review and 
observation work. A range of people were involved in the interviews, including senior and 
middle managers as well as supervisors, benefit assessors, trainers and customer services 
staff. There was such immense interest in participating in the interviews that I had to 
increase the time allocated to this work, but was still unable to accommodate everybody. 
There appeared to be less overt concern about the impact of the interview data (in terms of 
job losses) than there was about the observations. Perhaps this was because the participants 
felt that they had much to contribute on the issue of potentially avoidable contact, and their 
own strongly-held views about the ‘hidden’ value of their work.   
 
A total of 16 semi-structured interviews generated a list of 25 possible explanations, and 
23 suggested solutions, for potentially avoidable customer contact. The harshest criticism 
was reserved for the council’s computer-produced notices and letters. Most of the 
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respondents were complimentary about the management team and identified a range of 
actions that management could take to maximise the chances of a successful improvement 
programme. 
 
Most of the respondents agreed that there was a high volume of potentially avoidable 
customer contact (a manager said that the research had highlighted some 50% of contacts 
that were worthy of further scrutiny) but some were not convinced that the low level of 
contact resolution was problematical. Six respondents said that drop-in days were likely to 
produce better resolution rates than other days and were under-represented in the sample. 
Among these participants, the consensus of opinion was that scheduled interviews were 
often resolved, but drop-ins were rarely resolved. Three respondents (including a manager) 
pointed out that the findings were unsurprising because front-line staff were only expected 
to offer general advice and would normally seek help to achieve contact resolution.  
 
Three respondents highlighted the vulnerability of claimants and did not think that their 
need for extra help was unreasonable. A customer services officer said that some contacts 
(such as claimants reporting that they could not obtain required proofs) were not resolvable 
one-stop. An assessment officer argued that the fulfillment of simple service requests (such 
as the provision of claim forms) constituted one-stop resolution and should not be 
classified as the unresolved commencement of a potentially long ‘customer journey’. 
Another assessment officer pointed out that much of the customer contact was attributable 
to the complexity of the statutory scheme.  
 
Several respondents maintained that potentially avoidable contact and contact resolution 
did matter, especially if it revealed inconsistencies in procedures and advice that caused 
problems for claimants. For example, walk-in customers had to queue behind people who 
were only there because of queries that the council itself had generated. One assessment 
officer answered the question ‘what’s in it for me?’ by asserting “if you can reduce the 
contact, that reduces the work”. However, others said that contact was valuable to the staff 
if it was valuable to customers, and activities such as sign-posting and reassuring 
vulnerable people were all part of providing a “rounded service”. A senior assessment 
officer said that the telephone service must be necessary or it would not be so busy. A 
manager said that benefits administration was complex and high levels of one-stop 
resolution were not achievable but the technique (seeking to reduce potentially avoidable 
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contact and improve contact resolution) might help to improve the administration of other 
services such as council tax and business rates. 
 
Once again, the customer journey roadmaps were useful in terms of capturing aspects of 
the benefit claim process and revealing that internal delays contributed to PAFID. 
However, the amount of time and effort involved in extracting, tabulating, mapping and 
analysing the data in this way was considerable. In spite of the precautions introduced 
following the pilot study (to protect participants in the research), some staff seemed 
reluctant to provide necessary details. 
 
The council had acquired some information about Lean thinking from other councils and 
was trying to deploy some Lean techniques but without any external assistance or support. 
Similarly, Council C had adopted some management approaches that corresponded with 
Lean thinking (such as automation in the form of an electronic document management 
system, and mass customisation in the form of contact centre oriented call-handling 
arrangements) but I saw no evidence of a coherent plan to embrace the methodology.  
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Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, I have described the collection of data (about customer contacts and the 
penetration of Lean thinking into the UK public sector) during three case-studies of 
housing and council tax benefits services provided by local councils in south-east England. 
A district council, a unitary council and a London borough council were selected in order 
to provide a cross-section of the local democratic and socio-economic environments 
available in the region. The sample was limited to councils that routed customer enquiries 
through contact centres, as this facilitated the monitoring of high call volumes in 
circumstances that were arguably representative of the organisations’ overall service 
delivery capabilities.  
 
Each of the case-studies was divided into four distinct phases of research: document 
review, non-participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey 
mapping. The pilot study that preceded the case-studies was undertaken to develop, test 
and improve this research design so that it was demonstrably rigorous and systematic. The 
techniques and tools that emerged from the pilot research were deployed during the case-
studies. These were: (a) a data collection sheet and criteria for categorising customer 
contacts; (b) a spreadsheet-based model for capturing and displaying information about 
customer contacts; (c) an interview schedule and sequential approach to qualitative data 
analysis; (d) a process for mapping and analysing ‘customer journeys’; and (e) a schedule 
of precautions designed to eliminate or reduce potential methodological problems such as 
‘demand characteristics’ and observer bias. 
 
The first phase of each case-study (i.e. the document review) was necessary for collecting 
historical and contextual data about each council, but gave only limited insight into the 
phenomena under investigation. Interestingly, there was no obvious correlation between 
historical service standards, measured in terms of the performance indicators specified by 
central government, and the levels of service failure witnessed during the observation 
work. This observation resonates with comments that appear earlier in this thesis (Chapter 
1) about the inappropriateness of prescriptive top-down approaches that result in 
conformance to centrally imposed targets, instead of performance to desired standards.  
 
The case-studies generated evidence consistent with the assertion that housing and council 
tax benefits services suffer from high levels of failure leading to large volumes of 
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potentially avoidable customer contact. More than 1250 customer enquiries about housing 
and council tax benefits were observed and analysed during the second phase of the case-
studies. I sat with customer services staff and recorded data about contact cause, value and 
resolution. The research concentrated upon telephone and face-to-face contacts because 
most of the correspondence received by the case-study Councils was delivered in person 
by customers who chose to provide no other details. The volumes of electronic 
communication were minimal. It was notable that: 
 
• A high proportion of the customer contacts were attributable to a small number of 
causes, some of which  were common to all three case-study sites (e.g. customers 
providing documents in support of outstanding claims) 
 
• Nearly half of the observed contacts (48%) were categorised as potentially avoidable 
(i.e. failures that might have been prevented), and 16% were considered to have been 
resolved 
 
• While the proportions of potentially avoidable contact and resolved contact varied 
from site to site, there was a pattern or consistency about the data, which will receive 
further attention in the next chapter (see Table 34 below) 
 
 
Table 34: High-level summary of quantitative analyses across all case-studies and 
access channels. 
 
 Council A Council B Council C Total 
Potentially avoidable contact 53% 42% 49% 48% 
All work resolved 19% 13% 16% 16% 
Value work resolved 1% 12% 12% 9% 
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During the third phase of the case-studies, a total of 34 housing and council tax benefits 
officers (ranging from senior executives, through middle-managers and team leaders to 
junior customer services agents) who had volunteered to participate were interviewed for 
about one hour each, using a common set of questions and common procedures for 
recording, transcribing, analysing and validating the data. The semi-structured interviewing 
technique was well-suited to the situation, as the volunteers seemed most comfortable and 
forthcoming when allowed to address the topic at their own pace and in a sequence of their 
own choosing.  
 
The output from the interviews included a multiplicity of explanations for potentially 
avoidable contact and apparently low levels of contact resolution, which were structured 
(by a process of sequential analysis) around a number of common concepts selected for the 
frequency with which they arose during the interviews. These early categories included 
communication, contact value, business processes, quality, contact resolution, attitudes, 
knowledge, resources, targets, information technology, and complexity. Further analysis 
aligned implicit standards of customer care64 with the consequences of breaching those 
standards and ways in which failures might be prevented.  
 
The interviews also revealed examples of administrative practices consistent with Lean 
thinking. Two of the three case-study councils had experimented with Lean techniques but 
neither had made a coherent or sustained effort to adopt the full methodology, as a 
consequence of which the impact had been modest. Suggestions offered by interviewees 
pointed to the circumstances in which the management of a transition from the current 
NPM method to a new approach such as Lean thinking would be most likely to succeed.  
 
A substantial amount of time and effort was invested in the customer journey mapping 
exercises. The pilot work described in Chapter 4 highlighted the difficulty of obtaining 
candid explanations of internal failures for which the respondents may have been 
responsible. Nevertheless, the mapping work did reveal a common cause of failure and 
potentially avoidable contact across all three councils, namely delays that were internal to 
the departments that administered the housing and council tax benefits services. 
 
                                                          
64 For example, that logging letters, notices and forms sent to customers should be clear, consistent and 
concise (see Table 15 on page 128). 
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The processes that were developed during the pilot work and employed during the case-
studies to guard against methodological problems were successful. For example, the data 
collection sheets were shared with staff and research assistants at each site. They were 
consulted about the categorisation of customer contacts as the observation work 
progressed. Consequently, they did not seem inhibited by concerns about the monitoring of 
individual performance. Similarly, staff at all levels were generous with their time during 
the interviews, and nobody failed to attend. Indeed, the interview timetable at Council C 
was heavily over-subscribed.  
 
The revised schedule of interview questions was more effective than the pilot version in 
terms of eliciting information about potentially avoidable contact, contact resolution and 
the penetration of Lean thinking. While no new methodological problems emerged, some 
of the issues encountered during the pilot study reappeared during the substantive case-
studies. For example, the debate about the meanings of concepts such as contact cause, 
value, avoidability and resolution emerged spontaneously following completion of the 
observation work at Councils A and C. The interactive approach to problem resolution 
described in Chapters 3 and 4 was successfully employed to reach agreement, thus 
overcoming the problem encountered by Jowett and Rothwell (1988), reported in Chapter 
3, regarding the difficulty of measuring performance because of its interest-related nature. 
 
The staff at Council C expressed concern about job losses, following recent 
announcements about budget cuts, and this translated into a difference of opinion between 
management and staff. Management said that a lot of customer contact was potentially 
avoidable, but staff maintained that the support they gave to vulnerable customers was 
valuable and all part of a “rounded service”. The staff were also reluctant to accept that 
contact resolution had to be viewed in the context of the end-to-end customer journey, as 
this meant that very few enquiries received in the public service area resulted in contact 
resolution. The staff at Council A commented upon the unavoidable complexity of the 
housing and council tax benefits scheme, and argued that too much contact was better than 
too little. 
 
In Chapter 6, the data and preliminary ideas generated during the case-studies described 
above will be compared and contrasted. This cross-comparison is intended to further 
illuminate the problem under investigation and, by revealing similarities and differences, 
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begin to establish the generalisability of the findings for the study of public service 
delivery performance.  
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CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
As previously stated, the principal purpose of this research is to investigate, understand and 
explain why potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID) occurs in UK public 
sector services, and how it might be prevented. The background, theoretical insights and 
practical approaches described in Chapters 2 and 3 generated a number of possible 
explanations, but also highlighted the need for empirical understanding of current problems 
in the NPM context and the potential for improvement offered by Lean thinking. Chapter 4 
described the development and testing of a research design, while Chapter 5 described the 
collection and preliminary analysis of data captured during three case-studies conducted in 
the housing and council tax benefits services of local councils in south-east England. The 
four-phase research design of this dissertation consisted of document reviews, non-
participant observations, semi-structured interviews, and customer journey mapping.  
 
The output from the substantive case-studies consisted of data describing more than 1250 
customer enquiries or contacts, 34 staff interviews and 44 end-to-end customer journeys. 
The most significant findings were: (1) that nearly half of the observed customer contacts 
were attributed to some kind of failure and therefore potentially avoidable; (2) that less 
than one in six of all contacts were resolved; and (3) less than one in ten of the contacts 
that were categorised as valuable were resolved. The findings also included examples of 
Lean thinking as practised by the case-study councils, while suggestions offered by 
interviewees pointed to the circumstances in which the management of the transition from 
the current NPM method to a new approach such as Lean thinking is most likely to 
succeed. 
 
In this chapter, I will compare and contrast the findings from the case-studies described in 
Chapter 5, to further illuminate the problem of PAFID, and to reveal similarities and 
differences that may determine the extent to which generalisability can be inferred from 
the conclusions. 
 
 
187 
Case-study comparisons 
 
Case-study councils 
 
The ‘service biographies’ developed during the document review stage of the research 
described in Chapter 5 reveal differences between the case-study councils, but I maintain 
that these differences are outweighed by the similarities between the departments of the 
councils that deliver the services under scrutiny. For example, the administrative districts 
are different in terms of characteristics such as size65 and location, population, diversity, 
and measures of deprivation. The councils themselves (the organisational entities) differ in 
characteristics such as number of employees, range of services, corporate structures, 
political control, capital assets, and revenue resources. However, each of the services that 
were studied assess and pay the same welfare benefits (housing and council tax benefits), 
which they administer in-house.66  
 
Significantly, the benefits services provided by the councils are mandated by the same 
legislation, namely the Social Security Administration Act 1992, the Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, the Housing Benefits Regulations 2006 and the 
Council Tax Benefits Regulations 2006. The services are subject to the same 
comprehensive audit regime (delineated in the Audit Commission Act 1998), and funded 
in the same way by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) as mandated by the 
Income-related Benefits (Subsidy to Authorities) Order 1998. 
 
The administrative processes, procedures and technologies employed by the services to 
discharge their responsibilities are very similar. For example, it transpired that all three 
case-study councils deploy the same specialist computer systems to assess and pay 
benefits, manage documentation electronically, and distribute incoming telephone calls 
automatically. They all direct customer enquiries into corporate contact centres where 
customer services staff provide assistance and advice. In each case, the technical work 
involved in assessing and paying benefits is undertaken by back-office specialists, who are 
                                                          
65 There is no evidence that the size of councils or the populations they serve affect the quality of the housing 
and council tax benefits services they provide. For example, the three councils with the largest benefits 
caseloads in the UK (Birmingham, Glasgow and Leeds) processed new claims more quickly than the average 
for all UK councils in the quarter ended 31st March 2008 (DWP Resource Centre available online at  
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hobod/ accessed 30/08/09). 
66 Council B outsourced aspects of its services to private sector providers but brought them back in-house 
when problems were encountered. 
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usually members of the same professional organisation (the Institute of Revenues Rating 
and Valuation), which promotes professional and personal development and best practice 
among more than 5000 members nationwide. Similar organisational arrangements exist in 
different councils for distinguishing between back-office assessment officers, who 
calculate and pay benefits in accordance with the Regulations, and other specialists, who 
provide client-side services such as policy advice, appeals resolution, overpayment 
recovery, and fraud prevention.  
 
The tensions inherent in the organisational arrangements described above were evident in 
each of the case-study sites. For example, customer-facing staff commonly perceived 
themselves to be under pressure to enforce unnecessarily high standards67 of information 
and evidence imposed on claimants by assessment officers, while being required to 
maintain customer satisfaction targets and keep waiting times to a minimum. On the other 
hand, assessment officers were perceived as requiring the information and evidence 
collected by front-line staff to be ‘right first time’ in every detail, and as willing to delay 
benefit payments while they obtained additional details even if this caused customers to 
suffer hardship.  
 
                                                          
67 Unnecessarily high in the sense that assessment officers were perceived to be unduly diligent, causing one 
customer services officer to protest that “we shouldn’t be making them [benefits claimants] jump through 
hoops”. 
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Non-participant observations 
 
Overall, 1252 customer contacts were observed across three case-studies during the 
research; these consisted of 601 face-to-face visits, and 651 telephone calls. Figure 12 
below presents the contact volumes pictorially, while Table 35 below summarises the data 
across all three case-studies and both access channels. 
 
 
Figure 12: Volume of customer contacts observed during case-studies 
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Table 35: Observations across case-studies and access channels 
 
Council A Council B Council C Totals for case-studies Access Channel Customer Contacts 
Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion Number Proportion 
Face-to-face Number of contacts 
Potentially avoidable 
All contacts resolved 
Value contacts resolved
224 
104 
32 
3 
- 
46% 
14% 
1%* 
148 
45 
15 
7 
- 
30% 
10% 
12%* 
229 
107 
24 
6 
- 
47% 
10% 
5%* 
601 
256 
71 
16 
- 
43% 
12% 
5%* 
Telephone Number of contacts 
Potentially avoidable 
All contacts resolved 
Value contacts resolved
109 
74 
31 
0 
- 
68% 
28% 
0%* 
283 
136 
43 
8 
- 
48% 
15% 
11%* 
259 
134 
56 
20 
- 
52% 
22% 
19%* 
651 
344 
130 
28 
- 
53% 
20% 
16%* 
Totals Number of contacts 
Potentially avoidable 
All contacts resolved 
Value contacts resolved
333 
178 
63 
3 
- 
53% 
19% 
1%* 
431 
181 
58 
15 
- 
42% 
13% 
12%* 
488 
241 
80 
26 
- 
49% 
16% 
12%* 
1252 
600 
201 
44 
- 
48% 
16% 
9%* 
 
* Value contacts resolved as a proportion of the valuable contacts only 
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Potentially avoidable contacts 
 
Overall, 600 of the 1252 observed customer contacts (i.e. 48%) were classified as 
potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID), ranging from 42% in Council 
B, through 49% in Council C, to 53% in Council A. In the face-to-face environment, the 
PAFID ranged from 30% in Council B, through 46% in Council A, to 47% in Council 
C. On the telephones, it ranged from 48% in Council B, through 52% in Council C, to 
68% in Council A (see Figures 13 and 14 below).  
 
The data reveal consistently high levels of PAFID across the three case-study sites and 
two access channels (telephone and face-to-face) with only two ‘outliers’ apparent: the 
proportion of PAFID shown in Council A’s telephone contact centre (which is relatively 
high at 68%), and the PAFID in Council B’s face-to-face service (which is relatively 
low at 30%). The levels of PAFID observed in Councils A and C, at 53% and 49% 
respectively, were slightly above the average of 48%, while the level of PAFID in 
Council B was below average at 42%. 
 
Figure 13: Summary of PAFID across case-study councils 
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Figure 14: Summary of PAFID across access channels 
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Contact resolution 
 
A relatively small proportion (201 out of 1252, or 16%) of the total contacts observed 
was classified as resolved. The level of resolution ranged from 13% in Council B, 
through 16% in Council C, to 19% in Council A. Thus Council A was above the 
average of 16%, Council B was below average, and Council C performed at the 
average. Looking at the next level of analysis down, which distinguished between the 
telephone and face-to-face customer access channels, the highest level of resolution was 
28% of the calls received by Council A’s telephone contact centre. The lowest level of 
resolution was 10% of the face-to-face enquiries received by both Councils B and C 
(see Figures 15 and 16 below). 
 
Paradoxically, an even lower proportion of the observed valuable68 contacts were 
resolved, ranging from 1% in Council A to 12% in both Councils B and C, compared to 
the mean of 9%. There was even greater variation between the access channels, the 
highest proportion of valuable contacts being resolved in Council C’s telephone contact 
                                                          
68 The meaning of the concepts “value” and “non-value” were explored in Chapter 2, pages 29-32, where 
it was established that most commentators equated value with what matters to the end customer. During 
the pilot study described in Chapter 4, it transpired that a more sophisticated analysis was necessary that 
accommodated the policy objectives of the service providers and the needs of other key stakeholders. 
This potential ambiguity was overcome by including in the data collection sheets examples of value 
contacts agreed with key stakeholders in each case-study council before data collection began. 
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centre (19%), and the lowest in Council A’s contact centre (0%), compared to the 
contact centre mean of 16% (see Figures 17 and 18 below). 
 
Figure 15: Summary of contacts resolved across case-study councils 
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Figure 16: Summary of contacts resolved across access channels 
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Figure 17: Value contacts resolved across case-study councils 
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Figure 18: Value contacts resolved across access channels 
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Overall, Council A’s ability to resolve customer contacts appears at first sight to be 
better than Council B’s or Council C’s, at 19% in total and 28% in the telephone contact 
centre. However, Council A resolved only 1% of the valuable contacts, all of which 
arose in the face-to-face environment. Council B, on the other hand, resolved 12% of 
the observed valuable contacts, and was consistent at this level across the two access 
channels, with 12% face-to-face and 11% on the telephone.  
 
The data suggest some correlation between contact resolution rates and PAFID.  The 
highest level of PAFID across all three case-studies (68% in Council A’s telephone 
contact centre) does correspond with the lowest contact resolution rate (0%). However, 
Council C’s relatively high resolution rate of valuable contacts in its telephone call 
centre (19%) corresponds with an above average level of PAFID (52% in the same 
environment), and Council B’s more modest resolution rate of 12% corresponded with a 
lower level of PAFID (42%).69  
 
If the proportions of PAFID discovered during the observation phases of the case-
studies are applied to the annual customer contact volumes and unit costs declared by 
Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council in the Varney Report (see Table 1 on page 
36), they translate into potential savings of between £700,000 and more than £1million 
a year (see Table 36 below). These figures, substantial though they are, probably 
represent an underestimate of the potential saving, because I am aware (from my long 
experience as a senior manager of public services in local councils) that some customers 
circumvent corporate contact centres and access back-office environments directly, 
where the unit costs of contact handling are likely to be much higher. By inference, the 
data indicate that the potential savings available to the case-study councils described in 
this thesis, and to other councils administering housing and council tax benefits services 
in the UK, are also very substantial. 
 
                                                          
69 To establish direct correlation a greater number of case-studies needs to be undertaken. 
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Table 36: Financial implications of PAFID for Tameside MBC 
 
Range of PAFID Range of costs and 
potential savings 
Access 
channel 
Year Total 
contact 
volumes Lower 
estimate
Upper 
estimate
Unit 
costs 
Lower 
estimate 
Upper 
estimate 
2003/04 100,126 £15.50 £465,886 £729,418Face-to-
face 2004/05 104,986 
30% 47% 
£14.65 £461,413 £722,881
2003/04 303,511 £1.59 £231,640 £328,156Telephone 
2004/05 314,602 
48% 68% 
£1.39 £209,902 £297,362
2003/04 403,637 £697,526 £1,057,574Both 
2004/05 419,588 
  
£671,315 £1,020,243
 
 
In addition to providing an indication of potential savings, the data generate information 
about the causes of customer contacts that, combined with insights offered by 
respondents to the semi-structured interviews, may support the innovation of 
preventative measures. Table 37 below summarises the most frequent causes of 
customer contacts, and facilitates the identification of the ten most frequent causes of 
PAFID. 
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Table 37: Most frequent causes of customer contact across three case-study 
councils 
 
Causes of customer contacts Value Rank Order70  
Claimants advising changes of circumstances Valuable 1 
Claimants progress chasing outstanding 
claims 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
2 
Claimants providing documents that should 
have accompanied their original claim forms 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
2 
Claimants making new claims for benefits Valuable 3 
Claimants seeking clarification about 
supporting evidence needed by the council to 
complete the assessment of outstanding 
claims 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
4 
Claimants seeking clarification about 
benefits that have been awarded 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
5 
Council tax enquiries Off Remit 6 
Customers asking for claim forms Valuable 7 
Claimants responding to requests for 
information 
Valuable 8 
Claimants querying letters and notices sent to 
them by the council 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
9 
Enquiries requiring redirection Off Remit 10 
Claimants seeking clarification about 
overpaid benefits that they have been asked 
to repay 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
11 
Third parties seeking clarification about 
benefits that have been awarded 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
11 
Customers enquiring about possible 
entitlements to benefits 
Valuable 12 
Claimants seeking help to complete forms Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
13 
Claimants asking about payments they 
believe they should have received 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
14 
Landlords progress chasing outstanding 
claims 
Potentially Avoidable 
Failure 
15 
 
                                                          
70 The rank order of the most frequent causes of customer contact was calculated by taking the mean 
value of the percentage of contacts that each cause represented across the three case-studies and then 
arranging those mean values in descending order (i.e. with the most frequent cause at the top) and 
continuing down until the analysis revealed the top ten causes of PAFID. 
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The ten most frequent causes of PAFID observed during this research were: 
  
1. Claimants progress chasing outstanding claims 
2. Claimants providing documents that should have accompanied original claim forms 
3. Claimants seeking clarification about supporting evidence needed by the councils to 
complete the assessment of outstanding claims 
4. Claimants seeking clarification about benefits that have been awarded 
5. Claimants querying letters and notices sent to them by the councils 
6. Claimants seeking clarification about overpayments they have been asked to repay 
7. Third parties seeking clarification about benefits that have been awarded to others 
8. Claimants seeking help to complete claim forms 
9. Claimants asking about payments they should have received but have not 
10. Landlords progress chasing outstanding claims 
 
Semi-structured interviews conducted 
 
It was anticipated from the outset of this research that the observation work would 
provide useful quantitative data about PAFID but insufficient explanation about why it 
occurred or how it might be prevented. The comparative analysis of the data set out 
above realised this anticipation. The incidence, principal causes and perceived 
consequences of PAFID are identified, but explanation and elucidation are lacking. For 
this reason, semi-structured interviews were designed to supplement and enrich the 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 describes how, following completion of observations and interviews at each 
case-study site, a schedule of implicit standards of customer care was aligned with the 
potential consequences of breaching those standards, to identify ways in which the 
associated failures (i.e. causes of PAFID) might be prevented. In Table 38 below, the 
outputs from those analyses are compared and contrasted to expose the similarities and 
differences between the case-study sites. Common issues such as: (a) inexperienced and 
inadequately trained staff; (b) inconsistent and undocumented office procedures; (c) 
defective communication with customers; and (d) scarce staffing resources appear to 
afflict all three case-study sites. A high degree of convergence is revealed that begins to 
suggest generalisability from the findings. 
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Table 38: Summary of data from semi-structured interviews 
 
Strength of indication71  Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
Forms are completed incorrectly, and the evidence 
required to support claims is not provided. Claimants fail 
to identify or report errors in benefit award notices, and 
receive incorrect payments. Staff fail to understand 
letters and notices sent by their colleagues, and then give 
or seek incorrect information that results in further 
delays and unnecessary customer contacts. Customers 
often do not understand the content of the council’s 
letters and notices, so they make unnecessary telephone 
calls and visits to local service centres. They may also 
suffer hardship because of delays or loss of benefits. 
Some officers are more comfortable using more 
expensive and arguably less successful forms of 
communication such as correspondence, instead of the 
telephone, or face-to-face interviews. Customers are less 
likely to understand letters; letters are less likely to result 
in the resolution of outstanding issues and more likely to 
prolong the claims process and generate repeat customer 
contact. 
Strong Strong Strong Staff in Council A have problems with the software used to 
generate letters asking claimants for further information, 
which does not permit sufficient adaptation to make the 
letters understandable. The situation is exacerbated by staff 
who send out requests for information that are incorrect and 
inconsistent. 
Staff in Council B have difficulty communicating with 
people whose first language is not English. The staff do not 
understand the computer-produced letters, so they do not 
respond to customer enquiries with the right information. 
Some staff do not comply with instructions to explain awards 
and information requirements to customers via the telephone. 
Standard letters on the computer system ask for too much 
information. Computer-generated letters about overpayments 
are difficult to understand. Some of the requests for further 
information sent out by staff are incorrect or duplicated.  
Staff in Council C say that a lot of repeat contact is caused by 
computer-produced benefit award notices, which the staff 
describe as bewildering, confusing and looking like till 
receipts. Assessors are supposed to telephone customers to 
explain their requirements for information, but some staff are 
timid and prefer to write.  
                                                          
71 “Strength of indication” is shown as varying from none, through weak and medium to strong, depending upon the extent to which (according to the interviewees) the causes of 
PAFID and their consequences are present in the case-study councils. 
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Table 38 (continued)  
 
Strength of indication Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
Inexperienced staff are unable to deal with housing and 
council tax benefits enquiries. If experienced staff are 
not available to take calls, they have to call customers 
back at a mutually convenient opportunity. The double 
handling of these enquiries increases administration 
costs, damages customer relations and reduces resolution 
on first contact. 
Inconsistent standards among officers, and inconsistent 
policies and procedures (or the inconsistent application 
of policies and procedures) result in poor service and 
unnecessary activity, as claimants make repeat contacts 
to establish the correct situation or requirement.   
Back-office staff are duplicating the work undertaken by 
front-office staff (because they think it may be wrong), 
and claimants are being asked for superfluous 
information that generates unnecessary customer 
contacts. 
Customers are inconvenienced by being passed back and 
forth between different departments. Unnecessary 
contact is generated by the need for customers to provide 
the same information to the council more than once. 
Strong Medium Strong In Council A, office procedures are not documented. Staff 
say they are not fully trained and there is a lack of 
consistency and cohesion between front-line and back-office 
staff. Heavy workloads cause some staff to be unhelpful and 
to give insufficient consideration to the consequences of their 
actions.  
In Council B, productivity is being eroded by the loss of 
experienced temporary staff who are being provided with 
valuable skills and then moved on. 
Council C has a central store for office procedures, but 
nobody relies on them because they are not kept up-to-date. 
Front-line staff are not trained to the same standard as 
benefits assessors and do not have the same level of 
understanding. There is a lack of process and monitoring 
around call handling. Inconsistent approaches have emerged. 
For example, different benefits assessors adopt different 
standards for the evidence they require to support claims. 
Consequently, front-line staff cannot give definitive advice to 
claimants. A lot of potentially avoidable contact is caused by 
different officers giving customers different information. 
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Table 38 (continued)  
 
Strength of indication Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
Unnecessary contacts occur when customers enquire 
about the progress of their claims, or fail to provide 
correct and complete information and evidence, which 
subsequently delays (or affects the amount of) their 
benefit entitlements. 
Strong Strong Strong Staff in Council A have to write to claimants several times in 
order to get information, but they consider it inevitable 
because the requirements are complicated. Claimants may 
need to make repeat contacts with the council while they are 
trying to get information from employers and government 
departments. Staff say there are always going to be people 
who do not understand the requirements or the associated 
outcomes because of the complex nature of the benefits 
scheme. 
Council B has an ethnically diverse population and English is 
rarely the customers’ first language. Consequently, claimants 
often do not understand the benefits system in general or the 
benefits-oriented letters that they receive. 
Staff in Council C maintain that the benefits scheme is 
inherently complex and dynamic. Even the staff have 
difficulty keeping up-to-date. Front-line staff are unlikely to 
give correct information about complicated cases involving 
(for example) self-employed claimants. The population is 
multi-cultural so there are a lot of language related problems. 
Many claimants are vulnerable and have problems with 
numeracy and literacy.  
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Table 38 (continued)  
 
Strength of indication Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
Staff feel pressured to do things quickly, which 
generates errors and omissions, resulting in additional 
customer contacts. 
Work not completed during contact with the customer is 
retained for subsequent attention. It then joins an 
accumulation of other outstanding work and may not get 
done immediately. Delays generate additional customer 
contact in the form of progress chasing. If other officers 
become involved, customers may be given inconsistent 
information and advice, and may be asked for different 
information and evidence to support their claims. 
Staff turnover is high and the costs of filling vacancies 
and training replacements are substantial. Service 
standards are sub-optimal because new staff are 
inexperienced. Disaffected staff can be inflexible, 
unhelpful and possibly disruptive. 
Some back-office staff are not at ease when dealing with 
customers and can be unhelpful, causing delays and 
unnecessary contacts. 
Strong Strong Strong Customer service agents in Council A complain about the 
lack of experienced front-line staff. Similarly, some back-
office staff complain about heavy workloads, which cause 
them to respond negatively when front-line staff ask for help, 
and to place excessive reliance on the computer system. 
Back-office staff complain about having to check what front-
line staff have done because it may be incorrect or 
incomplete.  
Staff in Council B express concern about work volumes, and 
highlight a conflict between the need to resolve enquiries at 
the first point of contact and the need to respond to customer 
demand by keeping waiting times to a minimum. Managers 
avoid queues in the front line by encouraging officers to 
complete assessment work when they return to the back 
office, but assessors point out that this ‘batch and queue’ 
approach is contrary to the Lean approach that the council 
piloted some years earlier. 
In Council C, a slow down in recruitment and the closure of a 
satellite office was expected to put additional pressure on 
front-line services that may translate into more avoidable 
contact and less contact resolution. Back-office staff say the 
front-line staff need additional training as assessment officers 
because they do not always give or collect the right 
information. 
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Table 38 (continued)  
 
Strength of indication Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
A ‘them and us’ mentality in different sections of the 
organisation inhibits innovation by impeding the flow of 
information and ideas. 
Actions taken in parts of the organisation cause 
unnecessary and sometimes controversial customer 
contacts to impact upon other parts of the organisation. 
For example, environmental services staff fail to advise 
customer services staff about problems with waste 
collection, and IT services fail to notify users about 
problems with software systems. 
Outdated business processes (such as the deployment of 
customer services staff to create a buffer between 
customers and assessment officers when there are 
serious backlogs of work) create delays, frustrate current 
policies and demotivate staff. They cause customer 
enquiries to be passed around inside the organisation, 
instead of being resolved by assessment officers at the 
first point of contact. 
Strong Strong Strong Staff in Council A say that front and back-office staff are not 
working together, not ‘singing from the same hymn sheet’. 
Front-line staff criticise back-office staff for being too hard-
headed and inflexible, while back-office staff criticise front-
office staff for failing to give or collect the right information. 
External agencies such as the DWP, HMRC, and high street 
banks are not helpful either. 
In Council B, assessment officers complain that the local 
service centres (which deal with face-to-face enquiries) 
appear to work in different ways, and a lot of the information 
given to customers by front-line staff is wrong. A distinction 
is made between “old school assessors”, who won’t adapt to 
new ways of working, and other assessors who are more 
progressive. 
In Council C, front-line staff say that back-office assessors 
should invest more time drafting and editing the letters they 
send to customers. Different assessors have different 
procedures and apply different standards, leaving front-line 
staff unsure how to advise customers. Assessors are supposed 
to have ownership of cases but customer contact is handled 
by a layer of customer services staff, so many enquiries are 
passed back to the assessors, instead of being resolved in the 
front line. 
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Table 38 (continued)  
 
Strength of indication Common failures and their consequences  
identified by interviewees Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Site specific examples of common failures 
Some staff cannot get access to telephones and they 
therefore revert to correspondence, which is an 
expensive and less successful method of communicating 
with customers. If customers cannot contact officers by 
telephone they use more expensive access channels such 
as local service centres. Some customers abandon 
attempts to seek or provide information, which causes 
them hardship due to delay or loss of benefit. Lost calls 
may be detrimental to the council if they relate to benefit 
fraud prevention or detection.   
Weak Strong Medium Council A has sufficient telephone equipment and abandoned 
call rates in the corporate contact centre are satisfactory. 
Incoming and outgoing call volumes are not problematical. 
There are rudimentary ‘tell us once’ facilities, but these entail 
human intervention to distribute core information (such as 
births, deaths and changes of address) to all departments. 
Council B is in transition to a contact centre environment and 
staff complain of difficulty with both outgoing and incoming 
calls. 
Some staff in Council C describe the telephone call centre as 
a buffer between customers and back-office benefits 
assessors, which was created at a time when there were 
substantial backlogs of work and it was considered necessary 
to protect the assessors from interruptions. The backlogs have 
since been cleared, but the associated call-handling 
arrangements persist. Customers can contact the service and 
officers can contact customers, but staff describe a situation 
in which the flow of information is constrained and distorted 
by the system that the service is employing. 
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Lean thinking 
 
A secondary objective of this research is to establish how, and under what better 
conditions, the UK public sector could successfully exploit Lean thinking in order to 
manage potentially avoidable failure induced demand. The theoretical perspectives and 
practical approaches described in Chapter 3 suggested that a case could be made for the 
utility of the Lean thinking approach as an alternative to the current NPM method, but 
that there was insufficient evidence to support any firm conclusions. The empirical 
research described in Chapter 5 sought to reduce that deficiency. 
 
In Council A, management and staff describe improvement initiatives in ways that 
reveal an implicit rather than explicit appreciation of Lean thinking. For example, the 
pre-assessment of benefit claims is intended to ensure that they are clean prior to 
handling by expert benefits assessors. The staff are mostly unaware that they are 
employing Lean techniques such as removing waste, improving flow, managing 
constraints and avoiding unnecessary motions. Assessing new claims by taking 
information from claim forms as soon as they are received, instead of waiting until they 
are distributed via the electronic document management system, is calculated to speed 
up payment. However, the staff are unacquainted with the associated Lean techniques 
that include simplicity, thinking small and not over-processing. Introducing laminated 
desk aids is consistent with Lean approaches such as visual management, simplicity, 
thinking small, and clean and tidy.  
 
Since the case-study was conducted, Council A has taken tentative steps toward the 
adoption of Lean approaches. For example, service heads across the organisation have 
been introduced to Lean thinking via workshop events, and the housing and council tax 
benefits service is conducting a feasibility study to assess the costs and benefits of a 
full-scale Lean Improvement Exercise. With regard to the conditions under which Lean 
thinking can be successfully exploited, the expectations of Council A’s employees are 
revealed to be relatively modest: they want transparency, communication, involvement 
and recognition. 
 
Council B briefly adopted and promoted among its staff a version of systems thinking 
built upon the Lean principles described in Chapter 3, such as moving experts into the 
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front line and getting things right first time. For example, back-office benefits assessors 
have been placed on a rota that requires them to spend time dealing with customers 
face-to-face and on the telephone. Some of the staff were aware that these initiatives 
were consistent with Lean principles, which the organisation called ‘managing the 
process end-to-end’ and ‘putting the best resources where they will be the most 
effective’. The organisation’s failure to sustain the initiative led to some scepticism 
about this and other improvement projects. 
 
The research revealed that Council C has no formal policy on Lean thinking, but 
employs Lean-oriented approaches to performance improvement in its housing and 
council tax benefits service. For example, assessment officers are encouraged to contact 
customers by telephone instead of sending letters and notices. Back-office experts (so-
called seniors) are being deployed in the public service area and efforts are being made 
to combine tablet computers with electronic forms in ways that might help to reduce 
PAFID by enabling information to be captured in claimants’ own homes, if 
technological problems can be overcome. The housing and council tax benefits staff in 
Council C have many interesting points to make about the environment in which they 
think that change initiatives like Lean thinking can be successfully utilised.  
 
In contrast to the situation in Council B, the staff in Council C highlight many positive 
characteristics of their organisation and the people working in it. They maintain that the 
service has a very solid workforce that is adaptable, keen, friendly, receptive, 
supportive, passionate and even brilliant. This is partly attributable to the qualities of the 
management team, which they describe as flexible, trusting, approachable, positive and 
“willing to listen”. The staff identify improvements that they believe would enhance the 
environment, which include more pay, fairer performance measures, added consultation, 
better communication, greater transparency and increased involvement. 
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Customer journey mapping 
 
The methodology that was employed to conduct customer journey mapping exercises in 
each of the case-study councils is described in Chapter 4. A total of 44 housing and 
council tax benefits claims were selected, each one having the longest end-to-end 
journey time in its category among the claims completed by the case-study councils in 
the preceding six months. Claim histories were compiled by examining all available 
records. End-to-end roadmaps or ‘customer journeys’ were then developed to describe 
the customers’ experiences and to identify causes of PAFID impacting upon the 
assessment of these real-life benefits claims. Questions about perceived failures were 
then formulated and presented to service managers in writing, in order to confirm the 
details of the individual journeys, and to secure explanations for the observations.  
 
A comparative analysis is presented in Table 39 below. It reveals that, in all three case-
study councils, the most common problems identified during the customer journey 
mapping exercises were internal failures such as delays assessing claims, delays 
requesting information, and delays issuing award letters. An additional factor leading to 
PAFID emerged from the comparative analysis, namely claims not refused by staff at 
the earliest possible opportunity. In housing and council tax benefits services generally, 
managers tend to favour the truncation of outstanding claims because this optimises 
organisational performance in terms of government targets – it reduces average claim 
turn-around times.  
 
However, the evidence from the case-studies suggests that assessment officers have 
different priorities, and will sometimes give precedence to customers’ interests by 
keeping incomplete claims open for longer than necessary. This evidence did not 
emerge during any other phase of the investigation, and confirms the value of adopting 
a variety of research tools and techniques, in this instance by supplementing 
observations and interviews with customer journey mapping.  
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Table 39: Comparative analysis of failures leading to PAFID 
 
Number of occurrences 
Causes of PAFID identified during 
customer journey mapping Council 
A 
Council 
B 
Council 
C 
Total 
Delays assessing claims attributed to back-
logs of work 
6 6 8 20 
Claims not refused at the earliest opportunity 
(when customers failed to provide necessary 
details) because customer service was given a 
higher priority than government targets 
4 5 4 13 
Delays requesting information - 6 5 11 
Claims not refused at the earliest opportunity 
(when customers failed to provide necessary 
details) because of statutory restrictions 
2 5 2 9 
Delays attributed to errors committed by the 
benefits service 
3 - 3 6 
Excessive reminders and requests for 
information 
- 2 2 4 
Delays despatching award notification letters - - 3 3 
Delays requesting or conducting home visits - 1 1 2 
Delays attributed to outstanding referrals to 
the Rent Officer Service that were not 
progress-chased due to a reduced focus on 
monitoring activities 
1 - 1 2 
Delays attributed to the Local Pension Service 
visiting officer 
1 - 1 2 
Technical problems with ICT - 1 - 1 
Delays reminding claimants about outstanding 
information 
- 1 - 1 
Delays  creating council tax accounts - - 1 1 
Delays suspending claims - - 1 1 
Delays receiving documents from outstations - - 1 1 
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Chapter summary 
 
The theoretical insights and practical approaches described in Chapters 2 and 3 
generated a number of possible explanations and questions about the management of 
PAFID and the potential of Lean thinking as an alternative to the NPM method for the 
transformation of public services and change management. They also highlighted the 
need for empirical understanding of current problems, and the utility of Lean 
approaches. The case-studies described in Chapter 5 were intended to provide that 
understanding. 
 
The case-studies yield dependable data and reveal that PAFID is more prevalent and 
complex than failure demand or avoidable contact as previously envisaged. To reiterate, 
nearly half of all the customer enquiries handled by the services under investigation 
were attributed to previous failures, implying that nearly half of this activity (and 
approximately half of the associated cost) is potentially avoidable. Contact resolution 
rates were low. The data suggests some correlation between resolution rates and PAFID, 
but more work is needed to establish direct correlation. The ten most frequent causes of 
PAFID afflicting the case-study councils’ benefits services are identified, and ways in 
which they might prevent PAFID are compared and contrasted. This analysis reveals a 
high degree of convergence and begins to suggest generalisability from the findings. 
 
The semi-structured interviews generated numerous examples of Lean thinking in 
practice, and descriptions of the environment in which the transition to (and exploitation 
of) innovations like Lean thinking is most likely to succeed. Some of the staff in 
Council B were well placed to discuss these ideas, as the organisation had undertaken a 
short systems-oriented improvement exercise a couple of years earlier. 
 
Chapter 7 aims to inter-relate the primary and secondary research described in this 
thesis in order to summarise the argument regarding PAFID. It also begins to identify 
the contribution that this work makes to our knowledge base on public service delivery 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, I conducted a comparative analysis of the findings from three substantive 
case-studies to illuminate the PAFID problem and reveal the factors that might 
determine the extent to which generalisability might be inferred from the conclusions. 
In this chapter, I will broaden and deepen the analysis of the findings from the 
application of the research method by re-examining some of the theoretical concepts 
that underpin the research, and by considering the extent to which the investigation has 
answered the Research Questions. To reiterate, those questions were: 
 
Q1. What is potentially avoidable failure induced demand, and why does it occur in 
UK public service delivery? 
 
Q2. What does an examination of the failure mode tell us about improving the 
exchange process, diagnosing avoidable failure and resolving it ‘ex ante’? 
 
Q3.     How and under what better conditions could the UK public sector successfully 
exploit Lean thinking in order to manage potentially avoidable failure induced 
demand? 
 
This chapter answers these questions by examining PAFID through various filters: 
NPM and e-Government; modernism and hyper-modernism; the principal-agent 
problem; Lean thinking; knowledge management; and organisational learning. By 
drawing on the theoretical literature, this chapter attempts to show the contribution of 
the findings to a better understanding of the problems underlying public service 
delivery. The chapter also discusses policy options for eradicating or reducing the 
PAFID problem, which are then summarised in Chapter 8. 
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Discussion 
 
Encapsulating ‘potentially avoidable failure induced demand’ (PAFID) 
 
PAFID is defined here as “customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by earlier 
failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and 
potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services”. The case-study 
research revealed that inter-related concepts such as contact cause, failure, value and 
avoidability that are bound up in the notion of PAFID are individually and collectively 
complex and subjective. The question thus arose, in whose estimation are these 
characteristics to be assessed? Leading commentators such as Seddon and Varney seem 
content with an evaluation based upon the customers’ perspective. Thus avoidable 
contact becomes contact that is of low value or no value to the customers. Conversely, 
in this scenario, contact is necessary if customers consider it to be so. Failure, error and 
waste are characterised in terms of the systems operated by service providers. In these 
circumstances, the customer is always right. This thesis argues for a different approach. 
 
The difficulty with the wholly customer-oriented perspective on success and failure is 
that it can be hard to identify the customers of public service providers. Furthermore, 
customers’ expectations of public services can be difficult to assess, unreasonable, and 
possibly unaffordable. The research thus suggests that a wholly customer-centric 
approach to the management of PAFID is unsatisfactory because it makes no allowance 
for the needs of other stakeholders, such as the service providers. For example, Council 
C was in the process of closing a satellite office because resources were no longer 
available to keep it open, but the staff described the initiative as “appalling for the 
customers”.  
 
The wholly customer-centric approach also overlooks the possibility that some of the 
people involved in the process will behave in ways that confound efforts to avoid 
unnecessary contact. For example, all three case-study councils said that customers fail 
to report changes of circumstances that may result in overpayments and prosecutions, in 
spite of constant reminders about these requirements. Staff ignore instructions to contact 
customers by telephone or face-to-face. They fail to edit computer-produced letters that 
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are known to be unintelligible without adaptation, and they keep incomplete benefits 
claims open for longer than is necessary. 
 
There is also a moral hazard risk of customers expressing dissatisfaction when, in the 
view of service providers, their requests are ill-specified or incomplete. In this situation, 
there is a case for arguing mutual liability. This is analogous to the argument in law 
regarding liability, where the contribution of the complainant (or plaintiff) to the harm is 
an offset to damage, even if the defendant in a tort is held responsible for the harm. For 
instance, I may trip and fall on a pavement, but the fact that I was drunk at the time may 
limit the extent of damages to which I am entitled as a result. Chapter 2 of this thesis 
explains that different people in different places have different perceptions and 
expectations of public services, implying that improved performance measured in terms 
of cost, better contact resolution and shorter turn-around times might not translate into 
increased customer satisfaction. 
 
The case-studies generated references to the complexity of the PAFID problem, and this 
insight provides a useful lens through which the results can be further interrogated. For 
example, the evidence reveals a tension between a specification of process that (in 
theory) handles all eventualities, assuming non-failure in its execution, and the real-
world ‘information overload’ problem of dealing with all possible contingencies, even 
those that apply only to particular individuals. In Councils A and C, benefit claims from 
self-employed customers and people from abroad were said to be so complicated that no 
two assessors were likely to come to the same conclusions, and the chances of front-line 
staff giving the correct advice or collecting the right information were small. In Council 
B, the retrospective recalculations of some benefit assessments were said to be so 
complicated that nobody could explain the ensuing award letters to customers.  
 
The research suggests that a completely defined process might be too unwieldy to 
implement, and that the observed PAFID was partly a measure of the complexity and 
interconnectedness of the process. Similarly, PAFID may be an inevitable outcome if 
individual customers’ needs are at variance with standard methods of assessing benefits 
claims, and catering to small classes of people would raise burdens on many others. 
Likewise, there will be limits to the improvements that can be made where standards are 
dictated by parties outside the immediate system. Even with employee empowerment 
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and knowledge management methods, the flaws and unnecessary complications 
imposed by others may eventually reach an irreducible minimum. In other words, while 
councils may (in theory) strive for perfection, some undesirable customer contact may 
be unavoidable. Even that which is theoretically avoidable may be difficult to identify 
and categorise, as the research shows that subjective judgement is involved in deciding 
what constitutes failure in any particular set of circumstances. The words ‘potentially 
avoidable’ preface the phrase ‘failure induced demand’ in the term that I have adopted 
to describe the phenomenon (i.e. PAFID) to signify that some types of failure may be so 
infrequent, unimportant or intransigent that the opportunity costs of eliminating the 
associated customer contact may be unacceptable.  
 
In spite of the detailed regulatory requirements governing the UK’s housing and council 
tax benefits scheme, local councils retain some discretion about the ways in which they 
administer the services. Local councils have different problems, priorities and resources. 
In the case-study councils, political imperatives were generally implicit rather than 
explicit, but the differing perspectives of the staff were more transparently attributable 
to complex mixtures of professional, personal and altruistic motivations, the detailed 
analysis of which was outside the scope of this research. However, these tensions most 
conspicuously manifested themselves during the observation phases of the case-study 
research, when there was some polarisation of views between management and front-
line staff about the meanings of terms such as failure, value and avoidability. Managers 
were inclined to characterise most customer contacts as potentially avoidable, but staff 
attributed value to anything that they perceived to be useful to their customers. This 
suggests that, in spite of their generally positive attitude to change, staff in the case-
study councils might resist developments that management consider necessary to reduce 
the incidence of PAFID.  
 
The case-studies suggest that a wholly quantitative approach to identifying the PAFID 
problem might not be efficacious because it could result in disagreement about the 
findings, making it difficult to bring about desired improvements. If councils accepted 
Hoos’ (1969) rejection of the quantitative approach, and attributed PAFID to ‘soft 
failures’, then Ackoff’s (1974) interactivist approach to problem resolution (i.e. creating 
improvements in complex real-life situations by sharing perceptions and seeking 
consensus) might be effective. 
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Policy options 
 
A general policy option to deal with the PAFID problem might be for service providers 
to accept that customer contacts that are not strictly necessary or valuable are only 
possibly, and not definitely, avoidable. Resources could then be focused on the 
incremental reduction of those contacts that are perceived to be both significant and 
potentially avoidable (i.e. caused by failures that might have been prevented). The 
eradication of PAFID could be retained as a target, something to be worked toward, 
even if it is acknowledged that there will be difficulties.  
 
This research also suggests that it is necessary to accept and work with the subjective 
nature of concepts such as value, failure and avoidability. A range of key stakeholders 
are involved in the transactions that give rise to the customer contacts affecting services 
such as housing and council tax benefits. The public sector could attempt to 
accommodate these other perspectives and bring some equilibrium to the analysis by 
expanding the concept of the ‘voice of the customer’ to include (in the case of housing 
and council tax benefits) managers, benefits assessors, customer services advisors, 
councillors, voluntary agencies and the DWP.72  
 
In the scenario described above, customer contacts become valuable to varying degrees, 
depending upon the extent to which they are appreciated by the various participants. For 
example, the providers of public services might define value in terms of alignment with 
policy objectives, while customers and other stakeholders might remain concerned only 
with what matters to them. Failure might consist of non-compliance with a service 
specification that seeks to accommodate business imperatives and other stakeholders’ 
expectations. As already discussed, even those contacts that seem unnecessary and 
avoidable in some respects could be recognised as possibly and not definitely avoidable. 
The research suggests that a consensual approach to the investigation of PAFID would 
be particularly efficacious where the intention was to employ the data in a business 
improvement programme, the success of which might depend upon the willing 
participation of a wide range of stakeholders. The ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems approaches 
                                                          
72 The Department for Work and Pensions reimburses councils for the full costs of the housing and 
council tax benefits scheme. 
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to problem resolution described in Chapter 3 on pages 64-65 could be combined in a 
method that I call the “smart systems approach”.73 
 
Managing PAFID: NPM, e-Government and hyper-modernism 
 
In spite of the positive claims for the applicability of NPM and e-Government, the 
research shows that they are widely perceived to be ineffective and incapable of 
fulfilling the expectation that they will bring about improvements and savings on the 
scale (or in the timescales) currently mandated by UK central government. Indeed, 
Margetts (2005, 81) maintains that “… technology has injected uncertainty into the 
heart of government”. Dunleavy et al. conclude that the UK is a world leader in 
ineffective IT schemes for government (Dunleavy et al., 2006, 70) because the country 
appears in the bottom position in an evaluation of effective government IT performers 
that also includes the Netherlands, Canada, USA, New Zealand, Japan and Australia. 
Government stands accused of failing to learn lessons from past IT-led modernisation 
projects (Mills, 2006), and trying to improve outdated means of production. Heeks 
(2001, 163) asserts that “huge sums of money are being invested [in e-Government] but 
a large proportion of this is going to waste”. All of this is a manifestation of the 
argument that throwing technology at situations will not resolve the underlying 
problems. 
 
The concepts of modernism and hyper-modernism were explored in Chapter 2, on pages 
22 and 23, where it was established that the literature portrayed the UK government’s 
reliance and expenditure on IT modernisation as hyper-modernistic in character. 
Subsequently, data from all three case-studies described in Chapter 5 yielded evidence 
of PAFID caused or exacerbated by hyper-modernistic tendencies. The most common 
occurrence was an over-reliance on computer-produced letters that councils despatched 
to elicit information from benefit claimants. They also issued notices informing 
claimants about awards and overpayments. The research uncovered a realisation among 
staff (especially those working in the front line dealing with customers’ enquiries) that 
these documents were deficient and caused more problems than they solved because the 
                                                          
73 This expression is derived from the term “smart power”, which is used to describe foreign policy that 
combines hard characteristics such as economic and military might, with softer (diplomatic) 
characteristics such as legitimacy, co-operation and tolerance (Armitage and Nye, 1996). 
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content was often inappropriate and unintelligible. Consequently, the letters and notices 
generated much unnecessary contact in the form of claimants seeking clarification and 
reassurance. Technological solutions had been unsuccessful, and work-arounds (such as 
editing the documents manually and telephoning customers to explain them) were being 
promoted with the knowledge of management. These behaviours constitute empirical 
evidence supporting existing theory about ‘core capabilities’ and their tendency to 
become ‘core rigidities’ when routines become inappropriate but the organisation is too 
committed to the old ways of working to change (Tidd et al., 2005, 84).  
 
Much has been said about the potential of mobile technologies such as personal digital 
assistants to help councils meet efficiency targets (Jellinek, 2007), but the design-reality 
gap is large (Heeks, 2001). For example, damaging breaches of the UK’s data protection 
requirements and examples of ICT project failures were cited in Chapter 2. Constraints 
imposed by the need to satisfy central government’s code of connection to its secure 
network are described in Chapter 8 on page 242. I have observed, during many years 
service in the public sector, that managers are particularly adept at resisting change if it 
threatens to reduce the services or resources under their control. Administrative staff are 
equally adroit at defying transformations that do not correspond with their perceptions 
of ‘the way things are done around here’. Translating efficiency improvements into 
cashable savings can be difficult and time-consuming. A programme of business 
process reengineering is often required to transform efficiency gains into savings but 
public sector personnel rarely have these skills and councils can be reluctant or slow to 
purchase consultancy support. 
 
The empirical research reported in this thesis revealed that Councils A and C had both 
spent time and money developing software for use on hand-held computers that were 
intended to facilitate the calculation of housing and council tax benefits by officers 
visiting claimants in their homes. Expected efficiencies, such as improved claim turn-
around times and reduced avoidable contact, had not emerged because electronic claim 
forms were longer and more difficult to use than paper forms. The interfaces between 
the various software applications involved were unreliable or incomplete and data had 
to be re-keyed. Staff said that the hardware was too heavy, and the technology was more 
trouble than it was worth. Nevertheless, management remained supportive of the 
innovation and planned further development.  
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In spite of the problems with some e-processes described above, it is worth noting that 
there are examples of successful implementation of some forms of e-Government. For 
instance, E-Health Insider (2010) describes a successful electronic service in the shape 
of the NHS network N3, which links all NHS sites in England and was recently 
extended to include Scotland. N3 is described as one of Europe’s largest broadband 
virtual private networks, enabling the NHS to transform service delivery and standards 
of care, and benefiting patients throughout England and Scotland. The NHS has also 
deployed wireless tablet PCs that enable medical staff to access patient records on the 
ward without referring to paper notes (Computing chaos, File on 4, BBC Radio 4, 2nd 
March 2010). The hand-held computers read barcodes on drugs, which helps to ensure 
that the right drugs are administered at the right time, and they can be sterilized to 
reduce the spread of infections like MRSA and Clostridium difficile (Nursing Times, 
2009). Aichholzer and Tang (2004) also reported an increasing electronic accessibility 
for UK (and Austrian) citizens to public sector information (such as consultation 
documents and back-ground information in decision-making processes) that was 
formerly often shrouded in secrecy and unavailable to the public.  
 
A distinction therefore needs to be made between the bad implementation of e-
Government services, several examples of which are identified in Chapter 2 (pages 26 
and 27), and the positive potential of ICT to support the management of PAFID. For 
example, an increasing contribution to defect prevention is being provided by so-called 
‘intelligent forms’, which can be completed online, submitted electronically and then 
integrated directly into document workflows and processing systems. These electronic 
forms respond to users’ answers, alert users to incorrect or incomplete input, require the 
completion of mandatory fields, provide assistance through help messages, and allow 
the retention of partially completed forms for recovery and completion at later dates. 
Internal applications include purchase orders, expenses claim forms, and personal 
development reviews. Local councils are deploying intelligent forms on their websites 
to handle a wide range of external enquiries and requests including: comments, 
compliments and complaints; abandoned vehicle reports; missed bins; planning 
applications; and requests for food safety inspections.74 Inevitably, some of these 
                                                          
74 For example, see ‘Do It Online’ at Winchester City Council, available online at 
http://forms.winchester.gov.uk accessed 03/05/10, and ‘A to Z of Forms’ at Camden Council, available 
online at http://www.camden.gov.uk accessed 03/05/10. ‘Online Forms’ at Flintshire County Council are 
available online at http://www.flintshire.gov.uk/wps/portal/english/forms accessed 03/05/10.  
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developments are more successful than others, and the case studies revealed that e-
forms are unsuitable for some transactions (such as applications for means-tested 
welfare benefits) due to the complexity of the issues, the amount of information that 
needs to be imparted to customers, and the large number of questions that need to be 
asked. 
 
The literature also provides positive illustrations of ICT support for performance 
improvement in public services. For example, a municipal system called CitiStat, 
originally introduced into Baltimore (Perri 6, 2004, 87-92) and then extended into other 
major American cities and the Vancouver Police Department, has recently been piloted 
in the Scottish public sector (Scottish Executive, 2006). CitiStat is not a software system 
in itself but more a performance management system that relies upon some relatively 
straightforward and commercially available hardware and software technologies like 
Graphical Information Systems (GIS), spreadsheets and databases. An independent 
assessment found that the programme helped to enhance customer relations, increase 
accountability for resources, share performance information and policy data, and 
improve the delivery of goods and services (Henderson, 2003).  
 
It is likely that IT supported decision making of the kind provided by the CitiStat 
process can contribute to the eradication or reduction of PAFID. For example, 
Henderson (2003) describes the continuous collection and analysis of performance 
related data via computerized information networks. Typically, the data and analyses 
are examined during regular meetings in special facilities equipped with advanced 
audio-visual technology, where participants (usually service providers answering to 
senior managers and politicians) can view GIS-generated maps, budgets and other data 
projected onto large screens. The process enables regular policy and administrative 
adjustments such as close control of unscheduled staff absences, which in turn enhances 
the capacity of agencies to identify and resolve, or anticipate and prevent, service 
delivery problems such as PAFID. 
 
Policy options 
 
Technologies such as hand-held computers and e-forms are deployed by councils to 
help with the task of capturing correct and complete information at the first point of 
 
219 
contact. However, the research shows that technology can sometimes interrupt the work, 
create barriers where none previously existed, and introduce unnecessary motions, all of 
which correspond with the ‘service wastes’ that Lean thinking seeks to eliminate. 
Consequently, councils might adopt alternative approaches based upon simplicity and 
not over-processing. For example, while some enquiries and requests can be captured 
electronically, other e-forms may be so long-winded that neither customers nor staff 
will use them, or their contents may have to be re-keyed in back offices because there 
are no automatic interfaces with other business systems. Councils could withdraw 
dysfunctional e-forms of the type described above until they are ‘fit for purpose’ and, in 
the meantime, revert to paper-based forms. Similarly, if it is not currently possible to 
develop at reasonable cost software that will enable the automatic production of letters 
and notices that meet customers’ needs, councils could revert to templates that assessors 
can adapt on a case-by-case basis. The additional burden placed on benefits assessors in 
back offices might be outweighed by the added-value for customers and the improved 
efficiency of services when viewed from a holistic or ‘whole system’ perspective.  
 
Managing PAFID: principal-agent problems 
 
The literature explains the complications that can be generated by the separation of 
ownership by principals from execution by agents. To reiterate, agency theory argues 
that the desires and goals of principals and agents conflict, and that it is difficult or 
expensive for principals to verify what agents are doing. Agents may attempt to exploit 
the rules or behave inappropriately from the principals’ perspective. If agents are 
insulated from risk, they may not be as diligent as they might otherwise be. All this 
creates moral hazard risk. 
 
Policies can be designed to induce agents to behave as principals require, but these can 
create perverse incentives and generate unintended consequences. For example, the 
local authorities that administer housing and council tax benefits services act as agents 
for central government, representatives of their citizens, and principals in relation to the 
staff that they employ. The elected members of those same councils regularly find 
themselves involved in negotiations between officers and claimants to maximise the 
housing and council tax benefits entitlements of vulnerable families in their 
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constituencies. These cases often involve communication with members of parliament, 
representatives of central government and local advice agencies.  
 
Within the case-study councils, managers acting as principals were mainly focused on 
business objectives such as improving performance and reducing costs. Staff acting as 
agents were mostly customer-centric in their approaches. Team leaders (i.e. supervisors) 
occupied difficult territory between the two extremes, sometimes acting as principals 
and sometimes as agents. The case-studies yielded evidence of principal-agent problems 
affecting housing benefits services, and these are summarised in Table 40 below. 
 
Table 40: Principal-agent problems affecting housing benefits services 
 
Symptoms Consequences 
Front-line staff (agents) fail to 
record customer contact details on 
the customer tracking system 
Frustrates management’s (principals’) attempts to 
monitor work and make staff (agents) accountable 
Front-line and back-office staff 
(agents) fail to acknowledge 
problems caused by internal 
process delays 
Deprives management (principals) of information 
about the true customer experience and frustrates 
attempts to improve the situation or make staff 
(agents) accountable for their performance 
Managers (principals) and staff 
(agents) have different 
perceptions of contact value and 
avoidability 
Frustrates management’s (principals’) attempts to 
monitor and improve the situation 
Sections (principals and agents) 
within the same department fail to 
co-operate with each other 
Inhibits improvement by impeding the flow of 
information. Managers (principals) want teams 
(agents) to co-operate, but the organisational 
arrangements that managers have put in place to 
protect back-office specialists (agents) from 
interruptions create barriers and increase hand-
overs and movement between process stages 
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Table 40 (continued) 
 
Symptoms Consequences 
Back-office staff (agents) are 
reluctant to deal directly with 
customers 
Managers (principals) want staff (agents) to contact 
customers by telephone or face-to-face, but staff 
(agents) prefer to write letters, even if this prolongs 
the claims process and generates PAFID. Benefits 
assessors (agents) are not confident about speaking 
to customers; they want to preserve their 
anonymity and do not want to get drawn into 
potentially complicated enquiries. It is easier to 
send letters and put claims back into the system for 
a few more weeks. Front-line staff (agents) 
maintain that these letters are often unnecessary, 
unclear, inconsistent and long-winded. Assessors 
(agents) are insulated from the risk that customers 
may be aggrieved by their actions because of the 
barrier provided by front-line staff 
 Back-office specialists (agents) 
check the work of front-line 
officers and ask customers for 
superfluous information 
Benefits assessors (agents) impose strict evidential 
requirements not mandated by managers 
(principals), and disregard opportunities to be 
flexible and speed-up claim turn-around times 
Benefits assessors (agents) in 
different parts of the organisation 
apply different standards, leaving 
front-line staff (agents) unsure 
how to advise customers 
Managers (principals) want consistently good 
standards of service, but benefits assessors (agents) 
apply their own values and complain about 
inadequate staffing resources, training and 
equipment 
Front-line staff (agents) are not 
inclined to view contact 
resolution in the context of the 
end-to-end customer journey 
Managers (principals) want to evaluate contact in 
terms of the overall customer experience, but this is 
objectionable to the customer services staff 
(agents) because few of the enquiries they handle 
result in one-stop resolution and they fear this may 
be perceived as poor performance 
Benefits assessors (agents) keep 
incomplete claims (where 
supporting evidence is 
outstanding) open for longer than 
strictly necessary, even though 
this increases average claim turn-
around times and is detrimental to 
organisational performance 
measured in terms of targets 
prescribed by central government 
departments (principals) 
Managers (principals) want benefits claims that 
have not been properly completed to be closed 
down as soon as possible because this reduces 
average claim turn-around times and improves 
organisational performance measured in terms of 
central government targets. 
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A different perspective on the principal-agent problems afflicting housing and council 
tax benefits services is provided by the analysis set out in Table 37 on page 197, which 
identifies the ten most frequent causes of PAFID observed during the case-study 
research. These causes (i.e. failures that might have been prevented) are reproduced 
below and then further examined through the lens of agency theory to assist with the 
identification of policy options: 
1. Benefits claimants progress chasing outstanding applications 
2. Claimants providing documents that should have accompanied original claim forms 
3. Claimants seeking clarification about information and evidence needed by councils 
to complete the assessment of outstanding claims 
4. Claimants seeking clarification about benefits that have been awarded 
5. Claimants querying letters and notices that have been sent to them by councils 
6. Claimants seeking clarification about overpayments they have been asked to repay 
7. Third parties seeking clarification about benefits that have been awarded to others 
8. Claimants seeking help to complete claim forms 
9. Claimants asking about payments they should have received but have not 
10. Landlords progress chasing outstanding claims 
 
Arguably, the evidence suggests that customers and landlords are asking council staff 
for information (such as indications of what constitutes adequate criteria for 
qualification) that would tilt outcomes in their favour. The process model (the procedure 
for claiming, assessing, and paying housing and council tax benefits) assumes fixed 
inputs and determinate outputs.  If, alternatively, the process operates as a negotiation, 
the repeated contacts can then be interpreted as an ‘information extraction’ strategy on 
the part of the claimants, aimed at improving the chances of securing the outcomes they 
desire. Hastening resolution pushes the negotiation process on to the next stage, while 
the information channel informing customers and landlords of progress may contribute 
to their strategy of trying to tilt the process in their favour. 
 
Benefits claimants may believe (based on a subjective rather than an objective 
assessment of the situation) that the initial application requirements are onerous. Thus 
they make initial attempts to pass through the process by providing incomplete 
information and documentation. Applicants are thus encouraged if, in practice, some 
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incomplete applications are successful. Some hapless claimants are questioned about 
their submissions and that leads to the production of further information. This suggests 
that a critical feature of the system may be customer information exchange about what 
‘passes’ (i.e. what is acceptable), and information from council personnel contributing 
to the impression that some flexibility exists in the evidence and information required. 
Customers may believe that confusion in the application serves their interests. Not 
knowing what the ‘right answer’ is, the respondents provide in the combination of initial 
and subsequent submissions a variety of information, assuming that council personnel 
will sort it out in their interest. The implication is that being helpful to customers 
encourages this behaviour. 
 
At this stage, customers may be aware of the possibility that better outcomes could 
happen and it is in their interests to query the system with the aim of improving the 
outcomes. Explaining awards and reassessments provides an ‘information disclosure’ 
element that allows the customers to query the process and to attempt to re-start it if the 
desired results are not achieved. Fraudsters may test the system for weaknesses that can 
be exploited, such as uncertainty on the part of council staff about what benefits have 
been paid or who has received them. Incomprehensibility is, again, in the ‘eye of the 
beholder’: if the outcomes are not in the customers’ interests, they will more likely be 
seen as incomprehensible. More prompt notification of outcomes will not influence the 
underlying incentives. 
 
At the heart of these conundrums is the view that councils and their personnel have 
divided interests. On the one hand, as principals, they are meant to serve taxpayer 
interests by denying claims that are not justified (either fundamentally or in the level of 
benefits to be granted).  On the other hand, they are taken to represent customer 
interests, i.e. to be agents of the customers in achieving the customers’ requests. 
Conflict between these two roles causes customers to view councils and their personnel 
as adversaries in a game involving negotiation and selective disclosure of information.  
 
There are thus disjunctions between the expectations of customers and council workers, 
the perspectives of workers at different levels within the organisational hierarchies, and 
between councils’ and customers’ interests. The perceived ineffectiveness of the 
 
224 
administrative arrangements may be a consequence of these complexities: the 
permutational variety of failures outruns the ability of the councils to map or reliably 
reproduce decisions and explanations, so that customers may experience inconsistent 
information, advice and outcomes. 
 
Policy options 
 
To reduce the ‘transactions demand’, councils might make the process of claiming 
benefits more deterministic and rigid – one does not negotiate with the seller of lottery 
tickets. This, however, conflicts with customer service obligations. An alternative might 
be to become more customer-centric by enabling benefits assessment officers to 
negotiate on behalf of claimants with other council staff who act as internal standards 
keepers. If the assignment of customer agents by councils is arbitrary, and the 
negotiation between the agents and the assessors is more efficient than the negotiation 
between the assessors and the customers, this is efficiency improving. If customer 
agents differ in competence when negotiating customers’ interests, the assignment of 
agents to customers may become the crux of the problem and the basis of complaints 
and appeals. 
 
More generally, the empirical research highlights the conflict between a deterministic 
process perspective, in which all parties have a common interest (and incentive) to ‘get 
it right first time’, and the view that confusion and obfuscation may be inherent in the 
nature of the problem being solved, or that serving one or another of the parties’ 
interests is unavoidable. This, in turn, suggests a variety of radical approaches that 
might be undertaken to resolve the principal-agent issues identified above.  
 
In the case-study councils, there were varying degrees of realisation that the existing 
arrangements for distinguishing between front-line and back-office roles were 
problematical and exacerbating PAFID by fragmenting the processing of the work. The 
councils could, therefore, abandon the prevailing trend toward specialisation, forego 
anticipated economies of scale, reintegrate staff roles, and redesign business processes 
to re-establish contact between customers and the officers who assess their benefits 
claims. Alternatively, as explained above, councils might prefer to make a clearer 
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assignment of the customer service function to one group of staff and the standards 
maintenance function to another group of staff within their organisations. A fixed 
assignment of case officers might then make it possible to monitor individual 
performances, while a clearer demarcation of stages in the decision-making process 
might prevent renegotiation strategies if assessments seem to be heading toward (or 
reaching) unfavourable outcomes for individual applicants. 
 
Managing PAFID: innovation, change, knowledge and learning 
 
The literature that addresses innovation, change management, knowledge management 
and organisational learning is extensive, but does not directly explain how UK public 
services might exploit these concepts to reduce PAFID. A careful examination of the 
empirical evidence from this research provides some illumination regarding the 
strengths and weaknesses observable in the arrangements operated by three case-study 
councils. The public sector can also draw upon the early experiences of Lean thinking in 
central government departments, as the approach is being deployed in sections of 
Jobcentre Plus and HMRC. 
 
The research reveals that, in some respects, the case-study councils have sophisticated 
arrangements for capturing, sharing, retaining and securing information. For example, 
each council has extensive and modern ICT infrastructures, supported by teams of 
skilled operators, analysts, developers and technicians. Policies and procedures seek to 
ensure compliance with regulatory requirements (such as the Data Protection Act and 
the Freedom of Information Act), while business continuity plans provide resilience and 
facilitate disaster recovery. Authorised personnel have well-equipped workstations, 
Internet and Intranet facilities, and modern software applications (currently Microsoft 
Office Professional).  
 
In other respects the case-study councils share deficiencies in knowledge management 
that impact upon their abilities to innovate and learn. For example, each of the housing 
and council tax benefits services under investigation operates complex Electronic 
Document Records Management Systems and Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM) systems containing millions of documents and records about customer contacts. 
However, in each case, access is restricted to users in benefits services. The applications 
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are not available for use throughout the councils and opportunities for sharing data and 
systems are lost. The requirement is that front-line staff should create records on the 
CRM systems for all customer contacts, but in practice these files are neither 
comprehensive nor complete. Indeed, it is common to find less than 50% compliance 
with the requirement to record contacts. Many of the entries that have been made are 
incomprehensible. Efforts to extract and analyse customer insight data for the purpose 
of investigating PAFID were unsuccessful due to the manner in which they are 
structured. Crucially, the systems are not integrated with other applications such as 
telephony, geographical information systems and Local Land and Property Gazetteers, 
so that opportunities to generate new knowledge by amalgamating existing information 
about customers are not exploited. 
 
In each of the case-study councils, staff complained about inadequate arrangements for 
documenting and sharing information and procedures. The consequences of these 
failures contribute toward low levels of resolution on first contact and high levels of 
PAFID, as customers seek to reconcile inconsistent information and advice dispensed 
by officers. Council A has compiled a procedure book and developed desk aids, but 
these initiatives are confined to one specialist service area. Council B is contemplating 
the introduction of standard procedures that would be designed to compel officers to 
handle customer contacts in specified ways. Council C has created a training team to 
provide standardised training for new entrants, but officers still complain that many 
procedures evolve in the workplace and differ from team to team. The staff in all three 
sites were explicit about the need for systems that encourage co-operation, learning and 
knowledge sharing. 
 
The research revealed that much of the knowledge required by personnel in public 
services like housing and council tax benefits is not easily codified because of its 
complexity and volatility. Similarly, the interactions that public servants have with their 
customers can be convoluted, and the decision-making that is necessary to bring these 
transactions to a conclusion involves a significant component of subjective judgement, 
as explained earlier in this chapter. It is also apparent that a proportion of the knowledge 
that these officers require in order to resolve customer enquiries and get things right first 
time is undocumented or permanently in transition. For example, there are always new 
regulations to be interpreted, office procedures to be devised, guidance notes to be 
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drafted, and staff to be trained to meet new requirements. The adverse outcomes 
observed during the research included low levels of resolution on first contact and high 
levels of PAFID. These findings appear to correspond with Manyika’s (2006) 
description of ‘tacit but unarticulated and not-yet-codified knowledge’ that was 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The stereotypical portrait of government depicts stifling bureaucracy, over-controlling 
bosses, apathetic employees and red tape that inhibits innovation and learning (various 
authors including Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1956; Merton, 1957; Selznick, 1957; Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Drucker, 1969; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Morgan and 
Murgatroyd, 1994; Golden and Hughes, 2001; Massey and Williams, 2005; McNary, 
2008). Mintzberg (1983) characterises strong hierarchical bureaucracies (such as 
agencies that focus on the mass handling of forms, benefit claims and other 
documentation submitted by citizens) as “machine bureaucracies”. He maintains that 
these agencies are likely to be among the biggest users of government IT systems and 
arguably the most sensitive to their strengths and weaknesses. If ‘machine 
bureaucracies’ like housing and council tax benefits services are particularly sensitive to 
these adverse effects, this may explain why they yield evidence of particularly high 
levels of failure. The case-study councils exhibit features that both reinforce and 
contradict these preconceptions (see Table 41 below). 
 
Table 41: Factors inhibiting and encouraging innovation and learning 
 
Case-study council 
Inhibiting Encouraging 
A B C 
Internal divisions prevent co-
operation between staff in sections 
of the same department, officers are 
“not singing from the same hymn 
sheet”. 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Assertions that repeat contacts are 
necessary because the process is 
unavoidably complicated. 
  
X 
  
 Acknowledgement that 
everybody has good ideas and 
sharing them could make things 
more streamlined. 
 
X 
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Table 41 (continued) 
 
Case-study council 
Inhibiting Encouraging 
A B C 
 Recognition of an over-reliance 
on technology, especially 
computer-produced letters. 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 Requests for more training. X X X 
 The assertion that it is important 
to understand what technology 
can do for you and to adapt 
working procedures accordingly. 
 
X 
  
X 
 The development of a holistic 
‘end-to-end’ perspective on 
customer contact handling. 
  
X 
 
Some officers refuse to change. Some officers speak positively 
about changes emerging from a 
systems-oriented service review. 
  
X 
 
Erosion of the skills base through 
the loss of highly trained temporary 
staff. 
   
X 
 
 The recognition that inconsistent 
policies and procedures are 
causing a lot of PAFID and the 
problem needs to be addressed 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
There is a central source for office 
procedures but nobody relies on 
them because they are not kept up-
to-date. 
    
X 
 
If the rigid adherence to rules and procedures that is commonly associated with 
bureaucracy inhibits innovation and learning, why are highly structured and disciplined 
organisations such as Toyota successful, and why is there a burgeoning interest in Lean 
thinking, which promotes standardisation? Adler (1999) explores the tension in large 
organisations between the desire for minimum bureaucracy in order to release the 
creative energy of employees, and the necessity for hierarchical structures and 
procedures to cope with the chaos described by Tom Peters (1989). Adler’s observation 
that organisations whose primary tasks are essentially repetitive are under great pressure 
to find ways of mobilising their employees to contribute to continuous improvement, 
resonates in the UK public sector where the urgency to do more with less may never 
have been greater.  
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Adler proceeds to offer an alternative perspective by distinguishing between two 
different types of bureaucracy, one coercive and controlling, the other enabling. 
Coercive bureaucracies are characterised by rigid rule enforcement, extensive written 
procedures and hierarchical controls. Enabling bureaucracies involve and empower 
employees, use rules and regulations as enabling tools, and support organisational 
learning. For example, Adler says that Toyota has found better ways to develop and use 
very detailed standardised procedures without inhibiting creativity by bringing together 
workers and supervisors to develop effective working methods (Adler, 1999, 39). 
Similarly, Toshiba and Motorola are said to have successfully combined the 
standardisation75 of routine tasks with enabling autonomy in non-routine tasks. Adler 
maintains that significant benefits are available from the enabling approach in the form 
of increased employee commitment and loyalty and improved performance, but he 
warns that it involves extensive and costly up-front training and socialisation of 
employees and managers (Adler, 1999, 45). 
 
Policy options 
 
The research suggests that strong but previously unrecognised parallels exist between 
the type of work undertaken by public servants in areas such as housing and council tax 
benefits, and the ‘tacit interactions’ undertaken by people that Manyika calls ‘tacit 
workers’. Reich (1992) would probably place them somewhere between in-person 
service workers and symbolic-analytic workers. The argument continues that tacit 
interactions depend upon a complex mixture of judgement, problem-solving skills and 
information exchanges. Improving the effectiveness of these exchanges represents a 
significant opportunity to increase productivity. The literature suggests that the way to 
get the best out of people like public sector tacit workers is to provide them with a 
supporting environment that fosters change, learning, collaboration and innovation. 
Staff in the case-study councils would probably add to their list of requirements a better 
working environment, more pay, additional staffing resources and better training. 
 
                                                          
75 Henry Ford distinguished between “… standardizing that marks inertia and the standardizing which 
marks progress”, and argued that standards should be developed by the workers not forced upon them 
from above (Ford and Crowther, 1926). 
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The Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) for UK local government has 
developed an online community platform supporting professional social networks 
across the public sector to facilitate better knowledge management. It provides a secure 
environment for knowledge development and sharing through online communities of 
practice, fulfilling one76 of the key requirements of Rothwell’s ‘fifth generation’ 
innovation process, which involves the increased use of expert systems (Rothwell, 1992, 
236). For example, the West Sussex Accessible Services Partnership (WSASP) has a 
community of practice on the IDeA platform for staff employed by its member councils, 
which seeks to facilitate the sharing of best practice among the partner authorities. 
WSASP’s site also serves as a repository for knowledge that might otherwise be mislaid 
over time, as individual contributors come and go. 
  
Local councils are beginning to emulate the online approach to knowledge management, 
learning and innovation. For example, the London Borough of Brent has a community 
of practice on the IDeA platform for internal communication and engagement, which 
provides an online space for collaborative working and information-sharing for people 
working with the council to improve services in the borough. Kent County Council has 
a variety of sites on the same platform, for issues ranging from communications and 
public health through to member development. One of the case-study councils described 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis (Council A) creates micro-sites within the corporate Intranet 
system to store and share information about ongoing and completed ICT projects. For 
example, a CRM site holds all the documentation associated with a two-year 
programme that concluded with the implementation of a corporate contact centre and 
CRM system. A recently developed micro-site captures and shares data and information 
emerging from a project that seeks to identify and reduce PAFID affecting a range of 
council services. These resources, together with access to members of the relevant 
project teams, are available to people throughout the organisation. However, the 
research suggests that the level of usage of these facilities is not substantial and could 
usefully be extended.  
 
                                                          
76 The other four innovation processes in Rothwell’s typology are the technology-push model, need-pull 
model, coupling model, and integrated model (Rothwell, 1992, 236). 
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The research did not reveal clear examples of Adler’s enabling bureaucracies in local 
government,77 but embryonic versions of the model were found in branches of 
Jobcentre Plus and HMRC. Here, Lean approaches are being introduced with the aim of 
improving services and reducing costs. There are strong similarities between the contact 
handling and processing activities of these central government departments and local 
services such as housing and council tax benefits. It is therefore possible that local 
councils and other government agencies can learn from the Jobcentre Plus and HMRC 
initiatives. 
 
The literature cautions against excessive optimism. Simply copying management ideas 
from elsewhere is not enough: new ways of working must be learned and changed to 
suit the circumstances. The odds in favour of a successful innovation can be increased 
by managing the situation (e.g. providing necessary ingredients such as technical 
resources and capabilities, generating the conditions under which creativity can flourish, 
involving the users, preparing the market, and communicating well) but scholars point 
out that “… innovation management is a learned capability too” (Tidd et al., 2005, 69).  
 
Managing PAFID: Lean thinking 
 
The preceding sections of this chapter inter-relate theoretical ideas about PAFID and 
Lean thinking described in Chapters 2 and 3, with findings from empirical research 
(case studies conducted in UK local councils) detailed in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
outcome of the above analysis is a series of policy options or recommendations for 
addressing the PAFID problem. The adoption of Lean thinking for the management of 
PAFID is one such opportunity. 
 
Lean thinking is identified as a method for managing PAFID because of the strong 
correlation between its distinctive underlying philosophy (based on process 
improvement through the elimination of everything that is non-value-adding) and the 
causes of PAFID highlighted in this research. Key features of the Lean management 
method (such as systems thinking, waste reduction, defect prevention, customer focus, 
                                                          
77 Council B had undertaken a short Lean improvement exercise in 2004, and the management style at 
Council C was in some respects benign (see Chapters 5 and 6), but neither organisation had 
comprehensively or consistently embraced holistic or interactivist approaches.   
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continuous incremental innovation, knowledge management, organisational learning, 
non-hierarchical structures, collaborative working, individual responsibility and self-
motivation) correspond with the policy options set out earlier in this chapter, such that 
their application to the PAFID problem offers the strong prospect of service 
improvement and cost reduction through the eradication or reduction of the problem. 
Evidence of early successes in the UK public sector with process improvement through 
the application of Lean thinking is found in the offices of Job Centre Plus and HMRC. 
Four examples of the correlation between the problems of PAFID affecting UK local 
councils as reported in this thesis, and the Lean management methods that could be 
applied to resolve them, are set out below to illustrate the strength of the argument: 
 
(1) An over-reliance on technology. This problem is illustrated in the case studies by 
the widespread use of computer produced letters, forms and notices that many 
customers (and some staff) do not understand. Enquiries and complaints precipitated by 
these documents generate PAFID. The ‘Lean prescriptions’ for this (i.e. the ideas, tools 
and techniques that could be employed under a Lean management regime) include: (a) 
focusing on the needs of key stakeholders; (b) gaining a deep understanding of the 
problem through root cause analysis; (c) finding sustainable solutions that are supported 
by staff through creative problem solving; (d) redesigning processes to eliminate non-
value-adding activity; (e) capturing the gains in revised standard operating procedures; 
and (f) reverting to less technical solutions, when necessary. 
 
(2) Principal-agent problems. These are illustrated in the case-studies by the differing 
attitudes and opinions of stakeholders (managers, supervisors and staff in this study) 
about the necessity, value and avoidability of some customer contacts. The ‘Lean 
prescriptions’ include: (a) taking a systems approach to problem resolution by 
acknowledging that the problem is essentially about people’s perceptions, values and 
attitudes; (b) combining ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems analysis into what I call a ‘smart 
systems approach’ (see the discussion on pages 214-215); (c) striving for perfection but 
acknowledging the existence of ‘soft failures’ that are matters of opinion; (d) removing 
or reducing internal barriers by redesigning the organisation, which might include 
moving experts to the front line. 
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(3) Deficient arrangements for knowledge management and organisational 
learning. These are illustrated in the case studies by office procedures and CRM scripts 
that had become disused because they are not kept up-to-date. The case studies have 
also provided evidence that different groups of staff are trained to different standards 
with the consequence that customers are given incorrect, incomplete and inconsistent 
information. The ‘Lean prescriptions’ for this include: (a) accepting that the associated 
knowledge is not easily codified because of its complexity and that the work involves a 
significant element of subjective judgement; (b) recognising the work as knowledge 
work and treating the staff as knowledge workers who are most likely to be productive 
in a supportive ‘enabling’ environment where there is a commitment to knowledge 
management, organisational learning, training and development; and (c) maintaining 
structure and discipline while still involving and empowering staff to make changes. 
 
(4) Batching-and-queuing. This is illustrated in the case studies by long delays 
between stages of the benefits assessment process, and excessive end-to-end times 
observed during the mapping of ‘customer journeys’ experienced by benefits claimants. 
The ‘Lean prescriptions’ for this include: (a) developing visual management techniques 
to ensure that the status of key processes is visible to all and no problems are hidden; (b) 
undertaking root cause analysis; (c) developing countermeasures through creative 
problem solving and continuous improvement; (d) capturing improvements in standard 
operating procedures and communicating them to relevant workers; and (e) reinforcing 
individual responsibility. 
 
In spite of the challenges inherent in the implementation of new management methods, 
the research shows that Lean thinking has been adopted in parts of the UK public sector, 
although the potential benefits have yet to be widely realised. Commentators on Lean 
thinking focus almost exclusively on the benefits to be derived from it, but the case-
studies described in Chapter 5 reveal some previously unreported challenges with the 
Lean-oriented approaches that have been attempted in these particular housing and 
council tax benefits services. For example, the pre-assessment of benefits claims is 
intended to ensure that skilled assessors get correct and complete information, but this 
activity could also be perceived as non-value work (i.e. checking) and thus contrary to 
the principle of getting things right first time. Similarly, communicating directly with 
customers (face-to-face or via the telephone) instead of writing letters, is intended to 
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keep the work moving and reduce waste by preventing defects. However, the practice 
could potentially expose benefits assessors to manipulation and intimidation by 
claimants and increase the risk of claimant fraud. Finally, reducing the reliance placed 
upon computer-produced letters and notices to communicate with customers is intended 
to improve the customer experience and reduce unnecessary contact, but manual 
intervention arguably constitutes quality control, not quality assurance, and might 
increase the risk of misinformation and error. These suggested concerns, however, do 
not negate the potential benefits of Lean thinking for the management of PAFID but 
simply serve to highlight the need for care, as the incautious application of any 
management method may generate unintended consequences. 
 
Policy options 
 
The literature shows that Lean thinking is a systems (and systematic) approach to 
performance improvement and cost reduction that addresses problem situations by 
combining so-called ‘hard’ (quantitative) and ‘soft’ (more qualitative) management 
techniques. Studies have also demonstrated that Lean promotes partnership through 
team-working and encourages participation by enabling and empowering staff to 
identify and resolve problems.  
 
In many cases, the Lean interventions identified in the literature are tools-based78 and 
these approaches are revealed to be capable of generating rapid improvements, or ‘quick 
wins’. However, the implementation of Lean thinking as a management system, such as 
suggested in this thesis, aims to embed fundamental changes like continuous 
incremental improvement, knowledge management and organizational learning. 
Councils could consider adopting ‘contingency’ approaches to the management of the 
PAFID problem by combining Lean thinking and Lean tools with contributions from 
other compatible efficiency concepts such as Six Sigma and Balanced Scorecard (see 
Table 2 on pages 60-63) but these options are not explored in this thesis. 
                                                          
78 Many Lean-oriented improvement initiates involve the selective application of tools such as Value 
Stream Mapping and Visual Management, deployed during short ‘Kaizen Blitz’ workshops. However, 
Professor Dan Jones says that “… the tools on their own don’t add up to much” (Dan Jones, speaking at 
the Streamlining the Public Sector conference, Institute of Physics, London, 19th March 2009). 
 
235 
Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, the findings from the primary and secondary research, including relevant 
literature discussed throughout this thesis, were inter-related to explain PAFID, answer 
the Research Questions, and generate options for achieving the goal of eradicating or 
reducing the PAFID problem. A key consideration for UK local councils is the possible 
deployment of the systems-oriented management method known as Lean thinking. 
 
The next and final chapter summarises the conclusions, policy options and contributions 
to public sector management theory and practice that can be drawn from the research. A 
description of recent developments that reinforce the need for new ways of improving 
public services and making them less expensive follows the conclusions. Finally, the 
chapter suggests avenues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises the conclusions, policy implications and contributions to 
public sector management theory and practice that can be drawn from the research 
described in this thesis. The findings from this study provide building blocks for further 
studies and this chapter therefore suggests avenues for further research. Recent 
developments are described that reinforce concerns about central government policy 
regarding electronic service delivery and highlight the urgency with which UK public 
services need to find alternative ways of improving performance and constraining costs.  
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
In this thesis, I have maintained that it is unlikely that the installation of ICT-based 
systems built upon modernist managerial assumptions alone, will deliver the public 
service performance improvements and efficiency savings mandated by central 
government. The findings add to the body of literature that argues that a better 
alternative to the current NPM reform path might involve the adoption of less 
technological and more systems-oriented approaches to business transformation. For 
example, the services might be improved by eliminating or reducing customer contacts 
that appear to be precipitated by earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first 
time, which cause additional and potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public 
services. I call this phenomenon potentially avoidable failure induced demand (PAFID).  
 
Comparative analysis of the findings described in Chapter 5 of this thesis, which 
emerged from empirical research across three case-studies in UK local authority 
settings, confirmed that a substantial proportion (48%) of all the observed customer 
contact was potentially avoidable, and relatively little (16%) was resolved. 
Paradoxically, even less (9%) of the valuable contact was determined. The application 
of these proportions of PAFID to the contact volumes and unit costs associated with just 
one local council, Tameside metropolitan borough council, revealed the availability of 
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potentially substantial savings. In Tameside, PAFID could be costing more than £1 
million a year. By implication, the potential savings available to the three case-study 
councils described in Chapter 5, and nearly 500 other local councils in the UK that 
administer high-volume transactional services involving extensive customer contact, 
could also be very substantial.  
 
Another contribution of this thesis is the identification of some frequent causes of 
PAFID on which housing and council tax benefits services might focus attention in 
order to release efficiency savings. When respondents to semi-structured interviews 
were asked for further information about the common causes of PAFID, and this 
feedback was compared across the three case-studies, a high degree of consensus 
emerged. Problems such as inexperienced and inadequately trained staff, inconsistent 
and undocumented procedures, defective communication with customers, insufficient 
staffing resources, and over-reliance on unsatisfactory technologies afflicted all three 
sites.  
 
The customer journey mapping exercise revealed previously unidentified failures in the 
form of internal delays and benefits claims left unresolved well beyond the point at 
which they could have been closed. The evidence suggests that an appropriate policy 
response in order to reduce PAFID and release significant savings might be to make 
improvements in the specific problem areas identified by this research. Alternately, 
councils might apply the methodology described here to investigate service areas other 
than housing and council tax benefits, and then address the issues that seem most 
relevant in terms of their local strategic objectives. 
 
A variety of conceptual and theoretical lenses were applied to the PAFID instance 
identification in order to generate a coherent theoretical framework supporting 
alternative explanations and policy options. For example, a discussion about the 
difficulty that surrounded the meaning of concepts such as contact failure, value and 
avoidability (which are harder to define and measure than was previously appreciated) 
led to the hypothesis that a wholly customer-centric approach to the problem might be 
inappropriate. Such an approach defines the concept of the customer too narrowly, 
ignores the needs of other stakeholders, and overlooks the moral hazard risk that 
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customers might be culpable or their expectations unreasonable. Similarly, if 
unnecessary customer contact is perceived as only potentially avoidable, then the 
eradication of PAFID becomes an aspiration instead of an expectation. The policy 
response might be to focus resources on the incremental reduction of those activities 
that appear to be the most wasteful. 
 
Agency theory was invoked to explain the problems that can be generated by the 
differing perspectives of various stakeholders involved in processes such as the 
evaluation of housing benefits claims. Policy options emerged from a discussion about 
divided interests and ways in which these might distort processes. For example, the 
findings suggest that councils might reverse recent trends toward specialisation within 
organisation units (such as front-line customer services agents and back-office benefits 
assessors) and reintegrate selected areas of their organisations, thus removing PAFID 
generated by factors such as internal demarcation and poor communication that might 
otherwise continue. Alternatively, at the other extreme, councils might increase the 
degree of separation between, for example, benefits assessors and customer services 
agents, to reduce the scope for claimants to disclose information selectively and 
renegotiate assessments that might otherwise result in unfavourable awards. The 
findings also demonstrate that individuals in organisations may find themselves acting 
as principals and agents simultaneously, the likelihood being that these inter-related 
conflicts of interest will be detrimental to customers and compound PAFID. 
 
Further contributions to public sector management theory and practice were generated 
by an examination of PAFID that took into account the complexity of the housing and 
council tax benefits environment. For example, if the PAFID that afflicts these services 
is partly a measure of the inherent complexity of the benefits assessment process, such 
that experts are unlikely to agree about appropriate outcomes, then the problem may be 
only capable of reduction and not eradication. In this case, councils might still aspire to 
‘zero defects’ through continuous improvement, as this is a clear message for the 
purposes of communicating the service vision, but remain pragmatic about the costs and 
benefits of solving isolated problems. Similarly, genuine and strongly-held differences 
of opinion about concepts such as contact cause and value, failure, and avoidability 
might lead councils to take more holistic, interactivist and consensus-based approaches 
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to problem resolution. The combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems approaches to 
problem resolution described in Chapter 3 on pages 64-65, and Chapter 7 on pages 214-
215, is called here the “smart systems approach”. 
 
The findings confirmed that a modernistic over-reliance on technology was at the heart 
of some of the problems afflicting the case-study councils. For example, high volumes 
of computer-produced letters and notices were sent to customers. Everybody 
(management and staff) knew that these documents were deficient and generated a lot of 
unnecessary customer contact, but work-arounds (such as editing the letters by hand) 
were nevertheless not implemented. Similarly, hand-held computers and electronic 
claim forms were being promoted by management even though staff found them 
unreliable and less convenient to use than paper-based forms. The research suggests that 
much of the PAFID experienced by councils might be prevented by reverting to more 
simple, less technical solutions such as writing (or at least editing) letters and notices, 
and reverting to paper-based application forms. 
 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, the findings suggest that councils might benefit 
from the adoption of a more systems-oriented approach to problem resolution. Lean 
thinking is identified as a systems methodology derived from the Toyota Production 
System and earlier management paradigms, which has penetrated central and local 
government via the healthcare sector and is growing in popularity. The evidence shows 
that, in spite of some previously unreported difficulties and disadvantages, Lean tools 
are capable of delivering ‘quick wins’, while the more comprehensive Lean approach 
seeks to bring about more fundamental changes. Full Lean thinking seeks to embed 
concepts such as waste reduction, defect prevention, customer focus, continuous 
improvement and organisational learning through collaborative working, non-
hierarchical structures, self-motivation, respect for human dignity and putting 
performance before status. The policy options for councils therefore include both partial 
and full implementation of Lean thinking. 
 
The case-study councils exhibited both strengths and weaknesses in the areas of 
innovation, knowledge management and organisational learning. Opportunities for 
improvement identified during the research included the diligent collection of data 
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about customers, and the integration of that data across systems to generate new 
insights. Staff wanted better arrangements for documenting and sharing technical 
information and office procedures. The work undertaken by housing and council tax 
benefits officers involves a complex mixture of judgement, problem-solving, and 
information exchange. It requires a supportive ‘enabling’ environment that fosters 
change, learning, collaboration and innovation. The thesis provides public sector 
examples of such environments from which local councils and other government 
agencies might learn: they include the IDeA’s online Communities of Practice, the 
DWP’s Jobcentre Plus and HMRC.  
 
The findings provide support for the argument that the difficulties with PAFID explored 
in this research are most amenable to resolution in environments that acknowledge the 
subjective nature of real-world problems. Lean thinking appears to facilitate an 
interactivist approach to problem resolution while remaining “… a disciplined way of 
using the scientific process” (Professor Dan Jones, speaking at the Streamlining the 
Public Sector conference, The Institute of Physics, 9th March 2009). The research thus 
confirms that Lean thinking can provide the consistent approach to process innovation 
and the integrative approach to the management of PAFID that will be required if the 
service improvements and cost savings conjectured at the beginning of this dissertation 
are to be delivered. Indeed, there is some evidence that Lean thinking goes beyond 
process innovation and into paradigmatic innovation, which produces “… changes in 
the underlying mental models that frame what organisations do” (Tidd et al., 2005, 10). 
 
A principal implication of the findings is that an approach to the prevention of PAFID 
that involves the deployment of full Lean thinking, with its emphasis upon waste 
reduction and continuous incremental improvement, could help local councils to 
significantly improve services and substantially reduce costs. This research focused on 
housing and council tax benefits services, and described congruencies between these 
activities and analogous services administered by nearly 500 other local councils 
throughout the United Kingdom. However, it is notable that local councils in the UK 
deliver other high-volume transactional services such as housing management, electoral 
registration, on-street and off-street parking, building and planning control, waste 
management and environmental health. An implication is that these services may also 
be affected by significant amounts of PAFID and could benefit from the process 
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innovations described above, which are an integral part of the Lean-oriented approach 
to the management of PAFID described in this thesis.  
 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the lessons drawn from the case-study sites and the 
suggested policy options presented in this thesis may also be relevant to other UK 
housing and council tax benefits services, and other public services that involve 
extensive customer contact.   
 
Managers in the public sector will need new knowledge and skills in order to progress 
this work but, as Rothwell (1977, 203) points out “… most of the factors associated 
with success and failure in innovation are amenable to deliberate manipulation by 
technically progressive management”. Rothwell (1985, 218) also highlights the 
pluralistic nature of the explanations for success and failure in innovation management, 
which is “… not a matter of doing one or two things brilliantly, but of doing most things 
well and in a balanced and co-ordinated manner”.   
 
The next section of this chapter describes recent developments affecting public finances, 
government technology and customer contact handling. The chapter concludes with 
suggested opportunities for further research and ‘third stream’ activities. 
 
Recent developments 
 
Financial crisis 
 
In 2009, the severity with which the United Kingdom’s public finances have been 
affected by the financial crisis and steep global downturn is becoming apparent. In 
2009/10, Total Managed Expenditure is expected to increase to £671 billion, up from an 
estimate of £582 billion in 2007/08, and a revised estimate of £620 billion for 2008/09 
(HM Treasury, 2009a, 238). The public sector net borrowing requirement is projected to 
peak at 12.4% of GDP, or £175 billion in 2009/10. The reliance that central government 
continues to place upon the ‘improvement’ of public services, in spite of warnings from 
the National Audit Office (2007a) that only 26% of the savings claimed by central 
government departments are actually being delivered, is evident from the Budget 
Report. The chancellor of the exchequer has raised the Comprehensive Spending 
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Review money savings target from £30 billion to £35 billion for the three-year period 
ending 2010/11, and identifies £9 billion of additional efficiency savings by 2013/14 
(HM Treasury, 2009a, 123).  
 
Government technology 
 
Examples of government ICT project failures and data security problems continue to 
emerge. In 2008, the National Audit Office (NAO) reported on failed plans to make the 
Department of Transport more efficient by centralising its human resources, payroll and 
financial services support functions (National Audit Office, 2008). The scheme, which 
depended upon a new IT system, was expected to cost £55 million and save £112 
million over its lifetime to 2012. Instead, it will cost an estimated £121 million and save 
£40 million, resulting in a deficit of £81 million. In 2008, the Information 
Commissioner announced that the public sector had reported a further 176 data security 
breaches since the incident in which HMRC lost 25 million child benefit records in 
2007 (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008).  
 
In 2009, the NAO reported on delays and costs affecting the implementation of the 
Home Office’s single offender management IT system (National Audit Office, 2009). 
The NAO concluded that the project was badly handled, and represented poor value for 
money. Inadequate oversight and weak supplier relations contributed to a doubling of 
programme costs, a three-year delay in programme roll-out, and reductions in project 
scope and benefits.  
 
UK central government has developed a more secure Wide Area Network, but the strict 
information security requirements associated with gaining access to it (such as the 
requirement to encrypt all laptop computers and restrict the use of memory sticks) are 
inhibiting the development and roll-out of mobile technologies. Councils are obliged to 
adopt a formal Code of Connection (CoCo) in order to gain access to the Government 
Connect Secure Extranet (GCSx), which then enables more secure communication with 
central government departments and other public bodies. All this appears to reinforce 
the need identified early in this thesis for alternative, less technical, lower risk 
approaches to efficiency improvement – such as the eradication or reduction of PAFID. 
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Some of the improvements identified in the UK’s Budget Report for 2009 are drawn 
from the final report of the Treasury’s Operational Efficiency Programme. This makes 
explicit reference to projected savings from the deployment of “… continuous 
improvement tools such as Lean more systematically across the public sector” (HM 
Treasury, 2009b, 12). Central government appears to have realised that technology 
alone is not going to deliver the improvements and savings that it requires. 
  
National Performance Indicator NI 14 
 
After the empirical stages of the research detailed in this thesis were completed, central 
government introduced a new National Performance Indicator NI 14.79 All UK local 
councils are required to measure, report and reduce the proportion of what central 
government calls “avoidable contact”, which is defined as “customer contact that is of 
low or no value to the customer”. Five categories of avoidable contact are specified: 
customers not understanding council communications; customers contacting the wrong 
service channels; customers providing duplicate information; customers progress 
chasing or reporting service failures; and contacts ended prematurely. It is immediately 
apparent that NI 14 represents a missed opportunity in terms of public service 
improvement and cost reduction. For example, the narrow customer-centric definition of 
avoidable contact is inadequate for the reasons detailed earlier in this thesis (it 
overlooks the legitimate needs of other stakeholders). The subjective nature of concepts 
such as value and avoidability is not addressed, so that the emerging data is likely to be 
inconsistent. Consequently, there will be disagreement within and between councils 
about appropriate policy responses.  
 
The categories of avoidable contact specified by central government for the purposes of 
NI 14 are insufficiently detailed to enable councils to identify and tackle underlying 
problems. One of the most common causes of potentially avoidable contact (customers 
not providing information and evidence at the right time) is entirely omitted. Two of the 
most significant causes of potentially avoidable contact – progress chasing and 
reporting service failures – are conflated, and the actual reasons for the failures are not 
captured. 
                                                          
79 See ‘Reducing avoidable contact: a guide to NI 14’ available online at 
http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=8507853 accessed 25/10/08. 
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Further research and ‘third stream’ activities 
 
The following additional work could usefully be undertaken to improve our 
understanding of PAFID and stimulate new policy options for its eradication or 
reduction: 
 
• Action-oriented research into the effects (on the incidence of PAFID) of simplifying 
the administration of the UK’s housing and council tax benefits scheme – the 
expectation being that some simplifications will so reduce PAFID that the savings 
far outweigh any associated costs 
 
• Action-oriented research into the effects (on the incidence of PAFID) of 
interventions to alter principal-agent relationships between managers, staff and 
customers in UK public sector services – the expectation being that the incidence of 
PAFID will vary significantly according to the relationships between key 
stakeholders 
 
• Case-study research to investigate and understand the PAFID affecting UK central 
government departments such as the DWP, HMRC, HMCS and the Child Support 
Agency – the expectation being that high levels of PAFID, low levels of contact 
resolution and new potential remedies will be revealed   
 
• Comparative case-study research into the incidence of PAFID in high-volume 
transactional services administered by different tiers of UK local government  
(county, borough, town, parish, etc.) – the expectation being that the levels of 
PAFID will vary between tiers in ways that supplement our understanding of the 
phenomenon  
 
• Action-oriented research into the effects of Lean thinking on the incidence of 
PAFID – the expectation being that PAFID will vary (reduce) significantly over 
time with indicators of increasing penetration of Lean approaches 
 
• Quantitative and qualitative research into customer perceptions and expectations 
regarding PAFID – the anticipation being that different customers will have 
different perceptions and expectations in different places at different times, 
prompting an even more nuanced approach to problem resolution 
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• Quantitative and qualitative research to investigate the incidence of PAFID affecting 
electronic service delivery in the UK public sector – the expectation being that the 
increasing deployment of web-based services will generate new problems requiring 
new solutions 
 
• Case-study research to investigate and understand the inter-relationships between 
PAFID and organisational culture – the expectation being that the incidence of 
PAFID will vary (reduce) significantly with indicators of strong organisational 
culture 
 
• Case-study research into the incidence of PAFID affecting public sector services in 
countries other than the UK – the expectation being that high levels of PAFID will 
be discovered in some service areas, providing opportunities for significant 
improvements and savings through the eradication or reduction of the phenomenon 
 
• Case-study research into the incidence of PAFID affecting high-volume transaction 
services in other sectors of the economy – the expectation being that high levels of 
PAFID will be discovered elsewhere, providing opportunities for significant 
improvements and savings through the eradication or reduction of the phenomenon 
 
• Qualitative and quantitative research into methods of diagnosing and mitigating the 
problems introduced by central government’s performance indicator NI 14 – 
because it is widely maintained throughout UK local government that the mandated 
arrangements for measuring and reporting NI 14 (described above) will be laborious 
and ineffective. 
 
The work described in this thesis has resulted in the development of a conceptual 
framework, research methodology and research tools that could be transformed into 
support mechanisms and toolkits that would facilitate the identification and reduction of 
PAFID in a variety of organisational settings. Third stream activities of this nature are 
supported and encouraged by the UK government as a component of academic 
entrepreneurialism (HM Treasury, 2003, 43-46). 
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Congleton 
Copeland 
Corby 
Cotswold 
Craven 
Crawley 
Crewe and Nantwich 
Dacorum 
Dartford 
Daventry 
Derbyshire Dales 
Derwentside 
Dover 
Durham City 
Easington 
East Cambridgeshire 
East Devon 
East Dorset 
East Hampshire 
East Hertfordshire 
East Lindsey 
East Northamptonshire 
East Staffordshire 
Eastbourne 
Eastleigh 
Eden 
Ellesmere Port and 
Neston 
Elmbridge 
Epping Forest 
Epsom and Ewell 
Erewash 
Exeter City 
Fareham 
Fenland 
Forest Health 
Forest of Dean 
Fylde 
Gedling 
Gloucester City 
Gosport 
Gravesham 
Great Yarmouth 
Guildford 
Hambleton 
Harborough 
Harlow 
Harrogate 
Hart 
Hastings 
Havant 
Hertsmere 
High Peak 
Hinckley and Bosworth 
Horsham 
Huntingdonshire 
Hyndburn 
Ipswich 
Kennet 
Kerrier 
Source: Municipal Year Book 2005
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Kettering 
King’s Lynn and  
West Norfolk 
Lancaster City 
Lewes 
Lichfield 
Lincoln City 
Macclesfield 
Maidstone 
Maldon 
Malvern Hills 
Mansfield 
Melton 
Mendip 
Mid Bedfordshire 
Mid Devon 
Mid Suffolk 
Mid Sussex 
Mole Valley 
New Forest 
Newark and Sherwood 
Newcastle-under-Lyme 
North Cornwall 
North Devon 
North Dorset 
North East Derbyshire 
North Hertfordshire 
North Kesteven 
North Norfolk 
North Shropshire 
North Warwickshire 
North West  
Leicestershire 
North Wiltshire 
Northampton 
Norwich City 
Nuneaton and 
Bedworth 
Oadby and Wigston 
Oswestry 
Oxford City 
Pendle 
Penwith 
Preston 
Purbeck 
Redditch 
Reigate and Banstead 
Restormel 
Ribble Valley 
Richmondshire 
Rochford 
Rossendale 
Rother 
Rugby 
Runnymede 
Rushcliffe 
Rushmoor 
Ryedale 
Salisbury 
Scarborough 
Sedgefield 
Sedgemoor 
Selby 
Sevenoaks 
Shepway 
Shrewsbury and 
Atcham 
South Bedfordshire 
South Bucks 
South Cambridgeshire 
South Derbyshire 
South Hams 
South Holland 
South Kesteven 
South Lakeland 
South Norfolk 
South 
Northamptonshire 
South Oxfordshire 
South Ribble 
South Shropshire 
South Somerset 
South Staffordshire 
Spelthorne 
St Albans City 
St Edmundsbury 
Stafford 
Staffordshire 
Moorlands 
Stevenage 
Stratford-on-Avon 
Stroud 
Suffolk Costal 
Surrey Heath 
Swale 
Tamworth 
Tandridge 
Taunton Deane 
Teesdale 
Teignbridge 
Tendring 
Test Valley 
Tewkesbury 
Thanet 
Three Rivers 
Tonbridge and Malling 
Torridge 
Tunbridge Wells 
Tynedale 
Uttlesford 
Vale of White Horse 
Vale Royal 
Wansbeck 
Warwick 
Watford 
Waveney 
Waverley 
Wealden 
Wear Valley 
Wellingborough 
Welwyn Hatfield 
West Devon 
West Dorset 
West Lancashire 
West Lindsey 
West Oxfordshire 
West Somerset 
West Wiltshire 
Weymouth and 
Portland 
Winchester City 
Woking 
Worcester City 
Worthing 
Wychavon 
Wycombe 
Wyre 
Wyre Forest 
 
UNITARY 
Bath and North  
East Somerset 
Blackburn with Darwen 
Blackpool 
Bournemouth 
Bracknell Forest  
Brighton and Hove 
Bristol City  
Darlington 
Derby City 
East Riding of 
Yorkshire 
Halton 
Hartlepool 
Herefordshire 
Isle of Wight 
Kingston upon Hull 
City 
Leicester City 
Luton 
Medway 
Middlesbrough 
Milton Keynes 
North East Lincolnshire 
North Lincolnshire 
North Somerset 
Nottingham City 
Peterborough City 
Plymouth City 
Poole  
Portsmouth City 
Reading 
Redcar and Cleveland 
Rutland 
Slough 
South Gloucestershire 
Southampton City 
Southend-on-Sea 
Stockton-on-Tees 
Stoke-on-Trent City 
Swindon 
Telford and Wrekin 
Thurrock 
Torbay 
Warrington 
West Berkshire 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead 
Wokingham 
York City 
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ANNEX 2:  PILOT STUDY TRIAL DATA COLLECTION SHEET 
 
PART A 
 
Contact channel: 
 
Service Area: Housing & council tax benefits 
Researcher: 
 
Date: 
 
PART B 
Row 1 
Contact 
Identifier 
2 
Description 
3 
Valuable 
4 
Potentially 
Avoidable 
Failure 
5 
Off 
Remit 
6 
Resolution 
 
1 
 
Claim No. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
One Stop 
 
Returned 
 
Service 
Request 
 
Passed Over 
 
2 
 
Claim No. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
One Stop 
 
Returned 
 
Service 
Request 
 
Passed Over 
 
3 
 
Claim No. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
One Stop 
 
Returned 
 
Service 
Request 
 
Passed Over 
 
Part C – Notes: 
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ANNEX 2 (CONTINUED) 
 
Part D – Pilot Guidance Notes: 
 
1. The service has agreed that its purpose is “to make prompt payment of correct housing and 
council tax benefits to qualifying applicants”. 
 
2. The overall purpose of the research is to identify, describe and categorise any potentially 
avoidable contact, which is defined as customer contacts that appear to be precipitated by 
earlier failures, such as failures to do things right first time, which cause additional and 
potentially avoidable demands to impinge upon public services. 
 
3. The information required concerns the purpose of the customer contact and how it was 
resolved – information will not be collected about the performance of the customer services 
advisors. 
 
4. Agreed examples of  work that is valuable to claimants and other key stakeholders include: 
• Providing claim forms and simultaneous information and advice (excluding follow-up 
enquiries made by customers) 
• Receiving and processing pre-tenancy determinations, claims and changes of 
circumstances (if the documentation/information is incomplete, the follow-up work will 
count as non-value demand) 
• Notifying awards, changes to awards, rights and responsibilities (excluding follow-up 
enquiries/complaints made by customers) 
• Making payments (excluding changes to payment methods) 
• Receiving written appeals and backdating requests (a new indicator will appear on the 
template for all other appeal and overpayment related contacts) 
 
5. Agreed examples of potentially avoidable contact (that might have been prevented) include: 
• Submission of evidence on its own 
• Customers asking about progress 
• Customers seeking explanations or making complaints 
• Enquiries arising as a result of our error or omission 
• Duplication (customer being asked to do the same thing more than once) 
 
6. The researcher will: 
• Complete Part A on every data collection sheet before the session starts 
• Complete a separate row in Part B for each customer contact: 
? Column 1 – enter the claim number allocated by the housing benefits or document 
management systems. 
? Column 2 – describe the purpose of the customer contact so that other people can 
assess whether it was valuable or potentially avoidable contact, one stop, returned, 
service request or passed to the back office 
? Columns 3, 4 & 5 – tick one of these boxes to signify that the contact constituted 
value or potentially avoidable contact, or adjudication 
? Column 6 – circle one of the alternative outcomes, which are: 
? One Stop (resolved at first point of contact) 
? Returned (passed back for customer to take action) 
? Service Request (one stop but service request registered) 
? Passed Over (handed off to the back office) 
• Complete Part C explaining any exceptional circumstances that affected the monitoring 
exercise (such as interruptions, mail-outs, and technical problems) and recording any 
qualitative information volunteered by agents). 
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ANNEX 3:  PILOT STUDY TRIAL QUESTIONNAIRE PROTOCOL 
 
Name of interviewee: 
 
Name of interviewer: 
 
Job title of interviewee: 
 
Location of interview: 
 
Date and time of interview: 
 
Approximate duration of interview: 
 
 
 
BRIEF EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH: 
Recently, some customer enquiries about housing and council tax benefits were 
monitored to find out what caused them, which of them were valuable to the 
organisation and how they were resolved. The outcome of this pilot work was that a 
high proportion of the contacts appeared to have been avoidable (caused by failures 
that might have been prevented) and few of them were resolved on first contact. Most of 
the potentially avoidable enquiries seemed to be triggered by customers providing 
supporting documentation (for claims and changes of circumstances) that should have 
been produced earlier, or by customers seeking further clarification about 
documentation that the council had asked them to produce. Some claimants appeared to 
make several such contacts before the paperwork was sufficiently complete for the 
assessment of their claims to proceed.  
 
The purpose of these interviews is to find out what key people like you think about the 
situation, why it is happening and what you think should be done about it. It is likely 
that you have information that can contribute to our understanding. If it is correct that 
so many customer enquiries are potentially avoidable, this research could ultimately 
make the lives of council staff easier by reducing their workload. 
 
I need to record these interviews so that I can include your contributions in the overall 
findings, but nothing you say will be attributed to you personally. 
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Q1.  Please give your name and post title, then describe the work that you do. 
 
Q2. How do you feel about the assertion that there are high levels of potentially 
avoidable customer enquiries and low levels of resolution on first contact? Does 
this seem like a reasonable assessment of what really happens to housing and 
council tax benefits enquiries? [If necessary ask “How would you have expected 
the results to be different?”] 
 
Q3. Do you think it matters? [If necessary ask “Is it important, if not why not, who 
does it affect, what does it mean for them?”] 
 
Q4. What do you think explains the situation? Why is it happening? [If necessary, 
ask for specific examples from the interviewee’s experience. For instance, is the 
service consistent in what it asks for, is everybody trained to an adequate 
standard?] 
 
Q5. What do you think should be done about it? [If necessary, ask for specific 
examples. For instance, should customer services staff be able assess H&CTB 
claims?] 
 
Q6. What do you think would be the effect of these changes? [If necessary, ask for 
specific costs and benefits. For instance, how would the changes affect working 
practices and how might staff react?] 
 
Q7. What if anything has been done in the last two or three years to address this 
problem and what were the outcomes? [If necessary, ask for specific examples. 
For instance, how has the creation of a pre-assessment team affected the 
situation?] 
 
Q8. Please describe any other service improvement initiatives that you have been 
involved with during the past two or three years. [If necessary ask “What was 
done, how and when? What were the outcomes? What were the costs and 
benefits?”] 
 
Q9. What does the term Lean thinking mean to you? 
 
Q10. Lean thinking is a management approach that emphasises things such as team-
working, waste reduction, getting it right first time, continuous improvement and 
organisational learning. If we wanted to use these approaches in [name of 
council] to tackle problems with potentially avoidable contact and contact 
resolution, what do you think that management would have to do to maximise 
the chances of a successful improvement program? 
 
Q11. Have I left out any important issues with regard to customer contact and the 
ways in which it might be improved? 
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ANNEX 4:  EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
Kevin Masters interviewing Lee Kirk and Julie Gleeson 
2 p.m. Monday 8th March 2004 
Kingston Communications, Prospect House, Prospect Street, Kingston upon Hull. 
 
 
Key and Conventions (based on Schenkein, 1978, xi – xvi): 
 
K  = The Author 
L   = L. Kirk 
J   = J. Gleeson 
…  = utterance being reported in part 
(…)  = utterance left incomplete by the speaker 
L. = short pause within an utterance 
(0.0)             = interval between utterances, measured in seconds 
=  = contiguous utterances, where there is no interval between them 
( )  = transcriptionist doubt 
[ ] = overlapping utterance by the author (unless otherwise indicated) 
((         )) = other phenomena (described within the double brackets) 
Emphasis = italics, the larger the italics, THE GREATER THE EMPHASIS 
?  = rising inflection, not necessarily a question 
{           } = audible aspiration, such as {pff} 
[[          ]] = clarification or explanation of narrative by author during analysis 
[[…]]  = omission of one or more words by author during analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
The voice recorder was started some 2 or 3 minutes after the interview began. During that time, 
the author explained that XYZ borough council had committed itself to the implementation of a 
contact centre and Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system by December 2005. The 
author had been sponsored by the council to do a business research project at Hull University 
and had elected to help the council secure the potential advantages and avoid the potential 
disadvantages of contact centre and CRM systems. 
 
The author made the following opening remarks: 
 
“I have some questions I want to ask you. It doesn’t matter what order we take them in and 
there are no right or wrong answers. I am simply interested in your experiences, so please just 
respond in your own words.  I would like to record our conversation so that I can produce a 
transcript, the contents of which I will agree with you. I would also like to take some brief notes 
of any points that seem worth following up later in the conversation. Can I start by asking you 
about your respective roles, about what you each do here?” 
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L. …we don’t do that. Some days they were 
answering about 40% of the calls, on a, on 
a particularly bad day. On a good day 
[40%?] they were answering about 60% 
[yes] which wasn’t bad, lot better than a lot 
of areas. But it still wasn’t brilliant [hmm] 
so what they did was, myself and then there 
was a team of eight [hmm] actually took 
waste management calls, that’s all [right] 
and it was a case of, we had an Oracle 
(CRM) system brought in by the council.  
 
L. I infer from what you’re saying that Lee 
wasn’t involved at the time? 
 
L. No, I came in was it 2002 – I think it was, 
wasn’t it? Yes, November 2002 I came in 
[yes]. So we were just going live with the 
other implemented services. So we’d just 
finished, 2001, November 2001, so we’d 
just finished the pilot on cleansing and 
other street services, we’d just gone live 
with that when I came on board. 
 
L. And you’re based in the Guildhall, so your 
responsibilities are obviously wider than 
just the Contact Centre? 
 
L. Um – really no – um – my – my primary 
role, as I say, as Development Manager is 
to ensure the council running of the call 
centre. The contract that is in place 
between the council and KC, my role is to 
is to make sure that Julie and her team 
deliver what we would expect as the 
council. And also to liaise with the service 
areas that the call centre is delivering for, 
so er the issues that come out of there I 
raise with Julie. 
 
L. That’s interesting, so you’re responsible for 
the relationship with the departments? 
 
L. Yes. 
 
L. Yes and no. We rely a lot on the council 
side through myself. 
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ANNEX 5:  REVISED DATA COLLECTION SHEET 
 
 
SHEET No:  
PART A:  COMPLETE AT START OF SESSION 
 
SERVICE: CHANNEL: 
MONITORED BY: DATE: 
 
PART B:  ENTER CAUSE, VALUE, AVOIDABILITY AND RESOLUTION (ONE ROW FOR 
EACH ENQUIRY) DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT. 
 
ROW CAUSE OF CONTACT VALUE AND 
AVOIDABILITY 
RESOLUTION 
01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
NOTES ABOUT SYSTEMIC FAILURES SUCH AS TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS: 
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CONTACT CAUSE, VALUE, AVOIDABILITY AND RESOLUTION 
GUIDANCE NOTES ON COMPLETION OF DATA COLLECTION SHEET 
 
The purpose of the service is “to pay the right money to the right person at the right time”. The purpose of 
the survey is to identify, describe and categorise customer contacts according to cause, value, avoidability 
and first time resolution. 
 
CAUSE OF CONTACT 
 
The cause of each customer contact will be recorded as it takes place, for example: 
• Customer advised about a change of circumstances affecting an existing claim 
• Customer asked for an application form to make a new claim for housing and council tax benefits 
• Customer provided documentary evidence in support of an outstanding claim for housing benefits 
• Customer submitted an appeal against an award of housing and council tax benefits 
The customers’ details will not be recorded as this may contravene data protection principles. 
 
VALUE OF THE CONTACT TO CUSTOMERS AND OTHER KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
 
High value work includes: 
• Providing claim forms 
• Helping customers to make claims 
• Receiving, checking and processing new claims and changes of circumstances 
• Dealing with customers responding to the council’s requests for information and evidence 
• Providing trial calculations 
• Dealing with changes to methods of payment and bank details 
• Responding to landlords’ enquiries 
 
Low value work includes: 
• Contacts associated with discretionary housing payments 
• Contacts associated with appeals and back-dating requests 
• Overpayments, fraud prevention and detection 
 
Potentially avoidable customer contact (precipitated by earlier failures that might have been prevented) 
includes: 
• Information and evidence presented by claimants after the original application 
• Customers progress chasing outstanding decisions 
• Claimants requiring clarification of letters, notices and awards 
• Claimants enquiring about payments made and payments due 
• Complaints 
• Duplication (customer being asked to do the same thing more than once) 
• Mis-dials, hoaxes and wrong numbers 
 
Off remit contacts include: 
• Council tax billing, collection and recovery 
• Housing advice and tenancy enquiries 
 
Unclassified contacts include: 
• Contacts that cannot be allocated to high or low value work, potentially avoidable or off-remit 
contacts 
 
RESOLUTION ON FIRST CONTACT 
 
• One stop = customer agrees resolved on first contact 
• Repeat = repeat contact on same issue but customer agrees now resolved 
• Passed back = customer to take further action 
• Passed on = council to take further action 
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Name of interviewee: 
 
Name of interviewer: 
 
Job title of interviewee: 
 
Location of interview: 
 
Date and time of interview: 
 
Approximate duration of interview: 
 
 
BRIEF EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH: 
 
There is anecdotal evidence that a high proportion of the customer enquiries received by 
public services such as housing and council tax benefits are unnecessary and potentially 
preventable. It appears that these services also achieve low levels of resolution on first 
contact. If true, this aspect of the business presents very substantial opportunities for 
service improvement and cost reduction. Many of these apparently unnecessary 
enquiries seemed to be caused by customers asking about outstanding claims and the 
suspension of existing awards. People are providing information and evidence that 
should have been produced with the original claim, or seeking clarification about 
documents that they had been asked to produce. Some customers end up making 
multiple contacts before their claims are ready for assessment.  
 
The purpose of these interviews is to find out what key people like you think about the 
situation, why it is happening and what you think should be done about it. If it is 
correct that so many customer enquiries are unnecessary and potentially 
preventable, this research may help to make our lives easier by reducing the 
workload. 
 
As I explained in my message last week, I will provide you with a transcript of our 
discussion and nothing you say will be attributable to you personally. 
 
Q1.  Let’s begin by clarifying your name and your post title. Then I will be 
grateful if you will explain how you fit into the organisation and what you do. 
 
 
 
Q2. How do you feel about the assertion that [council XYZ’s] housing and 
council tax benefits service has high levels of potentially preventable 
customer enquiries and low levels of resolution on first contact – to what 
extent does this correspond with your perception of what is happening? [If 
necessary ask “How would you have expected the results to be different?”] 
 
 
 
Q3. Do you think it matters and if so, why? [If necessary ask “Is it important, if 
not why not, who does it affect and how does it affect them?”] 
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Q4. What do you think explains the situation, why is it happening? [Ask for 
specific examples from the interviewee’s experience. For instance, are we 
consistent in what we ask for, is everybody trained to an adequate standard?] 
 
 
 
Q5. What do you think the council should do about it? [Ask for specific 
examples. For instance, should the council be making more or less use of 
translation services?] 
 
 
 
Q6. What would be the effect of the changes that you suggest? [Ask for specific 
costs and benefits. For instance, how would the changes affect working practices 
and how would the staff respond?] 
 
 
 
Q7. What has been done in the last two or three years to improve contact 
handling and what have been the outcomes? [Ask for specific examples. How 
has moving assessment staff into the front line affected the situation?] 
 
 
 
Q8. Please describe any other initiatives that you have been involved with 
during the past two or three years, that were intended to improve 
performance and reduce costs. [Ask what was done, how was it done, when 
was it done, what were the outcomes?”] 
 
[To what extent did these initiatives constitute Lean thinking, which is about 
putting the customer first, team-working, preventing waste, getting it right first 
time, enhancing value, creating fast flexible flowing human actions, continuous 
improvement and shared decision-making? Related techniques include root 
cause analysis, visual control, mistake-proofing, business process reengineering, 
process standardisation, multi-skilled working and knowledge management] 
 
 
 
Q10. If management wanted to further improve performance and reduce costs 
(in the area of customer contact handling) what would they have to do to 
ensure the project was successful and staff were fully committed to it? 
 
 
 
Q11. Have I left out any important issues with regard to customer contact 
handling and the ways in which it might be improved? 
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ANNEX 7:  SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS STAGE 3 
 
Council A 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Communication: 
Referring to computer-produced letters that ask claimants to produce 
outstanding information and evidence, Interviewee A said: “the logging 
letter is the reason why most people call back, because they are having 
trouble understanding what is coming from us to them”. Interviewee F 
elaborated on this point by explaining that there are inconsistencies when 
requesting information because “customers get confused when they get a 
letter from the enquiry counter staff followed by another letter from the 
pre-assessment team”. Interviewee K said that incorrect information was 
often requested and that claimants were sometimes being “asked the 
impossible”. Interviewee M pointed out that the number of properly 
completed benefit application forms received in a typical week was very 
small “just two or three”. 
Interviewee B highlighted the absence of staff guidance notes and 
standard procedures but also said that “differing procedures between the 
two offices [[customer services front office and housing benefits back 
office]] get in the way”. Interviewee C reinforced the point by 
maintaining that “we’re all one department but we’re working 
separately”. Interviewees C, I and F used the same metaphor to describe 
two sections “not singing from the same hymn sheet”. 
Communication: 
Interviewee H emphasised the importance of customer visits to the public 
enquiry counter, which are key opportunities to communicate directly. 
The same respondent pointed out that communication via the telephone 
would be more productive than correspondence. Interviewee M said that a 
lot of the information that customers were asked to supply was 
unnecessary and that many contacts could be avoided by applying a 
degree of leniency because “we shouldn’t be making them [[claimants]] 
jump through hoops”. Interviewee I was concerned that too much 
standardisation [[of the content of logging letters]] might be counter-
productive, while Interviewee A recommended the council’s overpayment 
invoices as examples of best practice in graphical communication. 
Interviewee A also maintained that the logging reminder letter that others 
had complained about could in fact be edited. The problem was that this 
would be a time-consuming exercise for the benefit assessors. 
Interviewee M said that staff from different sections needed to “talk to 
each other more because everybody has good ideas and sharing them 
could make things more streamlined”. There was a need to change the 
“them and us” mentality that affected the front line and back office. The 
corporate contact centre and public enquiry counter should be co-located. 
Team meetings were valuable but needed to be more structured.  
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Council A 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Contact Value: 
Interviewee B said there were legitimate reasons why claimants might 
have to make repeated contact with the council. They might need to 
contact another government department and sometimes “they have to go 
away and speak to somebody else to get information”. Interviewee I 
maintained that that some of the potentially avoidable contact was due to 
the complex nature of the benefits scheme and that “no matter how well 
we put across our documentation there are always going to be people who 
don’t understand”. 
Contact Value: 
Interviewee F said that some delays were unavoidable and attributable to 
third parties such as the Department for Work and Pensions and HM 
Revenues and Customs. Interviewee B explained that some repeat contact 
was necessary because the process was unavoidably complicated. “It is in 
the nature of housing benefits that there’s a lot of information to get in” 
(Interviewee J). 
Business Processes: 
Interviewee B described the pressures associated with varied and heavy 
workloads in the back office. These caused the staff to get agitated by 
requests for help from the front-line staff and might explain why they 
didn’t appear to give adequate consideration to their actions or to realise 
that the computer would do things (such as recalculating council tax 
instalments) in ways that were likely to upset customers. 
Business Processes: 
Interviewee B urged the organisation to look for the simplest and most 
effective way of dealing with things instead of trying to over-complicate 
them. For example, a simple complement slip could be enclosed to 
explain computer-produced letters or the staff could “simply put a note 
[[on the letters]] at the bottom of the page”. The same respondent 
suggested that it would help to improve the service “if somebody from 
council tax simply came up and sat with us [[in the contact centre]]”. 
Interviewee H made a similar point, that “[[putting back-office specialists 
on the front line]] would help by speeding up the process and getting 
information”. 
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Council A 
 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Quality: 
Interviewee C liked “the idea of a pre-assessment team keeping an eye on 
things” while Interviewee H appeared critical of the fact that “we’re 
having to check what the counter [[staff]] have asked for, because there 
may still be stuff [[information and evidence]] missing”. 
Quality: 
Interviewee H emphasised the need to gather information correctly and 
said that “they [[the customer services staff]] really just need to go 
through it [[the documentation]] and make sure it’s all there before they 
tell them [[the customers]] that they [[the claim forms]] are or are not 
complete”. 
Contact Resolution: 
Interviewee B was clear that customers were calling back because their 
enquiries were not being resolved on first contact. Interviewee M said 
“we’re having to write out once, twice, maybe three times for information 
– we’ve had several letters [[from customers]] complaining that “I have 
written to you three times” or “I have phoned you twice and still my 
problems haven’t been resolved”. On the other hand, Interviewee A 
agreed that there were a lot of repeat calls but maintained that “it is 
inevitable with things like providing proof of [[entitlement to]] housing 
benefits, because it is quite complicated” and “less of a one-stop thing”. 
Contact Resolution: 
Interviewee B stressed the importance of making sure that “all the 
information is taken at the first attempt” by dealing with any potential 
problems as they arise. Interviewee J emphasised the need to both get and 
give the right information while the customer is present at the public 
enquiry counter. The earliest possible involvement of experienced 
assessors was considered to be a key success factor (Interviewee J) and 
the relocation of council tax payers from one address to another appeared 
to be a model of best practice (Interviewee A). 
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Council A 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Attitudes: 
Interviewee I pointed out that “some people [[staff]] are uncomfortable in 
a customer service environment”. Interviewee C said that “they [[the 
back-office housing and council tax benefits assessors]] are too hard-
headed, rigid and inflexible” which was unnecessary and caused delays. 
Interviewee M reinforced this perception by commenting that “if they 
[[the assessors]] are asking for that information then that is the 
information that is needed”. It was conceded that external agencies such 
as the high street banks were not helpful people either (Interviewee C). 
Attitudes: 
 Interviewee H explained that dealing with customers on the front line 
would not appeal to everybody and that it was necessary to check during 
the recruitment process that job applicants were happy to do this sort of 
work. 
Knowledge: 
Interviewee C explained that the level of expertise in the customer 
services section was “dwindling” and this resulted in a lot of call-backs. 
The inadequacy of staff guidance was highlighted (Interviewee E) while 
Interviewee F asserted that staff were concerned because they were not 
fully trained “due to the training officer being involved in other important 
projects”. It was said that more staff, better training and more 
comfortable surroundings would help the section to retain experienced 
staff (Interviewee F). 
Knowledge: 
Interviewee K stressed the need for cross-training because “it would be 
good for people [[staff]] on the counter to see how a claim is assessed” 
and “it would be good for the assessors to see what it’s like on the 
[[public enquiry]] counter”. Interviewee C said that additional revenues 
and benefits training would “stop an awful lot of calls going through to 
the back office” and improve resolution on first contact because “85% of 
what they do is revenues and benefits”. Interviewee M wanted “training, 
training and more training” together with a dedicated training officer who 
can provide consistence advice for front and back-office staff. The same 
respondent highlighted the potential benefits of simple solutions such as 
laminated desk aids. 
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Resources: 
Four interviewees referred to lack of staffing resources in the customer 
services section. Interviewee B pointed to “a problem with the public 
enquiry counter because there are not enough staff to cover it” and 
expressed concern about the recent loss of more experienced staff. 
Interviewee C said “there are so few people here” and explained the 
difficulties associated with covering the roster with people who had 
adequate knowledge. Interviewee K highlighted difficulties with the 
document management system because of recruitment and retention 
problems in the administration section.  Several interviewees emphasised 
the apparent incongruity of having sufficient pre-assessment staff but too 
few assessors and customer services advisors (Interviewees K and F). 
Resources: 
Interviewee B highlighted the need for customer services staff to receive 
more training on the housing and council tax benefits scheme, as this 
would “stop some of the call-backs”. The same respondent wanted more 
benefits assessors instead of pre-assessors. Interviewee E also said that the 
customer services staff required more training and should be supported by 
“benefit assessors on the front line”. 
Targets: 
It emerged that the customer services staff felt pressured to do things 
quickly and that this resulted in errors or “things not being completed 
properly” that caused customers to phone back again later (Interviewee 
B). The 30 seconds speed of response target exacerbated this problem 
(Interviewee B).  
Targets: 
Interviewee B said that front-line staff dealing with customers should be 
encouraged to take their time and identify things that were about to go 
wrong, because this would reduce the need for customers to make 
additional contacts in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
282 
ANNEX 7 (CONTINUED) 
Council A 
 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Information Technology: 
The respondents had relatively little to say (either positive or negative) 
about the role of technology but Interviewee I pointed out the dangers 
associated with introducing technology without first reviewing existing 
systems, which could result in the integration of existing problems. 
However, the difficulty with logging letters highlighted above (and said 
by Interviewee A to be the principal cause of PAFID) does appear to be 
attributable to deficiencies in the revenues and benefits software 
application. 
Information Technology: 
Interviewee K was impressed with the new mobile technology (such as 
hand-held computers and digital cameras) that was becoming available, 
which would enable claims to be dealt with more efficiently. Interviewee 
I cautioned that it was important to understand what technology could do 
for you and adapt working procedures accordingly. 
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Communication: 
Assessment officers C and E, and manager D all highlighted the problem 
of communicating with an ethnically diverse population. English was 
rarely the customers’ first language and they didn’t understand the 
system-produced letters. Overpayment letters generated by Pericles [[the 
Revenues and Benefits computer application]] were especially 
problematical; even the staff did not understand them. Customers 
frequently queried benefit suspension letters and this indicated that 
officers were not complying with the instruction to communicate via the 
telephone.  
Assessment officer F also said that a lot of the information that customers 
were given was wrong, for example, they were asked to supply details 
they had already provided and different officers demanded different 
standards of evidence, leaving customers unsure about what was required. 
Assessment officer C said that staff were not told about problems with the 
Pericles system (e.g. delays in issuing replacement cheques) as a 
consequence of which customers were given false information that led to 
unnecessary contacts. 
 
Communication: 
Managers A, B and D and assessment officers C, E and F all said that 
fresh efforts should be made to promote the direct approach to contact 
resolution (i.e. using the telephone and meeting customers face-to-face). 
Officers should be discouraged from writing out unnecessarily and from 
sending out letters without first telephoning to explain decisions, but they 
should be encouraged to agree with customers when they would call back 
or visit, so that the same officers could deal with claims end-to-end.  
Assessment officer F suggested additional coaching for the staff who sent 
out the most letters, as they could be using the telephone and home visits 
would give them a better appreciation of the circumstances endured by 
claimants. Employing telephone operators would enable benefit officers 
to get on with assessments.  
Manager G emphasised the need to process claims on time and suggested 
pre-empting progress chasing calls by being proactive and providing 
reassurance to customers that claims were being dealt with. 
 
 
284 
ANNEX 7 (CONTINUED) Council B 
Examples of failure (what happened and why) Prevention (how it can be avoided) 
Business Processes: 
Manager B identified a potential conflict between the demands of end-to-
end working and the need to respond to customer demand. Manager D 
made a similar point, explaining that there were tensions between 
customer waiting times and contact resolution. In the local service 
centres, managers avoided unexpected queues by discouraging officers 
from getting bogged down in assessment work.  
Manager H explained that in the early 1990s assessment officers had their 
‘patches’, worked from paper before it was sent for scanning, and dealt 
with claims end-to-end. The consultants who led the systems-oriented 
performance improvement project ignored things that the council did well 
and insisting upon the adoption of strict new principles. For example, all 
work had to be done in date-of-receipt order to avoid ‘batch and queue’. 
Consequently, all documents were directed into one tray within the 
document management system and officers were encouraged to take them 
out one at a time – the outcome was problematical. Officers didn’t know 
what work they had, new claims were delayed, overpayments increased, 
subsidy was lost, incoming forms were not linked together and repeat 
contact increased as customers were asked to supply duplicates of missing 
items. Managers eventually reverted to distributing work with due regard 
to priorities and staff capabilities. 
 
Business Processes: 
Assessment officer E said that different local service centres appeared to 
be working in different ways and management should check that they 
were all using the same approach.  
Assessment officer F would revert to a system where each officer was 
responsible for a specific geographical locality, as it was a more personal 
service. Customers could deal with the same officer all the time. It was 
your patch so “the more you keep it up-to-date the better it is, you know 
the people and you work harder”. 
Manager A said that specialist units should be created to progress claims 
from asylum seekers, students and the self-employed. Similarly, 
assessment officer C said that the back office could reduce waste by 
making more appointments to resolve complex claims before they became 
problematical. 
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Quality: 
Manager D said that the system templates that were used to generate 
standard outgoing letters over-specified the requirements (i.e. ask for too 
much information) and led to unnecessary customer contacts.  
 
Quality: 
Manager D said that the systems-oriented review encouraged officers to 
speak to customers to get the correct information and make informed 
decisions, to telephone customers before sending letters and to arrange 
interviews where complex cases were unlikely to be resolved through 
correspondence. Specialists could be pulled-in if required. This built 
quality into the work, avoided quality checking at the end and prevented 
waste, such as overpayments and appeals. Manager G also commented 
upon the shift away from closing documents and toward higher-quality 
work (which meant “working in the way that we expect you to work”). 
Contact Resolution: 
Manager H said it was good that assessment officers were dealing with 
everything in the local service centres, there was more chance of getting 
things right first time, but she maintained that “the volume of work is now 
an issue”. Assessment officer E explained that high levels of resolution 
were achieved previously, when they only dealt with the value work. Now 
they had reverted to dealing with everything and see up to 160 people a 
day, they were conscious about waiting customers and took the 
paperwork to sort out later – a process that assessment officer E 
characterised as “take, keep, next person”. Manager G explained that a 
new claims pilot preceded the systems thinking review and the new 
claims pilot “really worked” because there was an appointments rota and 
customers saw staff who processed claims there and then. 
Contact Resolution: 
Assessment officers C, E and F and Managers D, G and H all spoke 
positively about the changes that emerged from the systems-oriented 
review. Assessment officer C said that “the end-to-end thing” was an 
improvement, staff were more proactive about contacting claimants and 
resolving queries, and some local service centers passed hardly anything 
to the back office. Assessment officer E said the new way of working was 
better and going out to the local service centres helped officers to realise 
that claimants were real people – but some officers refused to change. 
Assessment officer F said it was good to have assessment officers in the 
front line because some things (such as de-suspensions) could be resolved 
quickly, dealing with claims end-to-end was better as the customer had 
only one person to deal with, and customers were happier with the 
service. 
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Attitudes: 
Manager A attributed the problem [[high levels of potentially avoidable 
customer contact]] to the reluctance of some staff to establish direct 
contact with customers. They were not complying with the council’s 
instructions to use the telephone and meet the customers in the local 
service centres. 
Assessment officers E and F explained that some “old school” assessors 
sent out unnecessary letters asking for information that could be obtained 
online or they wrote to customers because it was the easy way out as “it 
gets the case out of your tray for a month”. 
Attitudes: 
Manager A said that formal written procedures might be needed to 
enforce the compliance of reluctant staff. 
 
Knowledge: 
Manager A said there was not enough time to resolve individual enquiries 
end-to-end because staff were being “pulled around”, i.e. constantly 
moved from the back office to the telephones and the local service 
centres. Manager A also said that productivity was being eroded by the 
loss of temporary staff who were provided with valuable skills on the 
Pericles system and then moved on. 
 
Knowledge: 
Manager H recommended putting more staff into the local service centres 
(so that work didn’t get referred to the back office) and using benefits 
trained staff on document intake as this would improve queue 
management. Manager H also speculated that output might be 
unacceptably low in the back office, as officers were able to work on 
individual cases until they were finished, and this might be unproductive. 
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Resources: 
Manager H said there were not enough assessment officers in the local 
service centres and they were not allocated enough space. Consequently, 
it was not physically possible to get things done while working in the 
front line. Managers D and G agreed about the lack of staffing resources 
but Manager G maintained that valuable assessment officer time was 
being “lost” to the telephones and the work that was being brought back 
from the local service centres. In Manager G’s opinion, the systems-
orientated changes had run into trouble because too many [human] 
resources were being shifted into the front line. 
Resources: 
Managers D, G and H all referred again to inadequate staffing resources. 
Manager D said that more staff in the front line would increase resolution 
rates there and reduce the pressure on the back office. It would be a 
mistake to confine staff to the back office because they would revert to 
“knocking out letters”.  
Manager H was concerned about the pressure on staff and hoped that new 
accommodation would enable the organisation to pool resources in order 
to deal with things such as council tax and overpayments. 
Information Technology: 
Assessment officer F said there were not enough telephone extensions 
and officers used this as an excuse to send letters. Outgoing letters gave 
assessment officers’ extension numbers but getting through to the council 
was still “a nightmare” because the telephone system fails to recognise 
valid numbers. Assessment officer F explained that it was normal to ring 
several times and then get connected to the wrong extension. 
Information Technology: 
Assessment officer C suggested providing front-line staff with system 
support on Pericles with facilities such as overpayments 
Manager B explained that new arrangements for handling telephone calls 
had evolved into a contact centre solution. 
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Communication: 
Eight of the respondents identified problems with computer-produced 
notifications and letters. A customer services officer said that “a large 
percentage of telephone calls are from customers querying notifications”. 
A senior assessment officer said that customers had to contact the council 
for clarification because the notification letters were “bewildering and 
confusing”. An assessment officer said that “most of the repeat contact is 
caused by the notification letters, they look like till receipts”. It was said 
that the computer system produces three letters per period and one 
customer received 132 letters in one batch. The council expected 
claimants to check key details such as income and capital on the 
notification letters but even the assessment officers didn’t understand 
them. A customer services officer said that new notification letters had 
been introduced “but the old ones were clearer”. There appeared to be a 
consensus that the notification letters needed a lot more work doing on 
them. Respondents also expressed concern about system-produced further 
information letters, which were described as “a major problem”. A 
customer services officer said that these letters did not adequately explain 
what it was that the council required because “assessors forget customers’ 
needs and do not edit the letters to make them more understandable”. An 
assessment officer said “customers don’t understand the letters so they 
don’t produce the right information”. 
Communication: 
Four respondents referred to an over-reliance on standard paragraphs in 
computer-produced template letters. They said that staff needed to invest 
more time in drafting and editing these letters so that they explained the 
council’s requirements more clearly. References to the cessation of 
ongoing payments and threats about cancellation should be removed 
where they were not appropriate. Some training was necessary because 
standards of literacy varied widely and the council should test for literacy 
skills during the recruitment process. Strong feelings were expressed 
regarding the computer-produced notification letters. An assessment 
officer said they were “a long running joke” while a senior assessment 
officer said “the new ones are more rubbish than the old ones”.  
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Communication: 
Service delivery had moved away from personal contact with claimants 
and toward the use of correspondence, which was not very effective when 
many claimants lacked literacy skills or were vulnerable and needed 
support. A senior assessment officer explained that assessors were 
supposed to be telephoning customers to explain their requirements “there 
was a big push to promote this about a year ago” but telephone usage had 
tailed-off and even call-backs were done by the telephone team. A 
customer services officer explained that “a lot of assessment officers 
don’t like to make telephone calls to customers, so it doesn’t get done” 
while another said “some assessment officers are scared of claimants” and 
preferred to write.  
A senior assessment officer said that customer services officers attempted 
to explain the council’s requirements to claimants but different benefits 
assessors adopted different standards and this meant that front-line staff 
could not give definitive answers. Another respondent confirmed that 
assessment officers required differing standards of information and 
evidence (some are more strict than others) so customer services staff 
might think that documents are OK but could not be sure. A similar but 
wider point was made about inconsistent advice: a lot of potentially 
avoidable contact was said to be caused by different officers giving 
customers different information. 
Communication: 
There was general agreement that the council needed to increase the 
amount of direct contact between customers and assessment officers. 
Some respondents said that assessment officers needed to telephone 
claimants instead of writing because “telephoning is productive as 
assessment officers can ask about anomalies on claims”. A manager said 
that the section had always resisted the contact centre approach but still 
thought that the telephone was a medium that could be used to pre-empt 
unnecessary calls through ‘positive contact’, i.e. contacting people with 
council tax arrears before they got into even deeper trouble. 
 
Staff needed additional training as assessment officers because public 
service officers and the telephone team didn’t always give or collect the 
right information. The quality of the messages from the telephone team to 
the assessment officers needed to be improved, as they were occasionally 
unhelpful and missed key information. 
The council needed a simple message for customers about the information 
that they had to provide to support a claim. Customer services staff 
needed to be very clear from the outset about what customers had to 
produce and they should go through the checklist very carefully. 
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Business Processes: 
A senior assessment officer pointed out a fundamental tension between 
two conflicting policies. An earlier way of working sought to detach 
customers from individual assessment officers and teams, giving 
assessment officers a degree of anonymity. Previously, the customer 
services teams were intended to protect assessment officers from 
unnecessary customer contact, so that they could concentrate on clearing 
a backlog of work that existed at that time. The respondent said that the 
backlog had been cleared and there was no longer any need for the 
customer services buffer, which “delays things enormously”. Again, it 
was said that the office was set-up for busier times when there were 
backlogs but “things have remained unchanged for some considerable 
time and become antiquated”. Another respondent made a similar point: 
assessment officers were supposed to have ownership of cases but 
customer contact was still handled by a layer of customer services staff, 
so many queries were passed back instead of being resolved by 
assessment officers first time. 
 
Business Processes: 
The service needed a dramatic overhaul of its working methods and had a 
great opportunity to make these changes while it was so up-to-date. They 
could be presented as adaptations to the changing requirements of the 
Local Housing Allowance scheme. 
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Business Processes: 
Customers were passed back and forth between the housing benefits and 
council tax teams. The benefits telephone team said they tried to resolve 
council tax enquiries but the council tax team did not reciprocate. 
Apparently the council tax staff were on a higher salary scale because 
they made decisions about money. 
Drop-in interviews were problematical because assessment officers did 
not know what was coming and could not prepare. The system was said to 
be more about queue management during peak periods than it was about 
contact resolution. Even scheduled interviews often didn’t go to plan as 
the information provided in advance was sometimes incorrect or 
incomplete. 
The council got information about some claimants’ changes of 
circumstances directly from the DWP and landlords. The claimants 
provided the same information but the council did not discourage this 
contact because it could cause confusion about the need to notify changes. 
Customers provided information via the telephone but were then required 
to confirm it in writing. Some claimants obtained application forms 
online or from partner organisations, so their enquiries about the council’s 
requirements might not be attributable to previous failures. 
Business Processes: 
There should be closer working relationships between the revenues and 
benefits sections. Benefits staff currently knew little about council tax and 
it was easier to transfer these calls as it was “a bit of a grey area”. Within 
benefits, closer working between different teams would be advantageous. 
For example, everybody should agree on a policy regarding the treatment 
of information and evidence, and then stick to it. 
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Contact Resolution: 
At one time, the telephone team was only required to give and receive 
information. Now, they needed to be trained to assessment officer level so 
that they could resolve the contacts generated by the calls they handled 
[or the seniors could do the updating while somebody else supported the 
telephone team]. This was how the council tax telephone team worked but 
the practice did not extend to housing and council tax benefits. 
Contact Resolution: 
The telephone team needed the thirteen-week induction training course 
too, as that would cut down on the number of unresolved contacts. 
Reception gets a lot of people coming in who have been misinformed by 
the telephone team. The telephone team was expected to answer the same 
enquiries as the reception team but they got paid less. 
Attitudes: 
Some staff couldn’t relate to the “private sector stuff” all that well. Not 
everybody was signed up to the concept of treating claimants as 
‘customers’. In the public sector the customer was not always right, 
councils couldn’t always give them what they wanted, and staff didn’t get 
bonuses and free Christmas lunches. 
Customers who had experienced delays in the past were accustomed to 
chasing the benefits service in order to get things done. Similarly, some 
customers did not use the postal service (i.e. the mail) because previous 
experience had taught them that these items might not be dealt with 
promptly by the council. 
Customers were provided with explicit instructions but then did not do as 
requested. Some customers just liked to come into the office to maintain 
contact. 
Attitudes: 
An open-plan public service area was desirable, as this would transform 
staff attitudes to customer contact. Staff on the floor dealing with 
customers would absorb a lot of the off remit and low-value work, 
keeping these customers out of the queues and enabling specialists to 
focus on the value work. There would be no additional revenue costs 
because of the resources released by the closure of the satellite office. 
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Knowledge: 
It was said that telephone advisors were not trained to the same level as 
assessment officers and did not have the same level of understanding, 
which created tension between assessors and advisors. A senior 
assessment officer said that trainees were not taught how to resolve 
customer enquiries. Consequently, inconsistent procedures emerged 
during subsequent periods of on-the-job training. The officer explained 
that there was a lack of process and monitoring around call handling. In 
the private sector detailed processes were developed and documented, 
then a proportion of calls were monitored so that staff could be provided 
with feedback. A customer services officer pointed out that there was a 
central source for office procedures but nobody relied on them because 
they were not kept up-to-date. 
Knowledge: 
If a reduction in preventable contact reduced the workload on telephone 
team, the opportunity should be taken to have fewer but better paid 
telephone staff, as they had higher levels of knowledge than their current 
job specifications required. 
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Resources: 
The slow down in recruitment, combined with shutting the satellite office 
and the constant influx of people into the city, was expected to put 
additional pressure on front-line services. It might translate into more 
unnecessary contact and even less contact resolution, but a reduction in 
potentially avoidable contact could enable the service to absorb the 
increased pressure. The closure of the satellite office was said to be 
“appalling for the customers”. 
Some housing and council tax benefits staff qualified for housing benefits 
themselves and this suggested that they were under-paid. 
Resources: 
Benefits were complex and the council needed sufficient numbers of 
trained assessors in the public service area and on the telephones. Putting 
all reception and telephone staff on the same grade would pay for itself 
via increased flexibility and reduced hand-offs. Telephone staff wanted 
this opportunity and would be willing to do some assessment type work. 
This would enable management to get the best out of everybody. 
If a reduction in preventable contact reduced the workload on telephone 
team, the opportunity should be taken to have fewer but better paid 
telephone staff, as they had higher levels of knowledge than their current 
job specifications required. 
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Complexity: 
The council’s benefits claim forms were too long and complex, customers 
got confused and didn’t understand what was required and this caused 
additional contact. 
The benefits system was inherently complex and dynamic. Consequently, 
customers did not understand the council’s requirements. Staff were 
constantly adapting to centrally imposed changes and it was difficult for 
them to keep up-to-date, let alone explain the situation to customers. 
Customer services staff were unlikely to give correct information in 
inherently complex cases involving, for example, the self-employed and 
students. These cases almost inevitably resulted in repeat visits but this 
was partly attributable to the customers. Assessment officers didn’t know 
enough about overpayments to resolve enquiries and had to refer 
customers to specialist colleagues. 
The population of the city was multi-cultural, so there were a lot of 
language related problems and people from abroad were not familiar with 
the benefits system. Many claimants were vulnerable and had problems 
with literacy and communication. 
Complexity: 
Three respondents said the benefit claim forms should be simpler and 
clearer. The contents should be expressed in plain English, guidance 
about the production of information and evidence should be improved, the 
first few pages consisted of an off-putting “double page essay” and the 
checklist at the end was excessive. Customers did not subsequently 
remember which changes of circumstances they should notify to the 
council. A step-by-step guide for claimants, explaining the process and 
where they were in it, would help to reduce progress chasing and 
encourage valuable contact. 
 
 
 
- Ends - 
